Showing posts with label #Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #Ukraine. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 24, 2023

The Noisy Death of Russian Imperialism




Nothing will bring an end to the Russian empire more than an accurate historical accounting of the subjugation of its colonized nationalities.  Truth has the power to undermine governments and armies and the myths that these rely on for power.

Russia will not cease to exist but its empire will.

Botakoz Kassymbekova, Assistant Professor of modern history at the University of Basel, describes the Western mindset that failed to recognize the imperial subjugation of nationalities under Russian domination, especially the brutal oppression under the USSR.  

Russia’s war under Putin is a manifestation of a dying empire.


How Western Scholars Overlooked Russian Imperialism

"When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, discussions emerged about the imperial nature of the war. Scholars who spoke up about it were quickly dismissed in certain Western academic and political circles.

Some, especially the self-professed “anti-imperialists”, claimed Russia was “provoked” and portrayed Ukraine’s resistance as a “Western imperial” plot. Others considered analyses of Russian imperialism as having a pro-war, hawkish agenda or being a reflection of narrow ethno-nationalist sentiments.

But for scholars from the post-Soviet space – from places that have suffered from Russian aggression and imperialism – these reactions were hardly a surprise. They had been ignored and dismissed before.

Discussions of Russian imperialism have long been overlooked while American, British and French imperialisms have been studied closely and thoroughly. This has much to do with how Western academia and to a certain extent political elites have chosen to approach the Soviet Union and its eventual dissolution.

From empire to a ‘union’

Russian imperial ambitions date back to the 16th century when the Grand Principality of Moscow, or Muscovy, proclaimed itself the third Rome, the successor of the Byzantine Empire and protector of all Orthodox Christians.

The Russian imperial army fought numerous wars in the east, west and south, and by the mid-19th century, Russia had become the largest land empire. Along with the British, Austro-Hungarian and French empires, it understood and presented itself as a European colonial power.

Following the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the end of the Russian monarchy and Russian imperialism, but they fought brutally to preserve the Russian imperial borders. They reconquered newly formed independent states, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which emerged after the collapse of the Russian Empire.

In the early 1930s, Joseph Stalin embraced Russian nationalism based on the old imperial myth of the greatness of the Russian people. Bolshevik Moscow made ethnic Russians the most privileged group in the Soviet Union and sent Russian settlers to populate and control non-Russian regions.

Purging native leaders, forcefully resettling entire ethnic groups and creating conditions that led to mass deaths were all part of Soviet colonisation. Non-Russian people’s cultures, languages and histories were disparaged while Russification was presented as enlightenment.

At the same time, the Soviet Union adopted a progressive narrative of enfranchising nations conquered by the Russian Empire and giving them national rights within the Soviet Union. Many in Western academia bought into the anti-colonial narrative Moscow was trying to sell because they took official proclamations at face value and wanted to believe in the story of communist anti-imperialism.

Indeed, the Bolsheviks eliminated the tsarist aristocracy, and the people who took power were of diverse backgrounds. Stalin, for example, was an ethnic Georgian who spoke Russian with an accent.

For many Western scholars, that apparently meant that he was leading a post-colonial state. By focusing on individuals and official proclamations, Western academia too often overlooked the fact that Stalin was obsessed with maintaining Russian imperial borders and had adopted the same toolkit – ethnic cleansing, crushing dissent, destroying national movements, privileging Russian ethnicity and culture – that tsarist Russia used to maintain them.

Soviet coloniality was dismissed also because knowledge about the Soviet Union in the West was Russocentric. The Soviet Union was often referred to simply as Russia. There was little knowledge about non-Russian people. Non-Russian émigrés who fled to the West and wrote about Soviet coloniality with firsthand experience of Soviet imperialism were dismissed as anti-Soviet conservative ideologues.

Importantly, the Soviet Union also became a space of projections for those who looked for ways to criticise capitalism and Western imperialism. Those who blamed capitalism for oppression believed that eliminating capitalism would end all forms of oppression. For them, the Soviet Union was an internationalist project that brought equality and freedom to formerly subjugated peoples.

Violence against various nations and ethnic groups was either ignored or treated as a necessary evil of the transition to communism.

Western scholarship also overwhelmingly focused on the Soviet metropoles – Moscow and Leningrad. They knew very little, if at all, about the Soviet peripheries, which meant that nobody really understood the uprisings in Central Asia, the Caucasus or the Baltics from the late 1980s onwards or the bloodshed in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and later Chechnya.

As Ronald Gregor Suny, historian of Soviet imperial nation-building, noted in a 2017 interview, “Before the late 1980s, no one cared about non-Russians. Sovietology and Soviet studies [were] about the centre and the top – who was standing where on the Kremlin, on the mausoleum, and so forth.”

The generation of scholars who started studying the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s were also shaped by their firsthand experience of the country. When they travelled as foreign students to Moscow, they found impoverished people. Empty shelves and pervasive poverty made Russians look like victims of the Soviet regime, and financially, Soviet Moscow seemed more like a European periphery than an imperial metropole, which they associated with material affluence.

Dissolution without decolonisation

The wave of decolonisation in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, which started after World War II, was accompanied by rigorous academic discussions and scholarship of colonial legacies and tools of violence.

By contrast, the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union did not result in similar scrutiny of the Russian imperial legacy.

For metropolitan Western Europe and the United States, Europe stood for metropolitanism – a place from which the world was colonised, not a place of colonisation. Accepting colonial history within Europe made little sense, so the colonial nature of Russia remained unchallenged.

In Russia itself, the dominant narrative was one of victimhood. Russians learned to see themselves as a special nation that sacrificed its own wellbeing for the sake of non-Russians in the Soviet Union. “Let us stop feeding them” was the slogan Russians used to explain Moscow’s decision to let the colonies go in 1991.

In the West, the collapse of the Soviet Union came as a shock. Many – both in academia and politics – liked Mikhail Gorbachev and saw him as a hero, a man of peace. They approved of his reforms, which spurred a new era of freedom of speech.

Gorbachev was soft, open and democratic in his communication and seemed like a good partner for the next few decades. The United States was even willing to offer him assistance to reform the country; US policy was against Soviet disintegration.

This is how late Professor Mark von Hagen recalled in 2016 the political atmosphere back then: “Again, George Bush … was defending Gorbachev until the very last possible moment because he and the United States government at that level, with a few dissenting voices, wanted to keep the Soviet Union together because they were so afraid of the kind of crazy, fascist nationalism that they thought the Ukrainians represented.”

Indeed, this Western fear of chaos, bloodshed and even nuclear incidents led to the perception of independence movements within the former Soviet space as expressions of destructive ethno-nationalism rather than a natural progression of an empire collapsing.

At the same time, since the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was organised centrally by Moscow, it made the question of imperial oppression obsolete in the minds of Western observers. The idea that the Soviet Union was an internationalist experiment continued to stick, and its collapse was seen as this experiment simply expiring.

Many Western historians perceived it not as a regime that erased diverse polities and national movements, but as a political project that created and developed nations. This is highly problematic not only because it ignores the history of national movements that took place prior to the Bolshevik takeover but also goes contrary to the idea of a nation being formed on the basis of popular legitimacy.

Still there were exceptions. Influential works by historians like Ronald Grigor Suny (The Revenge of the Past) and Andreas Kappeler (Russia as a Multinational Empire) have pointed to the violent Bolshevik policies towards colonised nations and their resistance. Others like von Hagen (Does Ukraine Have a History?) and Timothy Snyder (Bloodlands) who have written from the point of view of the colonised were able to properly predict and warn of historical continuities and dangers still posed by Russia today for these nations.

What the myth of the Soviet Union as a nation-builder did was promote in the West the idea that Russia has a sphere of influence, a “backyard”, where it has the right to intervene.

That is why Western academia and political circles had little to say about the genocidal wars Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, led in Chechnya. Rather than seeing people claiming sovereignty and nationhood, the West readily bought into their portrayals of Chechens as bandits, nationalists and terrorists. That is why they also failed to see Russian imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe – the 2008 war on Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, etc – as such.

There has already been some recognition that mistakes were made. As Professor Susan Smith-Peter recently commented: “As scholars of Russia, we need to undertake a searching moral inventory to see the ways in which we have taken the Russian state’s point of view as a default. Have we in any way taken part in the glorification of the Russian state that Putin has taken to a pathological extreme? Has our field participated in casting Ukraine as a state without history in our own way?“

Indeed, it has. And it is time to correct that.

To understand Russia, one needs to listen to those who lived under Russian colonial rule. To understand former and current Russian colonies, one needs to listen to historians from these places and study their cultures, languages and histories, both written and unwritten. To appreciate the ways out of colonial dictatorships, one needs to study the successful transformations of states like Ukraine. This would require dismissing the myth of the “artificial nation” and finally seeing Russia as an empire."

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Wednesday, April 29, 2020

The Tightening MH17 Noose Around the Throat of Putin

                                                                                                                        photo credit

No need to add anything to this.  Bellingcat has again done a superb job of bringing to light the facts about the shooting down of Malaysia Flight MH17 over Ukraine by Russia, as summarized below by The Times.  The conclusion is inescapable that the BUK’s presence—and therefore the shooting down of MH17--in Ukraine was authorized by Russia officials and could not have happened without the consent if not the instruction of Putin.

Sanctions against Russia should not be lifted until the final determination of culpability for shooting down MH17 has been determined, and additional sanctions should be imposed if Russia continues to attempt to interfere in the investigations and judicial proceedings.

 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-spy-chief-is-potential-suspect-in-downing-of-mh17-jwqcxxrct

Saturday, December 16, 2017

Why I Am Optimistic About Ukraine

http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/12/16/why-i-am-optimistic-about-ukraine/

Article by: Dirk Mattheisen
Buffeted by rapacious oligarchs and invasion by Russia, Ukraine seems an unlikely success story. However, renewed economic growth is fueling a growing sense of optimism and of opportunity. There are a few things getting in the way. But first the good news.
Ukraine’s economy is projected to grow 2.0% this year and then accelerate to 3.5% in 2018 and 4.0% in 2019, driven by a steady growth in consumption of 3% per year and in exports of 1.6% in 2017, 3% in 2018 and 5% in 2019 (recent government estimates of growth are slightly lower but still very similar). Already in 2017 exports to the EU in the first nine months are up 29.1%, which indicates the rapid pace at which Ukraine is taking advantage of access to EU markets). The business press is full of stories about new businesses and investment opportunities, including highly innovative, internationally competitive startups, such as Google’s Grammarly, which was developed by two Ukrainian entrepreneurs in Kyiv, as well as countless “locally-grown” tech startups and micro-enterprises. There is constant chatter about fashion and advertising video shoots in Kyiv, including the recent Apple Watch 3 video, adding cultural flair to the economic momentum.
Ukraine Finance Minister Oleksandr Danyliuk said all the right things in September in the lead up to the World Bank/IMF annual meetings. He pointed to the government’s tough measures to stabilize the economy with the support of a US$17.5b IMF program. He also emphasized the seriousness of the government’s efforts to improve the business climate, such as in tax and customs administration for which Ukraine had hired an international consultancy firm to help run an anti-corruption program and invited the US, Germany, EU, EBRD, and Canada to sit on the supervisory board to ensure the program was not derailed. Danyliuk emphasized that many reforms had been instituted, but it was also now important for the people to feel the effect through improved living standards by not just eliminating high-level corruption but of eliminating petty day-to-day corruption.
However, despite the optimistic outlook, Ukraine needs to take advantage of this period to restructure its domestic economy.  Failure to restructure will slow growth and diminish overall economic prospects.
For example, the World Bank estimates that reforming land ownership laws alone could lift economic growth by 1.5%. This is critical because, as welcome as 4% GDP growth may be, Ukraine has to grow faster for people to feel, as Danyliuk emphasized, a meaningful impact on their well-being. At $2,200, Ukraine’s GDP per capita is roughly a quarter of Russia’s (though more equitably distributed) and among the lowest of the former Soviet republics; to counter Russia’s existential threat to the country, Ukraine needs to increase GDP per capita by several orders of magnitude to demonstrate that its economic model can deliver benefits comparable to other countries.
Ultimately, Ukraine needs to aspire to be a regional economic power in its own right, which would be good for Ukraine and for Europe–nothing would supercharge Ukrainian and EU economic growth like welcoming into the EU 40m talented people with an impressive endowment in resources and a strategic geographic position.
To visualize Ukraine’s economic potential, compare its GDP of about $93 bn to Poland’s GDP of about $480 bn with roughly half the area of Ukraine and the same population. Twenty-five years of serious economic reform separate Polish GDP from Ukraine’s. A more serious effort by Ukraine is necessary to make up the difference in a shorter period of time. As Poland shows, economic growth does not solve all the problems, but it is an essential start.
To make that happen, Ukraine has to get a grip on pervasive corruption that is fueled by lack of respect for the law, ineffective law enforcement and widespread self-interest over civic interest in government and business. Rule of law was the core of the 2014 Revolution of Dignity which, despite substantial progress, remains an aspiration.
Above all, reform has to be credible.
Liberalizing the land market is useless without a reliable cadastral system and market transparency that prevents raiding and speculation. Judicial reform is useless if incompetent or corrupt officials continue to be appointed. The recent appointment of 25 judges with histories of questionable decisions and improbable wealth undermines reform. Criminal charges against public officials, such as those against Ukraine’s General Prosecutor, Yuriy Lutsenko, need to be prosecuted in accordance with the highest legal standards and not subverted by legal artifice that fails to hold wrongdoers accountable. Lack of progress will erode vital international support (as evidenced by the recent halt due to unfulfilled anti-corruption conditions in the EU’s macro-financialassistance program and a slowed IMF program).
Political reform is integral to ending corruption and achieving economic success.
For reform to work, the political process has to serve society’s needs. It can’t if the political and economic elite, including President Poroshenko and members of his government, behave as in the past. The reformists can try to wait out the entrenched interests, risking that the reform process will peter out; or, they can find ways to breath additional life into the process.
Civic activism is essential; and entrenched interests have to support the reform process, which may require some form of selective amnesty for economic crimes committed before the Revolution of Dignity, which these interests fear will expose them to prosecution, and a commitment that they not stand in the way of or undermine further reform. Entrenched interests will not disappear, but they must be made to fall in line.
Timing is crucial. The 2019 presidential election is warming up. It can be a watershed moment in surmounting corruption. President Poroshenko has been effective in leading the economic stabilization program with the IMF and in introducing many of the needed reforms. His resolute defense of Ukraine internationally and support for association with the EU has elevated recognition in the West of Ukraine as a democratic nation distinct and separate from Russia.
However, he has also failed to live up to personal commitments as president, including putting his extensive business interests ahead of the national interest by forming a blind trust; many of his businesses are held in offshore corporations of the type that are used by oligarchs to hide assets and avoid taxes. Extraordinarily wealthy individuals fuel corruption if not checked by law, and they have yet to yield or share power in Ukraine with the next generation of business, government and political leaders who will build the new Ukrainian society. The 2019 election is a good moment for anti-corruption and political reform not just to be declared but to become real in order to unleash the rewards of reform.
Otherwise, popular frustration may overflow. Although recent pro-reform protests in Kyiv fronted by Georgian political activist Mikheil Saakashvili have been small—in part due to the seeming self-interest of its most prominent sponsors, Saakashvili and Yulia Tymoshenko, there is still widespread impatience with the slow pace of reform.
Though the protests have been small, the political risk is not. The “impeach Poroshenko” protest, again led by Saakashvili, is a portent of worse to come if reform is derailed. Public unhappiness will grow, especially if the politically unpopular Porochenko continues to provoke friction with highhanded political assaults on Saakashvili and other opponents and backroom maneuvers to enforce his control of the government. The focus needs to be on advancing anti-corruption and economic reforms and upholding the rule of law, including in politics. Messy disputes (such as this) between anti-corruption authorities and security services and mutual claims of corruption don’t help.
For all the risks, the promise of change is irreversible. Ukrainian society is no longer capable of sliding back into conformity and submission. Ukraine’s transformation into a more just and inclusive society is in its early stages but even now entrenched interests cannot contain Ukrainian society’s new aspirations nor its new economic promise.
Fundamentally, what distinguishes Ukraine is not its historic association with Russia. Cast between competing empires (and sometimes known as the borderlands), Ukraine has a powerful egalitarian tradition based on the independent-minded Cossack warrior-farmer (reviled during Russian-dominated Soviet times as kulaks). This tradition is a distinct cultural identifier setting Ukrainian society apart from a more hierarchical and authoritarian Russian society, something Stalin understood as a threat and attempted to extinguish through state-sponsored genocide in the 1930s.
Completing the key reforms today will transform Ukraine into a democratic nation and an economic power in Europe. In the future, when one speaks of Ukraine–a strong European nation at the heart of a unified Europe—one will be able to say that it’s democratic institutions were formed on its distinctive traditions that Russian imperialism failed to crush and on the renewed vitality of its civil society.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Do Sanctions Against Russia Work (Continued)?

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Following my article in Euromaidan Press, Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?, the New York Post has a good article in the same vein entitled When Sanctions Work--And Why They Fail.  To be clear, the author, Ralph Peters, writes that sanctions against Russia are working and should be continued (while he argues sanctions against North Korea and Iran are another story).  He writes regarding sanctions against Russia (underlining added),

"Contrary to counter-factual claims, economic sanctions imposed on Russia after successive invasions of its neighbors have had a profound effect ...Sanctions have bitten Russia for two reasons.  First, they coincided felicitously with a global collapse in energy prices.  Putin’s economic monoculture relies on income from gas and oil exports.  The double-whammy of cheap gas and Western sanctions hit Russia hard, causing Putin to pause his war in Ukraine and now to cut his defense budget.  But the second reason is that even Putin has to answer to his people at some level. And while Russia’s been under sanctions, the poverty rate doubled, inflation soared, pensions declined dramatically in real value and trade collapsed.  For months, Russian newspapers insisted that there was no shortage of medicines — which told Russia-watchers there were medicine shortages.  Sanctions alone won’t bring Putin down, but they’ve imposed a painful cost for his bad behavior.  As evidence mounts of Russian attempts to subvert our democracy, it would be wanton capitulation to remove the sanctions now"
He writes as well,
"...in Russia sanctions are frustrating Putin’s hostile ambitions, crippling his ability to modernize his military machine. Discontent is deepening, if slowly: The old maxim that Russians unite in their suffering breaks down when Russians see their leaders and favored oligarchs leading lives of unprecedented opulence."
As I wrote in my original post, sanctions have had a substantial impact in containing Russia aggression--Moscow does not dictate what Kyiv's domestic and international polices should be, its hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, its dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead, sanctions are responsible for 1.5% to 6% of Russia's economic decline, and Russia's prospects for significant economic growth are dim.

There was one point though that I failed to make in my original article that is echoed by Ralph Peters when he writes that sanctions are a tool not a stand-alone solution.  Sanctions are essential to tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine, but the real reason Ukraine has been able to stand up to Russia's aggression is because its civil society would not submit to intimidation and violence by either the corrupt Yanukovych government or by Putin's Russia, and because of the stubborn, valorous defense of Ukraine by its armed volunteer brigades and military.  As long as Ukrainian society stands firm, Russia has little prospect of achieving its aims, and sanctions are an essential aid in helping Ukraine remain a free and independent nation.   However, even now, Ukraine's civil society and its military continue to suffer daily from Russian aggression.  So far in 2017, 21 civilians have been killed and 95 wounded in daily fighting with Russian-led forces along the line of contact with the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  In March alone the Ukrainian military suffered 27 killed and 189 wounded.  Russia's aggression toward Ukraine and other countries is reason to sustain and expand sanctions until Russia reverses its behavior.  As both Ralph Peters and I write, sanctions take time but they are taking a heavy toll on Russia and in time Ukrainian resolve and sanctions will end Russia aggression.


Thursday, December 29, 2016

Privatbank

http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/12/29/nationalization-of-privatbank-a-promising-chapter-in-ukrainian-reforms/#arvlbdata
Article by: Dirk Mattheisen
The nationalization on December 18 of Privatbank, Ukraine’s largest bank by assets, opens a new and promising chapter in the reform of Ukraine.
Privatbank’s nationalization due to a slow boiling insolvency crisis that threatened to undermine Ukraine’s financial system was a necessary and overdue measure to stabilize Ukraine’s financial system given the size of Privatbank, which holds about 20% (or US$10.3 b) of Ukraine’s banking assets, even if it’s recapitalization puts additional pressure on the national budget. The cost to the state of nationalization will be partially offset through a “bail-in” of bondholders, but the principal burden will still fall on taxpayers.
The public guarantee of Privatbank’s deposits, amounting to about a third of total Ukrainian deposits, was also necessary to prevent a run on the bank. The other two systemically important banks identified by the Ukrainian Treasury–Oschadbank and Ukreximbank–are already government owned.
Privatbank, though, highlights as almost nothing else can, the depth of financial and economic mismanagement and corruption by Ukraine’s old guard political and business elite that reformers in the current government are struggling to uproot.
As detailed in several blistering articles in BNE Intellinews (including here and here), Privatbank’s owners, oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Hennadiy Boholyubov, used the bank, as BNE describes it, to “vacuum up” ordinary Ukrainian’s savings and use those savings as collateral to obtain loans for themselves and other closely related parties. BNE reports,
“The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) found that a massive 97% of the bank’s loans had been made to shell companies, many of them offshore, that are believed to be owned by the bank’s oligarch owners.” BNE estimates that “around 90% of the Privatbank loan book comprises loans to related parties, mostly shell firms linked to the [Kolomoisky’s] fuel trading business.”
Much of the money that left Privatbank was transferred overseas, enabled by correspondent banks in Austria and Luxemburg, as well as intermediaries in Cyprus and shell companies in the UK. Without the help of institutions and individuals in developed countries, the drain on the Ukrainian financial system could not have taken place, once again highlighting the role of the developed world in enabling corruption in the developing world. The offshore correspondent banks were often not shady fly-by-night financial institutions, but venerable banks, such as the Vienna’s Bank Winter that has operated as a private wealth management bank since 1892. How the scheme to transfer Ukrainian wealth offshore worked is worth quoting from BNE;
“The back-to-back funding scheme worked thus: Ukrainian banks placed depositors’ funds with the Alpine banks, and the Ukrainian bank shareholders received loans from the Alpine banks using their depositors’ funds as collateral. The shareholders then used at least part of these loans to recapitalize their banks, another part they simply moved offshore.
There is no reason to believe that PrivatBank’s arrangement with the niche Alpine banks was any different to that of around a dozen smaller brethren. Since 2011 up to 10 Ukrainian banks were reportedly involved in a scheme of siphoning of assets, where money was said to be unlawfully withdrawn by the owners and/or insiders of the insolvent Ukrainian banks through correspondent accounts of different banks incorporated in EU.”
What is extraordinary is that Ukraine may never recover the domestic or foreign-held money because it does not have adequate fiduciary laws and enforcement resources to protect savers from the likes of Kolomoyskyi and Bolholyubov.
With the nationalization of Privatbank, and the closure of over 80 smaller banks over the last couple of years by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), as well as tightening of regulations and oversight, led by reformist head Valeriya Hontareva, Ukraine has taken a major step in reforming its financial sector and ensuring its stability. Governance problems remain, including that the four largest banks are now government owned, limiting the opportunity to diversify the financial system and invigorate private sector investment. The four largest banks have assets of about US$25.5 bn and account for about half the banking sector. Ukraine is reported to intend to re-privatize Privatbank but privatization of any government-owned bank may be a long way off. The largest private bank, Raiffeisen Bank Aval, has a capitalization of only US$1.9 bn —a fifth that of Privatbank — so how to generate sufficient private capital to invest in banking is unclear.
Through schemes such as Privatbank, economic mismanagement and, most importantly, rampant corruption, had catastrophic consequences for the Ukrainian economy and for the Ukrainian people. The control of Ukraine’s financial resources by a small number of individuals, who offshored the gains and invested only to their own business interests limited productive investment in Ukraine and distorted the efficient allocation of capital to the advantage of those few individuals who reaped a disproportionate share of any economic gains. In other words, they stole it.
Ukrainian 2016 nominal GDP per capita is less than a quarter of Russia’s, and a sixth of Poland’s, which is roughly comparable to Ukraine in terms of economic potential. There is no economic basis for Ukraine’s poverty other than pervasive corruption such as that practiced by Privatbank.
To be sure, Russian aggression and economic interference have had a devastating impact as well but, in Ukraine’s first 25 years of independence, mismanagement and the capture and transfer of wealth out of Ukraine on the scale seen with Privatbank has been the primary impediment to sustainable economic growth and the distribution of economic benefits to the people of Ukraine. The local criminal with his hand in Ukrainians’ pockets has been more destructive than the neighboring criminal with a gun to Ukraine’s head.
Over the last two years, President Porochenko has delivered stability and the necessary reforms to keep the essential IMF support program from slipping off the rails, but the outlook is shaky for the 2018 elections because he and many others have one foot still lodged in the old school, pre-Maidan oligarch economy.

Wednesday, November 23, 2016

Backing Ukraine's Reforms



An excellent short Policy Brief on the reform process in Ukraine and what the West ought to do in support has been written by Anders Aslund (@anders_aslund), adjunct professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Ukraine stabilized its finances in 2015-2016 and returned to modest economic growth this year.  It introduced major reforms, including restructuring the energy sector and anti-corruption measures such as public disclosure by public officials of their financial interests and making government procurement substantially more transparent.  It has, as well, contained the threat from Russian-led insurgents in eastern Ukraine bordering Russia (without defensive arms support from the West).

Ukraine has achieved a lot and must do more to limit corruption, reform government, and free its internal market, but continued progress requires Western support.  As set out by Aslund, the West needs to do three main things,


  • "...mobilize its [the West's] resources for investment funding for the next half decade.  Former Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko has proposed US$5 billion a year for the next five years for investments, which sounds right."

  • "...allowing visa-free travel for Ukrainians in the European Union...This step alone could salvage the European Union's positive standing among Ukrainians."

  • ...that the European Union expands or abolishes its 36 import quotas for Ukraine.  These cover all of Ukraine's most important goods, notably all significant agricultural products.
With a population about half that of Germany and a land area 70% larger, with abundant and varied resources including a well-educated, industrious workforce, Ukraine has the potential to greatly augment Europe's economic strength.

The key is not to let this promising moment be wasted.



Tuesday, October 13, 2015

MH17 - The Rule of Chance

The biggest crisis in Putin's early career was the sinking of the Submarine Kursk.  The Kursk malfunctioned or there was human error.  Soviet leaders first refused international assistance and lied about the circumstances of the catastrophe.  They pressed their luck managing the event and with the truth.  Putin was not involved in the sequence of events in the sinking, but it happened on his watch and it contributed to the collapse in the Russian people's confidence in public institutions.

The destruction of MH17 is on Putin.  The downing of MH17 tore away the mask of Russian deniability of involvement in Ukraine and resulted in nearly 300 innocent deaths, not to mention the deaths of thousands of innocent Ukrainians lost in the civil conflict.  Although the Dutch report released today does not assign blame, the facts and circumstances make clear that the chain of accountability for the catastrophe lies with Russia and with Putin personally.  Meanwhile, Russia continues to issue fabricated evidence to "prove" MH17 was shot down by anyone else but Russia.  By launching a war in eastern Ukraine, Putin invited unexpected, catastrophic events, as will always happen when leaders are reckless and overreach and lie.  Putin has had an extraordinary run of good luck.  But it was chance.  With each additional role of the dice, Putin presses his luck. It could be Syria, or a moment in the next sequence of events, but the risk of catastrophe is all but certain.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

The Constant Gardener: Putin on Method


They didn’t teach vision they taught method at the KGB.  After all, the KGB was an instrument of power not the power itself.  That changed, of course, when one of their own, Vladimir Putin, became prime minister of Russia.

You have to admire the KGB.  They did their work well.  Putin doesn’t waste time worrying about the big picture.  If anything Russia’s decline is accelerating—the economy is sliding, its international standing is in tatters, and civil society is dead.  But, if Putin knows anything, it is method.  The slow, patient cultivation of incremental advantage.

The secret of method is simple.  In short, if you are prepared to think about something for 15 minutes more than the other guy, you’ve probably got the edge because you will be better prepared to anticipate that guy’s next move and figure out how you will respond in turn.  And, you are always in the position to take the initiative.

In The Art of Strategy, Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff summarize it this way,

“The general principle for sequential move games is that each player should figure out the other players’ future responses and use them in calculating his own best current move.  This idea is so important that it is worth codifying into a basic rule of strategic behavior.”

Nothing went the way Putin wanted in Ukraine.  He’d rather have kept Yanukovych.   The invasion of eastern Ukraine didn’t turn out so hot.  Using it to prevent Ukraine getting closer to Europe hasn’t paid off so far--they’re closer than ever.  And Crimea has turned out to be an albatross around the neck of the Russian economy.  But Putin is still in the game because one thing he knows how to do is keep his adversaries off balance.  Method.

So, with Putin it works like this.

First, think several steps ahead.  Putin is widely reported to have had plans to retake Crimea for years and to have decided to seize it as early as December 2013, well before Yanukovych fell from power.  To do that he had to weaken the Ukrainian government so that it could not respond and position in advance the resources necessary to take Crimea, all of which was in place well before the Maidan demonstrations.

Second, take the initiative, act first.  If there is one word that continually comes up in the press to define the West’s response to Putin’s aggression it is “wrong-footed.”  Throughout the crisis, Putin has taken the initiative and surprised his opponents.  The shift to Syria and bombing the moderate opposition in Syria rather than ISIL is just the latest example.

Third, while your opponent is digesting your last move, execute your next one.  Also, a recurring experience.  While the West hummed with indignation over Russia’s seizing Crimea, Putin’s agents undermined eastern Ukraine.  While Ukraine focused on retaking eastern Ukraine, Putin invaded south toward Mariupol.  While the West digested the sudden calm in eastern Ukraine, Putin seized the initiative in Syria.

Fourth, eschew conventional wisdom.  Putin does not let “sensible” behavior define his actions.  He focuses rather on the gaps or vacuums left by others.  The fall of Yanukovych opened the door to seizing Crimea, a high-risk initiative but one that the Ukrainian government—and the West—was unprepared to counter.  Conventional wisdom would say that ramping up military support for Assad, whose back is to the wall and will never regain legitimacy, is a bad, high-risk idea.  It might still be.  But Putin saw opportunity in the vacuum that the West and Arab World left when they failed to come up with a game plan to halt either Assad or ISIL and to end the Syrian conflict.

Fifth, give your opponent no time to react.  Putin moves in rapid succession.  Putin decided to seize Crimea at an all night meeting in the Kremlin on February 22, 2014.  On February 23 pro-Russian demonstrations began in Sevastopol, and on February 27 Russian troops seized the first Crimean government buildings.  All in a week’s work.   Putin needed parliamentary approval for military action in Syria.  Within 48 hours he had it, and Russian planes undertook their first air strike on Homs.

Sixth--need it be said--exploit you opponent’s weaknesses.  Early in the Ukrainian crisis, the US and leading countries in Western Europe, announced they would not use force to counter Russian aggression.  That left the door open for Putin to risk limited military action to achieve his goals.  The West has also been clear that it would not invoke sanctions sufficient to collapse the Russian economy, such as locking Russia out of SWIFT or blocking short-term Western finance, thus allowing Putin to believe that he just might ride out the economic consequences of his aggression.  In a sense, Putin is more interested in what the West will not do than he is in what it will do, because that is where opportunity lies.

If there is a core to Putin’s method, it is this; the path to success is in many, small steps.  He needs to keep moving forward but without invoking a massive response, just a small, continuing erosion of his opponent’s credibility.  Again, Dixit and Nalebuff,

“…you can try to destroy the credibility of an opponent’s threat by going against his wishes in small steps.  Each step should be so small in relation to the threatened costly action that it is not in the interests of the other to invoke it.” 

None of Putin’s actions have resulted in the overwhelming response from the world community that would halt his aggression, but the drum beat of his actions is eroding confidence in the principles and stability of the global system.  The West has followed a policy of incremental responses designed to dissuade Putin but not to compel him to stop.   The game is one of endurance, and Putin believes that the West’s credibility will erode before he has to face the consequences of his misspent efforts. 

So, now the “Normandy Four” (Ukraine, Germany France and Russia) met in Paris on Friday and Minsk II seems to be back on track.  There will be elections in eastern Ukraine under Ukrainian law.  They’ll just be a few months later.  Game over at last?

As the meeting in Paris took place, the OSCE monitoring group discovered for the first time in separatist-held territory advanced “thermobaric” missile systems.  At the same time, of the four parties to Friday’s Minsk II discussions, the only one who has not had anything to say about the outcome is Putin.


Go ahead, take 15 minutes to ask yourself, what next?

Friday, October 2, 2015

A Majestic Idea Hangs In The Balance. It Is The Idea Of What Peace Means to Europe.


On Friday, the so-called Normandy Group (Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine) meets to discuss implementation of the Minsk II agreement to end hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

A majestic idea hangs in the balance.  It is the idea of what peace means to Europe.

Russia has already taken Crimea, the territory of a sovereign Ukraine, and it is continuing its invasion of eastern Ukraine.  It pursues the subversion of other countries, including the leading European countries through support for extremist political parties on the right and left, and support for civil conflicts elsewhere, as in Syria, that drain Europe’s attention and energy.

Putin believes he is at war.  This gives him the advantage over his European contemporaries, because he believes he is fighting for something.  To Putin this is World War 2.1.  He is wrong, of course.  Russia is not at risk from European aggression.  Russia’s problem is that it is corroding from within.  It needs political, social and economic reform.

The Europeans however lack the conviction that they must fight to preserve the values that define their way of life, even though these are under direct attack.

In Friday’s discussion, Europe should avoid the temptation to acquiesce to what Russia has already done to Ukraine or to compromise further.  Russia is weak not strong.  Russia cannot sustain its aggression in Ukraine and in Syria unless Europe facilitates it by failing to confront Putin.  Relative calm in Ukraine is not a glimmer of hope but a negotiating ploy by Putin to deflect Europe’s focus by instilling the false hope that there is an easy way out of the Ukrainian crisis.  Calm in Ukraine is the carrot to the Syria stick, but Ukraine and Syria are the two faces of Putin’s aggression.  Europe marching backwards won’t halt Putin’s advance.


So, now is your moment.  Either in blindness give back to Russia what it took as the Soviet Union and then lost, or, defend the peace that was won on the basis of equity and dignity among nations and respect for open and free civil societies.  Now is your moment.