The Tightening MH17 Noose Around the Throat of Putin

                                                                                                                        photo credit

No need to add anything to this.  Bellingcat has again done a superb job of bringing to light the facts about the shooting down of Malaysia Flight MH17 over Ukraine by Russia, as summarized below by The Times.  The conclusion is inescapable that the BUK’s presence—and therefore the shooting down of MH17--in Ukraine was authorized by Russia officials and could not have happened without the consent if not the instruction of Putin.

Sanctions against Russia should not be lifted until the final determination of culpability for shooting down MH17 has been determined, and additional sanctions should be imposed if Russia continues to attempt to interfere in the investigations and judicial proceedings.

 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-spy-chief-is-potential-suspect-in-downing-of-mh17-jwqcxxrct

We Are Entitled to Investigate, Debate and Act on Russian Interference

 TheHill.com

American actor Morgan Freeman tossed a firecracker among Russian scholars by lending his voice to a newly formed Committee to Investigate Russia, whose purpose is to confront Russian interference in American democracy.

The response on behalf of Russian scholars was taken up by well-known Russian expatriate journalist, Leonid Bershidsky, in an article on Sept. 20 in Bloomberg entitled, “Wanted: Russia Experts. No Expertise Required.” Sean Keeley makes a similar point in The Russian Interference Racket in The American Interest.

Bershidsky’s complaint against Freeman is that the Committee to Investigate Russia (CIR) and many who write about Russia have no background in the subject. Therefore, they lack the familiarity to provide the nuance necessary to understand Russia. Consequently, their views are ill-informed and incorrect, and too often manifest as Russophobia. These persons should leave Russia to the experts. However, Bershidsky’s complaint is dead wrong.

The issue is not understanding Russia. The issue is how to deal with Russian aggression against Western institutions and values. CIR “investigates” Russia by drawing attention to Russian interference through posting background information and articles published elsewhere. Although decidedly to the right of the spectrum, CIR addresses plenty of Americans' concern about Russian interference that is well-established, if not yet well-understood. This is hardly Russophobic.

Bershidsky disparages by name the competence of CIR’s advisory board members, who are highly accomplished professionals but do not meet his requisite standard for expertise in Russian affairs. That criticism is misplaced. Whatever their specific competencies, they have a stake in the issue. They are affected by Russian interference.

Following Bershidsky’s reasoning, Jimmy Kimmel, the outspoken American comedian and talk show host, has no business opining on health care reform because he is not a health-care specialist. Kimmel however has a personal stake in the healthcare issue that he has spoken about on his show, as do millions of Americans whose voices cannot be shut out because their familiarity with the issues does not rise to a certain standard. The question here is not a particular kind of competence but a personal stake in the consequences. The same goes for Russia’s behavior, climate change, or tax reform.

Morgan Freeman does say that Russia is at war with the U.S., but Russia’s interference in elections in the U.S. and elsewhere, as well as its attempts to sow conflict through social media, is incontestable. There is nothing exaggerated or overblown in what Freeman says in the video. This isn’t hyperbole or jingoism.

Diminished in standing by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos, Russia under Vladimir Putin has veered toward blaming the West and has chosen to retaliate by invading neighboring countries and by interfering in other countries in areas that are fundamental to those countries’ institutions and values. Russia has legitimate grievances related to its change in circumstances, fed at times by American bungling on the world stage, but it does not follow that Russia’s grievances legitimate its aggression against perceived slights and imagined threats. It doesn’t take special expertise to figure that out.

What Bershidsky decries as lacking expertise and authority is part and parcel of legitimate public debate. Russia experts may feel swamped by the growing public debate on Russia because the importance of the issue to the public has become more manifest with the growing evidence of Russian interference. Russian experts have to speak more loudly to be heard.

Bershidsky quotes Russian scholar, Samuel Greene, to the effect that Russian scholars are not being heard because they are keeping their heads down due to the rise in Russophobia. This is nonsense. The increase in public debate about Russia is a direct consequence of Russian actions against democratic institutions; and, the emergence in some corners of Russophobia does not invalidate or diminish genuine debate about Russia’s behavior. Bershidsky also references Russian affairs expert Mark Galeotti. However, Galeotti does not keep his head down. He continues to publish frequently, as should Greene.

Galeotti’s articles are excellent and should be read by anyone wishing to be well-informed on the nuances of Russian behavior. And, indeed, their voices may be needed to balance out more strident voices, such as Molly McKew, mentioned critically by both Bershidsky and Keeley, who appears on the Committee to Investigate Russia website. An example of an excellent perspective on how to deal with Russian interference is provided by Jan Jankowicz, fellow at the Kennan Institute, in The Only Way to Defend Against Russia’s Information War in the New York Times.

If the drama about Russian influence in the West—or for that matter Trump’s attack on NFL players for speaking their minds--teaches us anything, it is that public debate is the most effective weapon against the real threat of overbearing authority—from governments to extremists of the left and the right, and even the malicious, manipulative voices on social media.

We—the affected parties—are entitled to investigate, debate and act on Russian interference. We are better off if our views are based on objective fact and sound judgement. In the meantime, we need to listen to what legitimate voices across the spectrum have to say.

Dirk Mattheisen is a writer and blogger on political economy and independent consultant on institutional governance and strengthening the role of civil society in government. He is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group. Follow him on Twitter  @DirkMattheisen.

Putin's Trump Moment

© Getty Images

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have the same problem, they have squandered their credibility. They both appear clever because by chance they have spent a lifetime getting away with things that have brought down others long ago, and they lied about them. They get away with it because the audacity catches everyone off guard.

However, the lesson of Trump’s first months in office is that, once most people catch on, it is harder to pull off the next audacious stunt. Trump’s agenda from health care to that wall is stalled. Putin has had a longer run in public office but is having trouble with his agenda, too — from lifting oil prices to lifting sanctions.

Now that everyone has caught on to Russia’s election interference and propaganda, Putin’s audacious stunts, despite much hand wringing by his victims, are harder to pull off without a substantial reaction in response. Local elections held in Russia on Sept. 10 fit the pattern and spell possible trouble for next year’s presidential election that Putin is currently expected to win handedly.

On Sept. 10, Putin’s United Russia party swept local elections in the 16 Regions where elections took place, including in Sevastopol in Crimea seized by Russia from Ukraine in 2014. However, opposition candidates in Moscow made surprising gains.

As reported by RFE/RL, United Russia took about 77 percent of the contested seats in Moscow while opposition parties took the remaining 23 percent, putting them on track to “ win a majority of seats in 14 of the more than 100 administrative districts of the capital.” A modest but significant gain for the political opposition in a key region.

Some commentators have made much of this success, arguing that it shows Putin’s declining popularity among the important Moscow electorate. Others conclude it is a ploy by Putin to give the appearance of plurality and vent some of the pressure from alternatives to United Russia before next year’s presidential election.

In one version, Putin will announce in November that he is running for president, but as an independent, effectively throwing United Russia under the bus to deflect public unhappiness from Putin over poor economic conditions and the unpopular and expensive interventions in eastern Ukraine and Syria that are draining lives and the national budget.

Given that Putin is at the pinnacle of his domestic power, it is difficult to believe that election results in Moscow, where everything is controlled from the top, are anything but a ploy in Putin’s presidential reelection strategy. Moreover, poor opposition results elsewhere and numerous election fraud complaints indicate that the modest opposition win in Moscow had at the least Putin’s tacit approval. Since Putin does not intend to give up power, the opposition victories seem to be a tactical concession on the part of Putin.

There is a risk, however, that this very modest ploy will backfire. It is not yet an insurgency, but the appearance of political plurality may escalate into a demand for actual plurality. Such an escalation — like Trump’s surprise election — might effervesce from deep dissatisfaction among ordinary Russians about their poor economic prospects.

Ordinary Russians have already expressed unhappiness with political and economic corruption through the unexpected strength of protests earlier this year. If dissent grows, Putin’s ability to rule through a diminished United Russia party would be undercut. This why there are rumors of him running as an independent.  He would have to build a new coalition, a seemingly improbable event if he can’t hold United Russia together, or he may fall back on suppressing dissent through his control of the justice system and the newly established National Guard that reports directly to him and is trained for such purposes.

In which case, the likely outcome is the social upheaval that Putin wants to avoid (not to mention that Putin might again foment a foreign conflict to rivet the Russian people’s attention and loyalty). A worrisome feature of this election for Putin is that turnout was as low as 14-15 percent in some districts, which magnified the opposition vote, suggesting that Putin may be stung by voter apathy next year. It seems unlikely that a populist insurgent like Trump could disrupt a vote for Putin, but a disaffected public also means that when the insurgency comes it will be unexpected, widespread and messy.

That Putin believes there is a risk of an unpleasant surprise is also suggested by the wave of bomb threats across Russia over the last few days. It may be a prank or a genuine terrorist threat, but it also has the appearance of old tradecraft out of Russia’s security service (FSB) playbook. It’s hard to tell.

It’s an old trick to instill in the Russian people a sense of vulnerability to dark (usually foreign) forces, and their reaction is to look to the central government in Moscow to protect them. Alarmist statements from Russian officials that the bombing threat is unprecedented and could have come from Ukraine fit into this narrative, as does the response of Russian authorities, which has been unremarkable when they are more noted for overreacting. The perception of a Russia under siege from terrorism was, after all, what propelled Putin to power in 2000.

Putin has reason to worry, because, unlike Trump, he is not the disruptor this time. Putin’s game is defensive. He has to fend off challenges to his power. However, his tricks have grown stale and repetition has increased the Russian public’s awareness that the government is failing them. Few believe that elections are fair, the economy is tepid at best, and no one believes that there are no Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine. Putin and Trump have credibility problems because mistrust of them has only grown and for that reason Putin, like Trump, may win elections but lose the broad appeal necessary to rule.

Dirk Mattheisen is a writer/blogger on political economy and independent consultant on institutional governance as well as strengthening the role of civil society in government.  He is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group.  Follow him on @DirkMattheisen or dirkmattheisen.blogspot.com

Putin's Long Descent (Post 2)

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Having written my last post on "Putin's Long Descent", Foreign Policy has an excellent article this week by Mark Galeotti, visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations, that makes the same point that Putin's tactical successes are not translating into strategic gains, including that,

"The Russian president’s tactical instincts for how to seize an opportunity are so brilliant, and yet the strategic outcomes are almost invariably disastrous."

 and

"The Kremlin’s problem, among others, is that Putin the Opportunist is consumed by the moment. He is focused on what he can accomplish tomorrow, without necessarily thinking through to what the consequences may be the day after. He also too easily assumes that he will remain in control of what he started..."

The Foreign Policy article rightly points out that, in my words, Putin's successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here.  Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  (Putin's Long Descent)

Putin’s Long Descent

Photo Credit:  Euromaidan Press

As airstrikes resume in Aleppo after a brief pause, Putin seems to be on the verge of another tactical success and to hold the fate of Aleppo in his hands.  Yet Putin would have preferred that Syrian forces had already taken Aleppo.  Syrian forces, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters have failed to sew up a clear win over tenacious rebel forces.  In addition, even if Aleppo now falls, Russia will pay a high price for success because it will require carpet-bombing reminiscent of Putin’s conquest of Grozny during the second Chechen war.  The West is already united in condemning Russia’s barbarism in Syria and further brutality will have unpredictable consequences for Russia (even if the EU failed at its meeting on October 20 to threaten sanctions).

In fact, Putin finds himself where he has been before.

His successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here. Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  Consider each of Putin’s supposed successes.

Putin hoped to gather a new pan-Russian world under an Eurasian Economic Union, for which Ukraine was key.  He attempted to maneuver former Ukrainian President Yanukovych into keeping Ukraine under Russian suzerainty, including through bribes, threats and subversion of state institutions, especially the military and security services.  Not only did Putin misjudge the resistance and strength of civil society in Ukraine, his actions strengthened resistance to Russian dominance across all the former Soviet Republics. 

Putin attempted to base Russian economic power on rents from resource extraction and a corrupt keptocracy, but he misunderstood what drives a dynamic economy.  GDP growth slowed due to lack of investment and poor governance.  Russia then plunged into economic crisis when commodity prices collapsed in 2014 and sanctions were imposed on Russia for the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.  GDP feel 3.7% in 2015 and is expected to fall 1% in 2016.  Russia is currently running a budget deficit that may reach or exceed 4% this year, putting an enormous strain on social spending, including all-important public sector salaries and pensions upon which a large share of the population depends and upon which his support is based.  Even the modernization program for the military, with which Putin hopes to project Russian power, is subject to budget cuts.  GDP growth is projected to be nearly stagnant into the foreseeable future, without deep economic and governance reforms, and the Russian Economic Ministry projects no change in Russians’ living standard before 2035.

Reputedly, when deciding to seize Crimea, Putin asked his advisors if Russia could weather a year of adverse international reaction.  Putin mistakenly believed that the West was so dependent on Russian energy and so weakened by economic and political disarray--encouraged in part by Russia--that it could not sustain diplomatic opposition to Russia’s land grab for longer.  Putin appears not to have anticipated the scale of sanctions that were imposed by the US and the EU.  Nearly three years later, international isolation and the prospect of continuing sanctions looks only stronger due to lack of progress on a settlement in eastern Ukraine and events in Syria.  Meanwhile, Russia continues to bleed resources to sustain Crimea and Russian-backed eastern Ukraine, as well as conduct military operations in Syria.

Buoyed by the first flush of success when seizing Crimea, Putin attempted to take control of the east and south of Ukraine through Odesa to the Moldovan border, calling it “Novorossiya.”  The people did not rally to Russia as expected, and Russian provocateurs and local agents who attempted to seize control of the region were overwhelmed.  Russia had to send in “unmarked” regular troops and armor to stop the Ukrainian military advance in eastern Ukraine.  The price in dead Russians and diplomatic fallout became too high and Putin was beaten to a standstill.  During the course of the conflict, Russia and/or its proxies committed an act of international terrorism by shooting down a civilian aircraft, MH17, killing nearly 300 persons.  A Dutch-led investigation released in September 2016 confirmed Russian involvement and the identification, and possible prosecution, of guilty Russian military and political leaders is expected in the future. 

Putin pivoted to Syria, looking for new leverage over the West.  In Syria, Putin believed he had seized the initiative from a feeble EU and American response to the crisis, while avoiding an Afghanistan-like quagmire by relying solely on airpower to support the Syrian army, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters.  And, indeed, the West looked flatfooted and outmaneuvered.  But the Syrian army proved unable to make the gains that Russia expected.  Russian Special Forces and “irregulars”, as well as barbaric methods, had to be added to sustain gains.  Putin was compelled to add support for a campaign to take Aleppo.  As of this writing, the combined pro-government forces have yet to take the city.  In the meantime, the brutality of the campaign has alienated the EU, which condemned Russian supported bombing and threatened prosecutions for war crimes.  Rather than gaining leverage over the West, Russia finds itself even more isolated. 

Meanwhile, Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and others is disruptive but has given the US new resolve to confront unconventional Russian interference and aggression.  The US has promised a firm and unmistakable response.  Ecuador cut Julian Assange, the Wikileaks founder who is believed to be working hand-in-hand with Russia, off from the Internet on suspicion of interfering in the US election, and the Russian news service, RT, accused of propaganda, had its bank accounts frozen in the UK.  If Russia had hoped to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, it failed miserably.  Russia’s capacity to be disruptive will now be confronted by firm US and European counter-measures.

Even if one steps back and looks at Putin’s probable strategic objective of a West too weak and in disarray to counter Russia’s interests, it is not clear Putin is making any headway.  Discord in Europe is the result of homegrown political mismanagement and of events elsewhere, such as Syria, that Putin can only hope to exploit but not control.  Even where Russia has had an outsized influence, such as using illicit money and offshore financial centers to corrupt Western elites, the window is closing after numerous revelations, including the Panama Papers and Spanish indictments of Russian mobsters and serving political figures.  Everyone is now alert to Russia’s corrosive influence.  That elites can be corrupted or that institutions can be undermined is not an insight that Putin alone has.  Europe and the US understand it also and can be effective in confronting it.  In short, what the Soviet Union could not do, Russia cannot do either.  Although Putin has managed to elevate Russia’s profile on the international stage, its standing is fragile because Russia’s role is seen as more disruptive than constructive.

Putin may deflect, feint, cut his loses, and pivot to a new provocation to distract from his failure to translate tactical successes into strategic gains, but the costs are mounting and his opportunities are narrowing.  Fundamentally, Putin cannot overturn global leadership on the foundation of political deceit and corruption, nor on militant nationalism.  Lack of political credibility and corruption through which Putin hopes to undermine the West are more deeply rooted in Russia.  And militant nationalism—especially if based on ethnicity--is a formula for catastrophe, whether in Nazi Germany, post-Yugoslavia Serbia or contemporary Russia.

Although it has been touched on by policy analysts at times, Putin’s personality is an underestimated weakness that contributes to his penchant for miscalculation.  Putin is not fully aware of how the most human of qualities, “empathy”, informs judgment and, therefore, he does not understand how it affects political decisions.  Much like Benedict Cumberbatch’s Sherlock Holmes character in the hit series “Sherlock,” Putin is oblivious to societal norms because he is a “high-functioning sociopath.”   He recognizes societal norms based on empathy, such as aversion to doing harm and sympathy for those who suffer or are less fortunate, but he does not feel it, and because he doesn’t feel it he is suspicious and contemptuous of it.  He personally expresses little sympathy and evidences no effort to comfort those who suffer in Donbas or for the horror in Syria or the increasingly difficult circumstances of the Russian people, except at the abstract level of strategic policy when he condemns the actions of others that he perceives are directed against Russian power.  Putin perceives Western leaders' concern for the impact of their actions on people as weakness.

Putin is not only indifferent to causing harm, he is personally culpable.  Putin is strongly implicated in “terrorist” attacks that killed hundreds of Russian citizens in 1999 that propelled him into the Presidency on a law and order platform.   Military and security services under his command are also implicated in provocations in 1999 that launched the second Chechen war that killed tens of thousands.  Putin is believed to be responsible for the deaths of countless opponents, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko whom a British Public Inquiry concluded had been murdered on orders by Putin personally.  The imprisonment--and torture--in Russia of numerous Ukrainian citizens, including Ukrainian pilot, Nadiya Savchenko, could not occur without Putin’s concurrence.  There are no checks on Putin’s behavior and deaths of ordinary Russians, opponents, and citizens of other countries, do not bother him and so are not part of his calculus of risk.

With less room to maneuver and an increasingly fragile base on which to support his actions, Putin will attempt further aggression.  His current bluster in Syria, moving missiles closer to the EU, and invading Finnish airspace may be carefully calibrated to convey threat without risking direct confrontation, but Putin’s hubris and inability to empathize mean that he will overreach yet again, and at some point his luck will collide with his penchant for miscalculation, and he will experience a categorical tactical failure.  At that point, rather than be unmasked as fallible, Putin will attempt to reverse his failure, possibly up to and including through a tactical nuclear “event” (not necessarily, but possibly, involving an actual limited strike). With the smoke and mirrors removed, Putin will be revealed to be, like Stalin, a plague on Russia and the world.

Putin's Attempt to Delegitimize a Revolution (Paul Niland, KyivPost)

photo credit

Paul Niland is a blogger (Twitter @PaulNiland) and regular contributor to the KyivPost, a Ukrainian English-language newspaper.

He writes with exceptional clarity in an objective, fact-based manner on the Ukrainian reform process and Ukraine's continuing democratization.

His latest article responds to remarks by Russian President Putin that badly mischaracterize Ukraine's recent history and the status of the Minsk agreement.  The article is essential reading for those that are too easily misled by Russian misinformation and propaganda; particularly those in the Western press who frequently fail to challenge Putin's false narrative about events in Ukraine.

The article can be read here:

Putin's Attempt to Delegitimize a Revolution

Paul has also provided a definitive narrative on Ukraine's Maidan Revolution and subsequent events that should be required reading for informed reporting on Ukraine.

The Way Forward For Ukraine (Part 3)

Euromaidan Revolution Myth and Reality (Part 2)

What Has Changed In Ukraine Post-Yanukovych (Part 1)

and

The Will Of The People?

The Economic Cost of Putin's Miscalculations

http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/01/13/the-economic-cost-of-putins-miscalculations/

This One Is For The Russia Conspiracy Buffs

Not that I am saying that the following is so, but, if #Putin believes, as widely reported, that the West, led by the US, wants to destroy Russia or reduce it to an impoverished state selling primary resources to the advanced Western economies, what is Putin prepared to do to save #Russia?

We already know that he will go to great lengths.  He has plunged Russia into an economic and international relations crisis by seizing Crimea, invading eastern Ukraine, threatening other countries, and launching his own military campaign in Syria, because he believes Russia is under threat from the West.  He is prepared to act aggressively, if not rashly, to stave off what he believes is a threat to Russia’s existence.  We also know he will strike out in unexpected ways, using force, threats, lies, deception and subterfuge to force outcomes on his own terms.  Certainly, he has shown he is prepared to take risks beyond the West’s expectations.

Is the Western threat real?  Putin feels entitled to think so.  The expansion of NATO, the two Iraq wars, the US-led UN intervention in the Balkans, and Western support for “democratic” revolutions in Libra, Egypt, Ukraine, Syria and elsewhere, suggest a pattern of engagement directed at something.  Not incidentally, that something undermines Russian clients and expands Western military power into what Russia considers its strategic space. 

Certainly containing Russia seems to be a part of a US strategy.  A recent article in The New Yorker, “How the Bushes Misunderstood Cheney”, discusses how Vice President Cheney “tilted away from Mikhail Gorbachev and toward Boris Yeltsin because he believed that Yeltsin would push harder for the dissolution of the Soviet Union.”  The New Yorker reports that the Neoconservatives, who still prowl the corridors of Washington licking their wounds, had been asked by Cheney to prepare a study (led by Paul Wolfowitz) “…calling for the maintenance of a one-superpower world in the post-Soviet era as the core principle of US foreign policy.”

So if Putin believes that Russia’s existence is at stake, what else is he capable of?  His seemingly reckless and impulsive actions and apparent indifference to the harm these have done to Russia, suggest he is capable of more, substantial surprises.

Would recent seemingly unrelated news reports amount to a plausible guess? Let’s see…

One example of such news reports is that Russia is on a “voracious” gold buying spree.  It bought 31 tons of gold in August and 34 tons in September and in October, up from 36.8 tons bought in the entire second quarter of 2015.  Buying gold may make sense as a confidence building measure to support the ruble and to diversify Russia’s reserves away from dependence on the US dollar and the Euro.   But why buy gold now?  Putin has said that the worst of the economic crisis is behind Russia, so what is his concern?  Is the explanation that hoarding gold also makes sense if Putin plans more provocations?  Does he believe that buffering the ruble with gold will insulate Russia from the consequences of those provocations?  What does Putin have in mind?

Another example, on November 12 news services aired a story about plans for a new Russian torpedo equipped with a tactical nuclear warhead that is capable of taking out coastal infrastructure or population centers.  Since the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict it has been reported that members of Putin’s coterie favor the use of tactical nuclear arms to, for instance, take out a small European city (think, Kyiv or Lviv, or Warsaw) to convince the West that Russia was too dangerous to mess with.  The experience of Chernobyl is supposed to have convinced them that the damage to Russia from a limited nuclear event could be contained.  The “leak” of the nuclear torpedo story gives currency to the risk of a tactical nuclear event if Russia feels threatened.

Or, for example, on October 25, The New York Times and other news services reported that Russian submarines were “aggressively” prowling near the Atlantic underwater cables that carry most of the world’s Internet communications.  Damage to these cables would bring down not only vital global communications but also the Western economies, which are dependent on the flow of information.

Is this just saber rattling, or does Putin plan new provocations?  Does he believe that husbanding gold can insulate the ruble from the financial system consequences of another provocation?  Does Putin believe that a strike--even a substantial one-- on the West’s economic infrastructure is feasible because, if limited, it would not result in a fatal Western response?  Putin certainly has a taste for brinksmanship, and the tepid Western response to his provocations so far has only increased his distain for his opponents.  Does he believe that by delivering blows that incapacitate the West’s ability to respond he can save Russia—perhaps by delivering the blow through proxies that he can disavow, such as jihadists armed with dirty bombs using Russian-supplied materials.  If he believes Russia’s existence is at stake, how far is he prepared to go?

Just saying.