The Instagram War: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine is the First Conflict Dominated by Social Media

(This post was composed with the help of AI)

Russia’s Instagram war…and Telegram, X, Substack, TikTok, Facebook, and YouTube, etc.  For simplicity’s sake, we’ll just call it the Instagram War.  Instagram seems to have been the most popular app Ukrainians turned to in 2022 for posting and viewing events as Russia invaded Ukraine.  Instagram’s format, which emphasized images rather than text, was perfectly suited for posting and for viewing fast-moving events on the ground.

In essence, you didn’t have to understand; you just had to absorb.

As far back as 2014, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine—principally Crimea and Donbas.  Russia then escalated hostilities in 2022 to topple Ukraine’s government and conquer the rest of the country.

When Russian forces crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24, 2022, tanks, artillery, and aircraft marked the beginning of Europe's largest conventional war since the Second World War.

Yet another war also began: one was fought from trenches across fields and cities, but a second was fought digitally across millions of smartphone screens.

In WW1 there were newspapers and radio.  In WWII, there was television, in addition to newspapers and radio.  Now, there is social media, as well as television, radio, and newspapers… eh, not so much television, newspapers, and radio compared with social media.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the most extensively documented wars in history.  Soldiers, civilians, journalists, volunteers, and governments all became content creators. Every missile strike, embattled village, destroyed bridge, and humanitarian evacuation has the potential to appear on social media within minutes of taking place.

This transformation led many, even those remote from the conflict, to use social media both as the primary source of news and a battlefield for influence.

Traditionally, military news followed a familiar path. Events occurred, reporters verified them, editors reviewed the material, and stories appeared hours—or even days—later.  Frequently, the military and government actors controlled what was accessible and what was reported.

Now, Instagram and other media dominate access, which shortens timelines dramatically, facilitated by the global internet and through satellite systems, such as Starlink.

When explosions rocked Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, during the opening hours of Russia’s invasion, residents recorded the missile flashes from apartment balconies and uploaded videos almost immediately. Photos and videos were already circulating worldwide long before television networks assembled their correspondents or satellite trucks reached the capital.

This pattern repeated itself throughout the last four and half years of war.  The Russian war crimes in Bucha in the first days of Russia’s invasion, the missile strike on the shopping center in Kremenchuk, attacks on civilian apartment buildings in Dnipro, flooding after the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities were all first encountered by millions of viewers through social media.

Professional journalists increasingly monitored Instagram and Telegram, and other online sources, and satellite imagery, which, in itself, was available in nearly real-time, because eyewitness content frequently provided the earliest indication of significant military events.

In effect, Instagram and other social media evolved into an early-warning system for what was happening on the ground.

One reason Instagram and other social media became so influential is simple: everyone with a phone carries a camera.

Thousands of Ukrainians documented images as they unfolded around them.  Anyone anywhere in the world can watch in real-time, minute by minute, hour by hour, as the conflict unfolded—Russian soldiers sprinting across open fields chased by Ukrainian drones, ongoing Russian “human safaris” killing Ukrainian civilians in Kharkiv, Russian vehicles blowing up, and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities and villages.  Instead of relying exclusively on embedded journalists, audiences witnessed conflicts through the perspectives of teachers, doctors, students, firefighters, soldiers, and ordinary families with cill phones.

This immediacy created an unprecedented level of authenticity.  The content was visceral.  Raw smartphone footage—facilitated in time with drone photos and videos--often carried greater emotional impact than carefully edited television reports because viewers felt they were witnessing events firsthand.

However, authenticity did not necessarily guarantee accuracy.

Images spread rapidly, but many lacked context. Others were shared without location information.  Almost immediately, information led to misinformation and propaganda; recycled footage from previous conflicts or staged events were used to misrepresent current military operations and as evidence for something that did not happen.  Slowly at first and then rapidly, AI was used to create convincing “alternative realities” to what was real.

With the flood of information, verification became one of journalism's and other “interpreters” most essential responsibilities.  News organizations increasingly relied on open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques to authenticate social media posts. Analysts compared landmarks, weather conditions, shadows, road layouts, satellite imagery, and metadata to determine where and when footage had been recorded.  Geolocation specialists became almost as important as frontline correspondents.

Groups such as ISW, Bellingcat, and independent OSINT researchers demonstrated that publicly available Instagram and other social media images could be verified or debunked with remarkable precision.  This analytical process has become a defining feature of modern conflict reporting.

Both Ukraine and Russia recognized that social media’s influence on public opinion had become an important strategic objective.

Ukraine proved particularly effective at digital communication.  Government ministries, military organizations, emergency services, and political leaders published highly visual content that blended battlefield updates with appeals for international support.  Infographics summarized military developments, while photographs emphasized resilience, reconstruction, and civilian courage, as well as the destruction and suffering of soldiers and civilians.  The communication strategy was consistent, emotionally compelling, and designed for social media sharing.

Russian officials likewise used digital platforms and social media “influencers” to present their own interpretation of military events, although their access to Western social media audiences became increasingly restricted following international sanctions and the removal or limitation of certain social media platforms, such as Telegram.

The pressure to publish first encouraged users to upload dramatic footage before its authenticity could be confirmed. Once a sensational video accumulated hundreds of thousands of views, corrections rarely traveled as fast and as widely as the original post.

This phenomenon illustrates one of the central weaknesses of social media reporting.  Information spreads faster than verification.

Military officials occasionally requested that civilians delay posting videos showing missile interceptions or troop movements because such footage could reveal operational details to opposing forces. What seemed like harmless documentation sometimes carried genuine military consequences.

Social media algorithms prioritize content likely to generate engagement through comments, shares, saves, and viewing time.

In wartime, this often favors emotionally powerful imagery--burning buildings, dramatic rescues, grieving families, destroyed military equipment, and victorious soldiers.  Less visually compelling stories—such as diplomatic negotiations, logistical planning, humanitarian coordination, or economic sanctions—typically receive less attention despite their strategic importance.

As a result, Instagram and other social media can unintentionally distort perceptions of war by emphasizing emotionally charged moments over slower-moving developments that may ultimately determine the conflict's outcome.  The platform therefore shapes not only what people see but also what they believe matters most.

Military analysts increasingly began using Instagram as a source of intelligence.

Social media photographs and videos of captured equipment revealed new weapons entering the battlefield. Drone footage helped identify tactical targets.  Images uploaded by civilians sometimes confirmed troop movements before official announcements.

The most powerful social media, such as Instagram, were those formatted to convey visuals.  This represented a remarkable shift from the past where written newspaper accounts and the occasional photo (but never video) were relied on to convey events.

Open-source intelligence—once considered a niche specialty—became central to understanding the conflict. 

Publicly available Instagram and other content contributed to battlefield analysis alongside satellite imagery, commercial mapping services, and other digital sources.

Although governments still possessed classified intelligence capabilities, independent researchers demonstrated that significant military insights could emerge from publicly shared photographs and videos.

Instagram and others have become part of the intelligence ecosystem.

Despite its emphasis on breaking military news, Instagram and others also documented experiences that traditional military reporting sometimes overlooked.

Many of the conflict's most memorable images were not photographs or videos of combat, but portraits of (Ukrainian) resilience.  Families fleeing occupied territories, volunteers distributing humanitarian aid, surgeons working under emergency conditions, teachers conducting classes in underground shelters, and communities rebuilding damaged neighborhoods all appeared alongside battlefield updates.

These personal narratives reminded viewers that wars are ultimately experienced by individuals rather than armies.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered expectations about how wars are analyzed and reported.

While before social media, dozens of journalists would pursue a story and thousands, even hundreds of thousands, would read about an event, now social media dominates the information space.  Instagram has about 2 billion active users per month, Facebook about 3 billion, and YouTube about 2.7 billion, Telegram about 1 billion, and X about 600 million.  Many users overlap from platform to platform, but social media’s dominance is unquestionable. 

Instagram and other social media no longer function merely as a platform for sharing photographs and videos. It has become an ecosystem where eyewitnesses document breaking events, journalists locate emerging stories, governments communicate strategic narratives, analysts verify evidence, and global audiences consume military developments in real time.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will be remembered as the conflict that demonstrated how social media became an integral part of modern warfare itself.  The battlefield now extends beyond geography into algorithms, compressed timelines, and the “global attention” economy, where the first images of history often appear not on the evening news, but in a scrolling Instagram feed.

The following are among the best reporting on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,

·       Instagram; russiainvasionintoukraine, ukraine.ua, ukraine.defense,

·       Telegram; NoelReports

·       X and other apps; ISW.org (frequently cited)

·       Medium.com; Dylan Combellick and Raj K

There are many more, but also many that promote false narratives, misinformation, and propaganda.

Happy hunting, but be careful.

EU view is Russia is floundering

 

Russia can win only if the US gives Russia the win.

The US's Role in "Peace" Negotiations--Uncertain Ally of Ukraine and Europe

 Dylan Combellick is a commentator on Ukraine on Medium.com.

He covers every aspect of Russia's war on Ukraine, military, economic, political, and social.  He is a keen observer of the nuances of war relationships.  Unfortunately, those relationships are not what they should be, particularly the US's relationship with Ukraine.

What, for instance, are Witkoff (Trump's business associate) and Kushner (Trump's son-in-law) doing in the negotiations?  They have no formal authority within the US government and no expertise in war--or "peace"--negotiations.  They are there solely because they are close to President Trump, who wants a peace deal more than he wants peace.  Trump wants to appease Russia at the expense of Ukraine for his personal ambition rather than for the welfare of Ukraine or for the security of the US and Europe.

Dylan's comment below from today's commentary is particularly apt.

The US often acts like an adversary rather than an ally of Ukraine and against its own interests in relations with Russia.

And NoelReports on X today. Also, an excellent source.

Short of Everything: the Coming Collapse of Russia

 

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The Russian Federation is eroding militarily, financially, economically, demographically, and culturally (societal values).  Its collapse is inevitable because it is set on a course of self-extinction.  In the five areas mentioned, Russia is expending more than it can replace.

Whether your point of reference is Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's Why Nations Fail, or Peter Heather and John Rapley's Why Empires Fall, or Peter Zeihan's The End of the World is Just the Beginning.

Militarily, Russia is losing more than it can replace in terms of vehicles and personnel.  It may perhaps have yet enough to lay waste to a greater portion of Ukraine, but its diminishing military resources will never be enough to conquer all of Ukraine, and it will never rebuild its military due to its overall decline. 

Financially, Russia is spending far more than it has.  Many regional governments in Russia are bankrupt, and at the federal level, there is not enough money to bail out the regional governments because energy exports have collapsed due to sanctions and Ukraine's missile and drone attacks on Russian energy production and distribution.  No other nation, even China, is going to bail out Russia because they are all watching and calculating the slow financial collapse of Russia.

Closely related to Russia's financial crisis is its economic decline.  Other than oil and gas and agricultural production, Russia doesn't produce anything that the world buys.  Its manufacturing and technical capacity is too limited and often out-of-date--Russian oil and gas production is heavily dependent on foreign technology.

Demographically, Russia is in rapid decline.  The additional impact of the war on Russian demographics is substantial.  Over 1 million Russians have died or have been severely wounded.  These casualties are the working-age men (and women) that Russia relies on to drive the economy.  

Culturally (societal values), Russia has a growing problem.  The people of Russia are growing impatient with Putin's war as the consequences affect them; for instance, through gasoline shortages and blackouts.  Leading former supporters of the special military operation (war) are beginning to express frustration.  And as the hundreds of thousands of war veterans return home, the Russian government will not be able to meet their expectations.

I've chosen not to rehash the particulars of each of the points above that will erode and eventually--sooner rather than later--collapse the Russian state.  But here are some of recent articles that explore each of the areas that I wrote about.

Kost Elisevick--https://kostelisevich.com/2025/09/23/putins-end-of-days/

Reuben F. Johnson the Director of Research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation -- https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/the-collapse-of-russia-has-just-begun/ar-AA1J475i

https://www.forbes.com/sites/marktemnycky/2025/10/08/how-the-war-in-ukraine-has-sparked-a-demographic-crisis-in-russia/

Foreign Affairs--https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/cracks-russias-war-economy#

National Security Journal--https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-collapse-of-russia-has-just-begun/

Mikhail Khodorkovsky--https://www.msn.com/en-ie/politics/international-relations/i-m-a-russian-dissident-living-in-london-putin-knows-the-end-is-coming-soon/ar-AA1Pr497?ocid=BingNewsVerp

Stupid People Make Stupid Government--And There's A Law For That

You know, I'm just going to leave this here.  It's obvious what is going on.

There is a federal regulation that covers things like this (see below).

 

In case you wonder how political partisanship by US government employees/appointees is supposed to be dealt with, there's this below (from AI Gemini).  The US Office of Special Counsel (osc.gov), mentioned at the bottom, explains it and is responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations like these.

AI Gemini on Political Partisanship in the US government

The core US policy aimed at limiting political partisanship within the federal government is the Hatch Act of 1939 (amended in 1993 and 2012).   

The purpose of the Hatch Act is to ensure that federal programs are administered in a nonpartisan fashion, protect federal employees from political coercion in the workplace, and ensure employees are advanced based on merit rather than political affiliation.   

---

Key Provisions of the Hatch Act

The Hatch Act applies to most employees in the executive branch of the federal government (excluding the President and Vice President) and certain state and local employees whose positions are federally funded.   

Prohibited Activities (Generally Applies to All Covered Employees)

Federal employees may not engage in partisan political activity:   

• While on duty (this includes teleworking).   

• In any federal room or building or while wearing an official uniform or insignia.   

• While using a federally-owned or leased vehicle or federal property/resources (like work computers or email).   

• They may not use their official authority or influence to interfere with or affect the result of an election.   

• They are prohibited from being candidates for public office in partisan elections.   

• They may not solicit or receive political contributions for a partisan political party, candidate, or group (with limited exceptions).   

Permitted Activities

Most federal employees are considered "less restricted" and may engage in partisan political activities while off duty, outside of a federal facility, and not using federal property, including:   

• Voting and expressing their opinions about candidates and issues.   

• Contributing money to political campaigns, parties, or groups.   

• Attending and being active at political rallies and meetings.   

• Campaigning for or against candidates, referendums, or ordinances.   

• Being a candidate in a nonpartisan election.

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) is the independent agency that investigates and prosecutes alleged violations of the Hatch Act. Penalties for violations can include removal from federal employment, reduction in grade, suspension, or civil fines.

Making Clear the Absurdity of the Russian Position on Peace

 

Dylan Combellick is an online commentator on Russia's war on Ukraine.  His background, including living in Ukraine, gives him a grounded perspective on the war in Ukraine.  Here's his profile on Medium.com,

But his special expertise is making clear in simple terms what issues are at stake on the battleground and in geopolitical terms.

Below is a quote from his latest article that illustrates the absurdity of Russia's demands for a negotiated peace agreement.

Especially his last, simple sentence sums up nicely the absurdity of Russian claims.

"I wrote about how to win the war against Russia using Russian tactics. I left out one of the most important, negotiations.

"When entering negotiations with Russia, do what they do — demand the insane, then offer “concessions” and settle for the merely absurd.

"Thus, Ukraine’s opening position should be the annexation by Ukraine of all traditionally Ukrainian lands, including Sochi and Primorye, Rostov, Kursk, and Belgorod. Next to that would be complete nuclear disarmament of Russia and strict limits to conventional arms. Then, Russia should not be allowed to join any alliances that would threaten Ukraine's security, like BRICS or defensive pacts with Iran, North Korea, or other nations that have supplied arms or manpower to Russia. Putin’s legitimacy as leader is in question, as there have never been open and fair elections in Russia, and the press is tightly controlled. Religions are harshly suppressed in Russia, with many churches having been banned entirely.

"Below is a map from a Soviet-era textbook showing the outlines of “nationalities of the USSR.” Note how most of the Rostov and Kursk regions are Ukrainian.

Press enter or click to view image in full size

‘Concessions’ in the Russian style can then be made. “We will allow you to keep twelve nuclear weapons if you agree to pay $500 billion in reparations.” “We will allow Putin to remain in his illegitimate post as leader if you surrender two hundred other war criminals.” “If you will allow the open practice of Mormonism and pay for the construction of Mormon churches, then we will allow your refineries to be rebuilt.” … and so on.

"Demand what you have no right to demand, pretend ownership of things that are not yours, assume rights that are not possessed, and negotiate from a position of absurdism."

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The Illusion of a Ukrainian Peace Through a Flawed Negotiation Process

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Mike Pompeo, Trump's former CIA Director and Secretary of State during Trump's first term, has an opinion piece in this weekend's FT about the Ukrainian peace process that, while correct in it's thrust that Ukraine needs credible and robust security guarantees, opens unconsciously with just what is wrong with the American approach under Trump.

Pompeo writes in his opening,"The president [Trump] is marshaling American strength to build the coalition necessary to secure Ukraine's future--exactly the kind of leverage Putin fears."  Pompeo's obsequious praise of Trump may be necessary to ingratiate Pompeo with Trump, but it is an absurd characterization of Trump's effectiveness in negotiating with Putin.

In the same edition of FT, Trump critic and historian, Timothy Snyder, writes in an article titled, The Myths that Made Putin's War, a more  realistic appraisal of Trump's effectiveness.  Timothy Snyder--writing in the context of Russia's mythical past that justifies, in Muscovy's (Moscow's) mind, its war on Ukraine--writes,

"Russia is now engaged in a war in eastern Europe.  And, apropos of this war, it is dominating the court of its stronger rival, the US.  The Trump administration surrenders position after position.  No longer, under Trump, need Putin fear condemnation for his illegal invasion and Russia's extensive war crimes.  Standard means of deterring future wars, such as trials, reparations and troop deployments, are conceded in advance, in exchange for nothing.  US military aid to Ukraine has been stopped twice and, to all appearances, will be allowed simply to run out."

Pompeo writes that the Ukrainian people are "exhausted by years of bloodshed and destruction" and "peace will probably require difficult compromises." But that is for the Ukrainian people and their leaders to decide.  Ukraine did not choose this moment or this circumstance.  Indeed, they have no choice.

The US negotiating separately with Putin, and in bad faith, is not a substitute.