Showing posts with label #Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label #Russia. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 29, 2020

The Tightening MH17 Noose Around the Throat of Putin

                                                                                                                        photo credit

No need to add anything to this.  Bellingcat has again done a superb job of bringing to light the facts about the shooting down of Malaysia Flight MH17 over Ukraine by Russia, as summarized below by The Times.  The conclusion is inescapable that the BUK’s presence—and therefore the shooting down of MH17--in Ukraine was authorized by Russia officials and could not have happened without the consent if not the instruction of Putin.

Sanctions against Russia should not be lifted until the final determination of culpability for shooting down MH17 has been determined, and additional sanctions should be imposed if Russia continues to attempt to interfere in the investigations and judicial proceedings.

 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-spy-chief-is-potential-suspect-in-downing-of-mh17-jwqcxxrct

Thursday, September 28, 2017

We Are Entitled to Investigate, Debate and Act on Russian Interference


 TheHill.com

American actor Morgan Freeman tossed a firecracker among Russian scholars by lending his voice to a newly formed Committee to Investigate Russia, whose purpose is to confront Russian interference in American democracy.
The response on behalf of Russian scholars was taken up by well-known Russian expatriate journalist, Leonid Bershidsky, in an article on Sept. 20 in Bloomberg entitled, “Wanted: Russia Experts. No Expertise Required.” Sean Keeley makes a similar point in The Russian Interference Racket in The American Interest.
Bershidsky’s complaint against Freeman is that the Committee to Investigate Russia (CIR) and many who write about Russia have no background in the subject. Therefore, they lack the familiarity to provide the nuance necessary to understand Russia. Consequently, their views are ill-informed and incorrect, and too often manifest as Russophobia. These persons should leave Russia to the experts. However, Bershidsky’s complaint is dead wrong.

The issue is not understanding Russia. The issue is how to deal with Russian aggression against Western institutions and values. CIR “investigates” Russia by drawing attention to Russian interference through posting background information and articles published elsewhere. Although decidedly to the right of the spectrum, CIR addresses plenty of Americans' concern about Russian interference that is well-established, if not yet well-understood. This is hardly Russophobic.
Bershidsky disparages by name the competence of CIR’s advisory board members, who are highly accomplished professionals but do not meet his requisite standard for expertise in Russian affairs. That criticism is misplaced. Whatever their specific competencies, they have a stake in the issue. They are affected by Russian interference.
Following Bershidsky’s reasoning, Jimmy Kimmel, the outspoken American comedian and talk show host, has no business opining on health care reform because he is not a health-care specialist. Kimmel however has a personal stake in the healthcare issue that he has spoken about on his show, as do millions of Americans whose voices cannot be shut out because their familiarity with the issues does not rise to a certain standard. The question here is not a particular kind of competence but a personal stake in the consequences. The same goes for Russia’s behavior, climate change, or tax reform.
Morgan Freeman does say that Russia is at war with the U.S., but Russia’s interference in elections in the U.S. and elsewhere, as well as its attempts to sow conflict through social media, is incontestable. There is nothing exaggerated or overblown in what Freeman says in the video. This isn’t hyperbole or jingoism.
Diminished in standing by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos, Russia under Vladimir Putin has veered toward blaming the West and has chosen to retaliate by invading neighboring countries and by interfering in other countries in areas that are fundamental to those countries’ institutions and values. Russia has legitimate grievances related to its change in circumstances, fed at times by American bungling on the world stage, but it does not follow that Russia’s grievances legitimate its aggression against perceived slights and imagined threats. It doesn’t take special expertise to figure that out.
What Bershidsky decries as lacking expertise and authority is part and parcel of legitimate public debate. Russia experts may feel swamped by the growing public debate on Russia because the importance of the issue to the public has become more manifest with the growing evidence of Russian interference. Russian experts have to speak more loudly to be heard.
Bershidsky quotes Russian scholar, Samuel Greene, to the effect that Russian scholars are not being heard because they are keeping their heads down due to the rise in Russophobia. This is nonsense. The increase in public debate about Russia is a direct consequence of Russian actions against democratic institutions; and, the emergence in some corners of Russophobia does not invalidate or diminish genuine debate about Russia’s behavior. Bershidsky also references Russian affairs expert Mark Galeotti. However, Galeotti does not keep his head down. He continues to publish frequently, as should Greene.
Galeotti’s articles are excellent and should be read by anyone wishing to be well-informed on the nuances of Russian behavior. And, indeed, their voices may be needed to balance out more strident voices, such as Molly McKew, mentioned critically by both Bershidsky and Keeley, who appears on the Committee to Investigate Russia website. An example of an excellent perspective on how to deal with Russian interference is provided by Jan Jankowicz, fellow at the Kennan Institute, in The Only Way to Defend Against Russia’s Information War in the New York Times.
If the drama about Russian influence in the West—or for that matter Trump’s attack on NFL players for speaking their minds--teaches us anything, it is that public debate is the most effective weapon against the real threat of overbearing authority—from governments to extremists of the left and the right, and even the malicious, manipulative voices on social media.
We—the affected parties—are entitled to investigate, debate and act on Russian interference. We are better off if our views are based on objective fact and sound judgement. In the meantime, we need to listen to what legitimate voices across the spectrum have to say.
Dirk Mattheisen is a writer and blogger on political economy and independent consultant on institutional governance and strengthening the role of civil society in government. He is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group. Follow him on Twitter  @DirkMattheisen.

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Do Sanctions Against Russia Work (Continued)?

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Following my article in Euromaidan Press, Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?, the New York Post has a good article in the same vein entitled When Sanctions Work--And Why They Fail.  To be clear, the author, Ralph Peters, writes that sanctions against Russia are working and should be continued (while he argues sanctions against North Korea and Iran are another story).  He writes regarding sanctions against Russia (underlining added),

"Contrary to counter-factual claims, economic sanctions imposed on Russia after successive invasions of its neighbors have had a profound effect ...Sanctions have bitten Russia for two reasons.  First, they coincided felicitously with a global collapse in energy prices.  Putin’s economic monoculture relies on income from gas and oil exports.  The double-whammy of cheap gas and Western sanctions hit Russia hard, causing Putin to pause his war in Ukraine and now to cut his defense budget.  But the second reason is that even Putin has to answer to his people at some level. And while Russia’s been under sanctions, the poverty rate doubled, inflation soared, pensions declined dramatically in real value and trade collapsed.  For months, Russian newspapers insisted that there was no shortage of medicines — which told Russia-watchers there were medicine shortages.  Sanctions alone won’t bring Putin down, but they’ve imposed a painful cost for his bad behavior.  As evidence mounts of Russian attempts to subvert our democracy, it would be wanton capitulation to remove the sanctions now"
He writes as well,
"...in Russia sanctions are frustrating Putin’s hostile ambitions, crippling his ability to modernize his military machine. Discontent is deepening, if slowly: The old maxim that Russians unite in their suffering breaks down when Russians see their leaders and favored oligarchs leading lives of unprecedented opulence."
As I wrote in my original post, sanctions have had a substantial impact in containing Russia aggression--Moscow does not dictate what Kyiv's domestic and international polices should be, its hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, its dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead, sanctions are responsible for 1.5% to 6% of Russia's economic decline, and Russia's prospects for significant economic growth are dim.

There was one point though that I failed to make in my original article that is echoed by Ralph Peters when he writes that sanctions are a tool not a stand-alone solution.  Sanctions are essential to tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine, but the real reason Ukraine has been able to stand up to Russia's aggression is because its civil society would not submit to intimidation and violence by either the corrupt Yanukovych government or by Putin's Russia, and because of the stubborn, valorous defense of Ukraine by its armed volunteer brigades and military.  As long as Ukrainian society stands firm, Russia has little prospect of achieving its aims, and sanctions are an essential aid in helping Ukraine remain a free and independent nation.   However, even now, Ukraine's civil society and its military continue to suffer daily from Russian aggression.  So far in 2017, 21 civilians have been killed and 95 wounded in daily fighting with Russian-led forces along the line of contact with the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  In March alone the Ukrainian military suffered 27 killed and 189 wounded.  Russia's aggression toward Ukraine and other countries is reason to sustain and expand sanctions until Russia reverses its behavior.  As both Ralph Peters and I write, sanctions take time but they are taking a heavy toll on Russia and in time Ukrainian resolve and sanctions will end Russia aggression.


Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Putin’s Long Descent


Photo Credit:  Euromaidan Press

As airstrikes resume in Aleppo after a brief pause, Putin seems to be on the verge of another tactical success and to hold the fate of Aleppo in his hands.  Yet Putin would have preferred that Syrian forces had already taken Aleppo.  Syrian forces, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters have failed to sew up a clear win over tenacious rebel forces.  In addition, even if Aleppo now falls, Russia will pay a high price for success because it will require carpet-bombing reminiscent of Putin’s conquest of Grozny during the second Chechen war.  The West is already united in condemning Russia’s barbarism in Syria and further brutality will have unpredictable consequences for Russia (even if the EU failed at its meeting on October 20 to threaten sanctions).

In fact, Putin finds himself where he has been before.

His successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here. Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  Consider each of Putin’s supposed successes.

Putin hoped to gather a new pan-Russian world under an Eurasian Economic Union, for which Ukraine was key.  He attempted to maneuver former Ukrainian President Yanukovych into keeping Ukraine under Russian suzerainty, including through bribes, threats and subversion of state institutions, especially the military and security services.  Not only did Putin misjudge the resistance and strength of civil society in Ukraine, his actions strengthened resistance to Russian dominance across all the former Soviet Republics. 

Putin attempted to base Russian economic power on rents from resource extraction and a corrupt keptocracy, but he misunderstood what drives a dynamic economy.  GDP growth slowed due to lack of investment and poor governance.  Russia then plunged into economic crisis when commodity prices collapsed in 2014 and sanctions were imposed on Russia for the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.  GDP feel 3.7% in 2015 and is expected to fall 1% in 2016.  Russia is currently running a budget deficit that may reach or exceed 4% this year, putting an enormous strain on social spending, including all-important public sector salaries and pensions upon which a large share of the population depends and upon which his support is based.  Even the modernization program for the military, with which Putin hopes to project Russian power, is subject to budget cuts.  GDP growth is projected to be nearly stagnant into the foreseeable future, without deep economic and governance reforms, and the Russian Economic Ministry projects no change in Russians’ living standard before 2035.

Reputedly, when deciding to seize Crimea, Putin asked his advisors if Russia could weather a year of adverse international reaction.  Putin mistakenly believed that the West was so dependent on Russian energy and so weakened by economic and political disarray--encouraged in part by Russia--that it could not sustain diplomatic opposition to Russia’s land grab for longer.  Putin appears not to have anticipated the scale of sanctions that were imposed by the US and the EU.  Nearly three years later, international isolation and the prospect of continuing sanctions looks only stronger due to lack of progress on a settlement in eastern Ukraine and events in Syria.  Meanwhile, Russia continues to bleed resources to sustain Crimea and Russian-backed eastern Ukraine, as well as conduct military operations in Syria.

Buoyed by the first flush of success when seizing Crimea, Putin attempted to take control of the east and south of Ukraine through Odesa to the Moldovan border, calling it “Novorossiya.”  The people did not rally to Russia as expected, and Russian provocateurs and local agents who attempted to seize control of the region were overwhelmed.  Russia had to send in “unmarked” regular troops and armor to stop the Ukrainian military advance in eastern Ukraine.  The price in dead Russians and diplomatic fallout became too high and Putin was beaten to a standstill.  During the course of the conflict, Russia and/or its proxies committed an act of international terrorism by shooting down a civilian aircraft, MH17, killing nearly 300 persons.  A Dutch-led investigation released in September 2016 confirmed Russian involvement and the identification, and possible prosecution, of guilty Russian military and political leaders is expected in the future. 

Putin pivoted to Syria, looking for new leverage over the West.  In Syria, Putin believed he had seized the initiative from a feeble EU and American response to the crisis, while avoiding an Afghanistan-like quagmire by relying solely on airpower to support the Syrian army, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters.  And, indeed, the West looked flatfooted and outmaneuvered.  But the Syrian army proved unable to make the gains that Russia expected.  Russian Special Forces and “irregulars”, as well as barbaric methods, had to be added to sustain gains.  Putin was compelled to add support for a campaign to take Aleppo.  As of this writing, the combined pro-government forces have yet to take the city.  In the meantime, the brutality of the campaign has alienated the EU, which condemned Russian supported bombing and threatened prosecutions for war crimes.  Rather than gaining leverage over the West, Russia finds itself even more isolated. 

Meanwhile, Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and others is disruptive but has given the US new resolve to confront unconventional Russian interference and aggression.  The US has promised a firm and unmistakable response.  Ecuador cut Julian Assange, the Wikileaks founder who is believed to be working hand-in-hand with Russia, off from the Internet on suspicion of interfering in the US election, and the Russian news service, RT, accused of propaganda, had its bank accounts frozen in the UK.  If Russia had hoped to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, it failed miserably.  Russia’s capacity to be disruptive will now be confronted by firm US and European counter-measures.

Even if one steps back and looks at Putin’s probable strategic objective of a West too weak and in disarray to counter Russia’s interests, it is not clear Putin is making any headway.  Discord in Europe is the result of homegrown political mismanagement and of events elsewhere, such as Syria, that Putin can only hope to exploit but not control.  Even where Russia has had an outsized influence, such as using illicit money and offshore financial centers to corrupt Western elites, the window is closing after numerous revelations, including the Panama Papers and Spanish indictments of Russian mobsters and serving political figures.  Everyone is now alert to Russia’s corrosive influence.  That elites can be corrupted or that institutions can be undermined is not an insight that Putin alone has.  Europe and the US understand it also and can be effective in confronting it.  In short, what the Soviet Union could not do, Russia cannot do either.  Although Putin has managed to elevate Russia’s profile on the international stage, its standing is fragile because Russia’s role is seen as more disruptive than constructive.

Putin may deflect, feint, cut his loses, and pivot to a new provocation to distract from his failure to translate tactical successes into strategic gains, but the costs are mounting and his opportunities are narrowing.  Fundamentally, Putin cannot overturn global leadership on the foundation of political deceit and corruption, nor on militant nationalism.  Lack of political credibility and corruption through which Putin hopes to undermine the West are more deeply rooted in Russia.  And militant nationalism—especially if based on ethnicity--is a formula for catastrophe, whether in Nazi Germany, post-Yugoslavia Serbia or contemporary Russia.

Although it has been touched on by policy analysts at times, Putin’s personality is an underestimated weakness that contributes to his penchant for miscalculation.  Putin is not fully aware of how the most human of qualities, “empathy”, informs judgment and, therefore, he does not understand how it affects political decisions.  Much like Benedict Cumberbatch’s Sherlock Holmes character in the hit series “Sherlock,” Putin is oblivious to societal norms because he is a “high-functioning sociopath.”   He recognizes societal norms based on empathy, such as aversion to doing harm and sympathy for those who suffer or are less fortunate, but he does not feel it, and because he doesn’t feel it he is suspicious and contemptuous of it.  He personally expresses little sympathy and evidences no effort to comfort those who suffer in Donbas or for the horror in Syria or the increasingly difficult circumstances of the Russian people, except at the abstract level of strategic policy when he condemns the actions of others that he perceives are directed against Russian power.  Putin perceives Western leaders' concern for the impact of their actions on people as weakness.

Putin is not only indifferent to causing harm, he is personally culpable.  Putin is strongly implicated in “terrorist” attacks that killed hundreds of Russian citizens in 1999 that propelled him into the Presidency on a law and order platform.   Military and security services under his command are also implicated in provocations in 1999 that launched the second Chechen war that killed tens of thousands.  Putin is believed to be responsible for the deaths of countless opponents, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko whom a British Public Inquiry concluded had been murdered on orders by Putin personally.  The imprisonment--and torture--in Russia of numerous Ukrainian citizens, including Ukrainian pilot, Nadiya Savchenko, could not occur without Putin’s concurrence.  There are no checks on Putin’s behavior and deaths of ordinary Russians, opponents, and citizens of other countries, do not bother him and so are not part of his calculus of risk.


With less room to maneuver and an increasingly fragile base on which to support his actions, Putin will attempt further aggression.  His current bluster in Syria, moving missiles closer to the EU, and invading Finnish airspace may be carefully calibrated to convey threat without risking direct confrontation, but Putin’s hubris and inability to empathize mean that he will overreach yet again, and at some point his luck will collide with his penchant for miscalculation, and he will experience a categorical tactical failure.  At that point, rather than be unmasked as fallible, Putin will attempt to reverse his failure, possibly up to and including through a tactical nuclear “event” (not necessarily, but possibly, involving an actual limited strike). With the smoke and mirrors removed, Putin will be revealed to be, like Stalin, a plague on Russia and the world.


Saturday, November 14, 2015

The Russian Doping Scandal


A Doping Travesty Russia Cannot Duck http://nyti.ms/1kRzEih

Russia's president, government and media lie.  Such is their reputation that if they were to announce that the sky is blue, it would have to be independently validated before it could be believed.  Russia's moral authority is in tatters and its civil society is deeply eroded by pervasive corruption.  The shocking scope of Russia's doping scandal reflects this profound crisis in Russian society.  It is worthwhile though to remember that the evidence of official Russian deceit in the Ukraine crisis and the doping scandal has come from courageous individual Russians.  

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Friday, November 13, 2015

This One Is For The Russia Conspiracy Buffs


Not that I am saying that the following is so, but, if #Putin believes, as widely reported, that the West, led by the US, wants to destroy Russia or reduce it to an impoverished state selling primary resources to the advanced Western economies, what is Putin prepared to do to save #Russia?

We already know that he will go to great lengths.  He has plunged Russia into an economic and international relations crisis by seizing Crimea, invading eastern Ukraine, threatening other countries, and launching his own military campaign in Syria, because he believes Russia is under threat from the West.  He is prepared to act aggressively, if not rashly, to stave off what he believes is a threat to Russia’s existence.  We also know he will strike out in unexpected ways, using force, threats, lies, deception and subterfuge to force outcomes on his own terms.  Certainly, he has shown he is prepared to take risks beyond the West’s expectations.

Is the Western threat real?  Putin feels entitled to think so.  The expansion of NATO, the two Iraq wars, the US-led UN intervention in the Balkans, and Western support for “democratic” revolutions in Libra, Egypt, Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, suggest a pattern of engagement directed at something.  Not incidentally, that something undermines Russian clients and expands Western military power into what Russia considers its strategic space. 
Certainly containing Russia seems to be a part of a US strategy.  A recent article in The New Yorker, “How the Bushes Misunderstood Cheney”, discusses how Vice President Cheney “tilted away from Mikhail Gorbachev and toward Boris Yeltsin because he believed that Yeltsin would push harder for the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”  The New Yorker reports that the Neoconservatives, who still prowl the corridors of Washington licking their wounds, had been asked by Cheney to prepare a study (led by Paul Wolfowitz) “…calling for the maintenance of a one-superpower world in the post-Soviet era as the core principle of US foreign policy.”

So if Putin believes that Russia’s existence is at stake, what else is he capable of?  His seemingly reckless and impulsive actions and apparent indifference to the harm these have done to Russia, suggest he is capable of more, substantial surprises.

Would recent seemingly unrelated news reports amount to a plausible guess? Let’s see…

One example of such news reports is that Russia is on a “voracious” gold buying spree.  It bought 31 tons of gold in August and 34 tons in September and in October, up from 36.8 tons bought in the entire second quarter of 2015.  Buying gold may make sense as a confidence building measure to support the ruble and to diversify Russia’s reserves away from dependence on the US dollar and the Euro.   But why buy gold now?  Putin has said that the worst of the economic crisis is behind Russia, so what is his concern?  Is the explanation that hoarding gold also makes sense if Putin plans more provocations?  Does he believe that buffering the ruble with gold will insulate Russia from the consequences of those provocations?  What does Putin have in mind?

Another example, on November 12 news services aired a story about plans for a new Russian torpedo equipped with a tactical nuclear warhead that is capable of taking out coastal infrastructure or population centers.  Since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict it has been reported that members of Putin’s coterie favor the use of tactical nuclear arms to, for instance, take out a small European city (think, Kyiv or Lviv, or Warsaw) to convince the West that Russia was too dangerous to mess with.  The experience of Chernobyl is supposed to have convinced them that the damage to Russia from a limited nuclear event could be contained.  The “leak” of the nuclear torpedo story gives currency to the risk of a tactical nuclear event if Russia feels threatened.

Or, for example, on October 25, The New York Times and other news services reported that Russian submarines were “aggressively” prowling near the Atlantic underwater cables that carry most of the world’s Internet communications.  Damage to these cables would bring down not only vital global communications but also the Western economies, which are dependent on the flow of information.

Is this just saber rattling, or does Putin plan new provocations?  Does he believe that husbanding gold can insulate the ruble from the financial system consequences of another provocation?  Does Putin believe that a strike--even a substantial one-- on the West’s economic infrastructure is feasible because, if limited, it would not result in a fatal Western response?  Putin certainly has a taste for brinksmanship, and the tepid Western response to his provocations so far has only increased his distain for his opponents.  Does he believe that by delivering blows that incapacitate the West’s ability to respond he can save Russia—perhaps by delivering the blow through proxies that he can disavow, such as jihadists armed with dirty bombs using Russian-supplied materials.  If he believes Russia’s existence is at stake, how far is he prepared to go?

Just saying.