Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Putin’s Long Descent


Photo Credit:  Euromaidan Press

As airstrikes resume in Aleppo after a brief pause, Putin seems to be on the verge of another tactical success and to hold the fate of Aleppo in his hands.  Yet Putin would have preferred that Syrian forces had already taken Aleppo.  Syrian forces, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters have failed to sew up a clear win over tenacious rebel forces.  In addition, even if Aleppo now falls, Russia will pay a high price for success because it will require carpet-bombing reminiscent of Putin’s conquest of Grozny during the second Chechen war.  The West is already united in condemning Russia’s barbarism in Syria and further brutality will have unpredictable consequences for Russia (even if the EU failed at its meeting on October 20 to threaten sanctions).

In fact, Putin finds himself where he has been before.

His successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here. Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  Consider each of Putin’s supposed successes.

Putin hoped to gather a new pan-Russian world under an Eurasian Economic Union, for which Ukraine was key.  He attempted to maneuver former Ukrainian President Yanukovych into keeping Ukraine under Russian suzerainty, including through bribes, threats and subversion of state institutions, especially the military and security services.  Not only did Putin misjudge the resistance and strength of civil society in Ukraine, his actions strengthened resistance to Russian dominance across all the former Soviet Republics. 

Putin attempted to base Russian economic power on rents from resource extraction and a corrupt keptocracy, but he misunderstood what drives a dynamic economy.  GDP growth slowed due to lack of investment and poor governance.  Russia then plunged into economic crisis when commodity prices collapsed in 2014 and sanctions were imposed on Russia for the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.  GDP feel 3.7% in 2015 and is expected to fall 1% in 2016.  Russia is currently running a budget deficit that may reach or exceed 4% this year, putting an enormous strain on social spending, including all-important public sector salaries and pensions upon which a large share of the population depends and upon which his support is based.  Even the modernization program for the military, with which Putin hopes to project Russian power, is subject to budget cuts.  GDP growth is projected to be nearly stagnant into the foreseeable future, without deep economic and governance reforms, and the Russian Economic Ministry projects no change in Russians’ living standard before 2035.

Reputedly, when deciding to seize Crimea, Putin asked his advisors if Russia could weather a year of adverse international reaction.  Putin mistakenly believed that the West was so dependent on Russian energy and so weakened by economic and political disarray--encouraged in part by Russia--that it could not sustain diplomatic opposition to Russia’s land grab for longer.  Putin appears not to have anticipated the scale of sanctions that were imposed by the US and the EU.  Nearly three years later, international isolation and the prospect of continuing sanctions looks only stronger due to lack of progress on a settlement in eastern Ukraine and events in Syria.  Meanwhile, Russia continues to bleed resources to sustain Crimea and Russian-backed eastern Ukraine, as well as conduct military operations in Syria.

Buoyed by the first flush of success when seizing Crimea, Putin attempted to take control of the east and south of Ukraine through Odesa to the Moldovan border, calling it “Novorossiya.”  The people did not rally to Russia as expected, and Russian provocateurs and local agents who attempted to seize control of the region were overwhelmed.  Russia had to send in “unmarked” regular troops and armor to stop the Ukrainian military advance in eastern Ukraine.  The price in dead Russians and diplomatic fallout became too high and Putin was beaten to a standstill.  During the course of the conflict, Russia and/or its proxies committed an act of international terrorism by shooting down a civilian aircraft, MH17, killing nearly 300 persons.  A Dutch-led investigation released in September 2016 confirmed Russian involvement and the identification, and possible prosecution, of guilty Russian military and political leaders is expected in the future. 

Putin pivoted to Syria, looking for new leverage over the West.  In Syria, Putin believed he had seized the initiative from a feeble EU and American response to the crisis, while avoiding an Afghanistan-like quagmire by relying solely on airpower to support the Syrian army, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters.  And, indeed, the West looked flatfooted and outmaneuvered.  But the Syrian army proved unable to make the gains that Russia expected.  Russian Special Forces and “irregulars”, as well as barbaric methods, had to be added to sustain gains.  Putin was compelled to add support for a campaign to take Aleppo.  As of this writing, the combined pro-government forces have yet to take the city.  In the meantime, the brutality of the campaign has alienated the EU, which condemned Russian supported bombing and threatened prosecutions for war crimes.  Rather than gaining leverage over the West, Russia finds itself even more isolated. 

Meanwhile, Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and others is disruptive but has given the US new resolve to confront unconventional Russian interference and aggression.  The US has promised a firm and unmistakable response.  Ecuador cut Julian Assange, the Wikileaks founder who is believed to be working hand-in-hand with Russia, off from the Internet on suspicion of interfering in the US election, and the Russian news service, RT, accused of propaganda, had its bank accounts frozen in the UK.  If Russia had hoped to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, it failed miserably.  Russia’s capacity to be disruptive will now be confronted by firm US and European counter-measures.

Even if one steps back and looks at Putin’s probable strategic objective of a West too weak and in disarray to counter Russia’s interests, it is not clear Putin is making any headway.  Discord in Europe is the result of homegrown political mismanagement and of events elsewhere, such as Syria, that Putin can only hope to exploit but not control.  Even where Russia has had an outsized influence, such as using illicit money and offshore financial centers to corrupt Western elites, the window is closing after numerous revelations, including the Panama Papers and Spanish indictments of Russian mobsters and serving political figures.  Everyone is now alert to Russia’s corrosive influence.  That elites can be corrupted or that institutions can be undermined is not an insight that Putin alone has.  Europe and the US understand it also and can be effective in confronting it.  In short, what the Soviet Union could not do, Russia cannot do either.  Although Putin has managed to elevate Russia’s profile on the international stage, its standing is fragile because Russia’s role is seen as more disruptive than constructive.

Putin may deflect, feint, cut his loses, and pivot to a new provocation to distract from his failure to translate tactical successes into strategic gains, but the costs are mounting and his opportunities are narrowing.  Fundamentally, Putin cannot overturn global leadership on the foundation of political deceit and corruption, nor on militant nationalism.  Lack of political credibility and corruption through which Putin hopes to undermine the West are more deeply rooted in Russia.  And militant nationalism—especially if based on ethnicity--is a formula for catastrophe, whether in Nazi Germany, post-Yugoslavia Serbia or contemporary Russia.

Although it has been touched on by policy analysts at times, Putin’s personality is an underestimated weakness that contributes to his penchant for miscalculation.  Putin is not fully aware of how the most human of qualities, “empathy”, informs judgment and, therefore, he does not understand how it affects political decisions.  Much like Benedict Cumberbatch’s Sherlock Holmes character in the hit series “Sherlock,” Putin is oblivious to societal norms because he is a “high-functioning sociopath.”   He recognizes societal norms based on empathy, such as aversion to doing harm and sympathy for those who suffer or are less fortunate, but he does not feel it, and because he doesn’t feel it he is suspicious and contemptuous of it.  He personally expresses little sympathy and evidences no effort to comfort those who suffer in Donbas or for the horror in Syria or the increasingly difficult circumstances of the Russian people, except at the abstract level of strategic policy when he condemns the actions of others that he perceives are directed against Russian power.  Putin perceives Western leaders' concern for the impact of their actions on people as weakness.

Putin is not only indifferent to causing harm, he is personally culpable.  Putin is strongly implicated in “terrorist” attacks that killed hundreds of Russian citizens in 1999 that propelled him into the Presidency on a law and order platform.   Military and security services under his command are also implicated in provocations in 1999 that launched the second Chechen war that killed tens of thousands.  Putin is believed to be responsible for the deaths of countless opponents, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko whom a British Public Inquiry concluded had been murdered on orders by Putin personally.  The imprisonment--and torture--in Russia of numerous Ukrainian citizens, including Ukrainian pilot, Nadiya Savchenko, could not occur without Putin’s concurrence.  There are no checks on Putin’s behavior and deaths of ordinary Russians, opponents, and citizens of other countries, do not bother him and so are not part of his calculus of risk.


With less room to maneuver and an increasingly fragile base on which to support his actions, Putin will attempt further aggression.  His current bluster in Syria, moving missiles closer to the EU, and invading Finnish airspace may be carefully calibrated to convey threat without risking direct confrontation, but Putin’s hubris and inability to empathize mean that he will overreach yet again, and at some point his luck will collide with his penchant for miscalculation, and he will experience a categorical tactical failure.  At that point, rather than be unmasked as fallible, Putin will attempt to reverse his failure, possibly up to and including through a tactical nuclear “event” (not necessarily, but possibly, involving an actual limited strike). With the smoke and mirrors removed, Putin will be revealed to be, like Stalin, a plague on Russia and the world.


Friday, November 6, 2015

Lost Russian Lives in Sinai

It is hard to believe that a tragedy such as the crash of the Russian commercial passenger plane, Kogalymavia Fight 9268, in Egypt could affect the course of political events in Russia.  Afterall, it is simply an un-looked for tragedy, with a high cost in lives cut short and grief for surviving family members.

However, such is the absorption in Russia with all things Putin that the government’s response to the tragedy could have profound political ramifications.  Especially if the plane was sabotaged by Islamic terrorists, the cost of Putin’s Syrian gambit just rose to 224 innocent Russian and (a few) Ukrainian lives.  Just as the price of Putin’s gambit in eastern Ukraine was the nearly 300 innocent lives lost in the downing of Malaysia Flight MH17 (not counting the thousands killed in the conflict on the ground).

What Putin fears most is that the tragedies in Ukraine or Syria will rebound upon the Russian people because, until now, he has convinced them that these adventures cost them nothing.  At some point, the truth will pierce Putin’s massive deception and all hell will break loose.

Sunday, October 25, 2015

Gazing at Stars Backwards - Russia in Syria


Russia’s show of force in Syria is intended to assert Russian power and impress geopolitical stargazers.  But look through the telescope from the other end.

Only 10th largest among world economies, Russia’s economy is about 15% smaller than Italy’s and roughly half that of Germany’s economy (the Euro area economy is 7 times larger than Russia’s) (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-table).  Russia's economy is also shrinking.

In such circumstances, imagine Italy dominating the military and political process in Syria, or imagine Italy’s Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi—who is critical of EU sanctions on Russia--threatening, if only in economic terms, to unilaterally re-impose Italy’s authority over its traditional sphere of influence in Europe.

Is Russia's seeming success due to an authentic projection of power or are we looking through the wrong end of the telescope?

Sunday, October 4, 2015

The Constant Gardener: Putin on Method


They didn’t teach vision they taught method at the KGB.  After all, the KGB was an instrument of power not the power itself.  That changed, of course, when one of their own, Vladimir Putin, became prime minister of Russia.

You have to admire the KGB.  They did their work well.  Putin doesn’t waste time worrying about the big picture.  If anything Russia’s decline is accelerating—the economy is sliding, its international standing is in tatters, and civil society is dead.  But, if Putin knows anything, it is method.  The slow, patient cultivation of incremental advantage.

The secret of method is simple.  In short, if you are prepared to think about something for 15 minutes more than the other guy, you’ve probably got the edge because you will be better prepared to anticipate that guy’s next move and figure out how you will respond in turn.  And, you are always in the position to take the initiative.

In The Art of Strategy, Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff summarize it this way,

“The general principle for sequential move games is that each player should figure out the other players’ future responses and use them in calculating his own best current move.  This idea is so important that it is worth codifying into a basic rule of strategic behavior.”

Nothing went the way Putin wanted in Ukraine.  He’d rather have kept Yanukovych.   The invasion of eastern Ukraine didn’t turn out so hot.  Using it to prevent Ukraine getting closer to Europe hasn’t paid off so far--they’re closer than ever.  And Crimea has turned out to be an albatross around the neck of the Russian economy.  But Putin is still in the game because one thing he knows how to do is keep his adversaries off balance.  Method.

So, with Putin it works like this.

First, think several steps ahead.  Putin is widely reported to have had plans to retake Crimea for years and to have decided to seize it as early as December 2013, well before Yanukovych fell from power.  To do that he had to weaken the Ukrainian government so that it could not respond and position in advance the resources necessary to take Crimea, all of which was in place well before the Maidan demonstrations.

Second, take the initiative, act first.  If there is one word that continually comes up in the press to define the West’s response to Putin’s aggression it is “wrong-footed.”  Throughout the crisis, Putin has taken the initiative and surprised his opponents.  The shift to Syria and bombing the moderate opposition in Syria rather than ISIL is just the latest example.

Third, while your opponent is digesting your last move, execute your next one.  Also, a recurring experience.  While the West hummed with indignation over Russia’s seizing Crimea, Putin’s agents undermined eastern Ukraine.  While Ukraine focused on retaking eastern Ukraine, Putin invaded south toward Mariupol.  While the West digested the sudden calm in eastern Ukraine, Putin seized the initiative in Syria.

Fourth, eschew conventional wisdom.  Putin does not let “sensible” behavior define his actions.  He focuses rather on the gaps or vacuums left by others.  The fall of Yanukovych opened the door to seizing Crimea, a high-risk initiative but one that the Ukrainian government—and the West—was unprepared to counter.  Conventional wisdom would say that ramping up military support for Assad, whose back is to the wall and will never regain legitimacy, is a bad, high-risk idea.  It might still be.  But Putin saw opportunity in the vacuum that the West and Arab World left when they failed to come up with a game plan to halt either Assad or ISIL and to end the Syrian conflict.

Fifth, give your opponent no time to react.  Putin moves in rapid succession.  Putin decided to seize Crimea at an all night meeting in the Kremlin on February 22, 2014.  On February 23 pro-Russian demonstrations began in Sevastopol, and on February 27 Russian troops seized the first Crimean government buildings.  All in a week’s work.   Putin needed parliamentary approval for military action in Syria.  Within 48 hours he had it, and Russian planes undertook their first air strike on Homs.

Sixth--need it be said--exploit you opponent’s weaknesses.  Early in the Ukrainian crisis, the US and leading countries in Western Europe, announced they would not use force to counter Russian aggression.  That left the door open for Putin to risk limited military action to achieve his goals.  The West has also been clear that it would not invoke sanctions sufficient to collapse the Russian economy, such as locking Russia out of SWIFT or blocking short-term Western finance, thus allowing Putin to believe that he just might ride out the economic consequences of his aggression.  In a sense, Putin is more interested in what the West will not do than he is in what it will do, because that is where opportunity lies.

If there is a core to Putin’s method, it is this; the path to success is in many, small steps.  He needs to keep moving forward but without invoking a massive response, just a small, continuing erosion of his opponent’s credibility.  Again, Dixit and Nalebuff,

“…you can try to destroy the credibility of an opponent’s threat by going against his wishes in small steps.  Each step should be so small in relation to the threatened costly action that it is not in the interests of the other to invoke it.” 

None of Putin’s actions have resulted in the overwhelming response from the world community that would halt his aggression, but the drum beat of his actions is eroding confidence in the principles and stability of the global system.  The West has followed a policy of incremental responses designed to dissuade Putin but not to compel him to stop.   The game is one of endurance, and Putin believes that the West’s credibility will erode before he has to face the consequences of his misspent efforts. 

So, now the “Normandy Four” (Ukraine, Germany France and Russia) met in Paris on Friday and Minsk II seems to be back on track.  There will be elections in eastern Ukraine under Ukrainian law.  They’ll just be a few months later.  Game over at last?

As the meeting in Paris took place, the OSCE monitoring group discovered for the first time in separatist-held territory advanced “thermobaric” missile systems.  At the same time, of the four parties to Friday’s Minsk II discussions, the only one who has not had anything to say about the outcome is Putin.


Go ahead, take 15 minutes to ask yourself, what next?

Friday, October 2, 2015

A Majestic Idea Hangs In The Balance. It Is The Idea Of What Peace Means to Europe.


On Friday, the so-called Normandy Group (Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine) meets to discuss implementation of the Minsk II agreement to end hostilities in eastern Ukraine.

A majestic idea hangs in the balance.  It is the idea of what peace means to Europe.

Russia has already taken Crimea, the territory of a sovereign Ukraine, and it is continuing its invasion of eastern Ukraine.  It pursues the subversion of other countries, including the leading European countries through support for extremist political parties on the right and left, and support for civil conflicts elsewhere, as in Syria, that drain Europe’s attention and energy.

Putin believes he is at war.  This gives him the advantage over his European contemporaries, because he believes he is fighting for something.  To Putin this is World War 2.1.  He is wrong, of course.  Russia is not at risk from European aggression.  Russia’s problem is that it is corroding from within.  It needs political, social and economic reform.

The Europeans however lack the conviction that they must fight to preserve the values that define their way of life, even though these are under direct attack.

In Friday’s discussion, Europe should avoid the temptation to acquiesce to what Russia has already done to Ukraine or to compromise further.  Russia is weak not strong.  Russia cannot sustain its aggression in Ukraine and in Syria unless Europe facilitates it by failing to confront Putin.  Relative calm in Ukraine is not a glimmer of hope but a negotiating ploy by Putin to deflect Europe’s focus by instilling the false hope that there is an easy way out of the Ukrainian crisis.  Calm in Ukraine is the carrot to the Syria stick, but Ukraine and Syria are the two faces of Putin’s aggression.  Europe marching backwards won’t halt Putin’s advance.


So, now is your moment.  Either in blindness give back to Russia what it took as the Soviet Union and then lost, or, defend the peace that was won on the basis of equity and dignity among nations and respect for open and free civil societies.  Now is your moment.