Showing posts with label Sanctions. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sanctions. Show all posts

Friday, January 28, 2022

Russia’s Ukrainian Agents


Photo Credit: China Daily - Ukraine Parliment 2012

The US Treasury notice sanctioning four Ukrainians for “activities to destabilize Ukraine” is a compelling window on Moscow’s campaign of subversion that complements its campaign of military aggression.  Each of the Ukrainians is accused of aiding Russia against Ukraine through activities that undermine Ukraine’s government and civil society.   You read that right.  Ukrainians against Ukraine.

Take Taras KOZAK(age 49) from Lviv in western Ukraine. He is a current member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Opposition Platform – For Life party led by Victor Medvedchuk, who is himself sanctioned by the U.S. for undermining Ukrainian sovereignty in 2014 ( Medvedchuk, a close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is currently under house arrest in Ukraine for treason). US Treasury writes,

“Kozak, who controls several news channels in Ukraine, supported the [Russian] FSB’s plan to denigrate senior members of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inner circle, falsely accusing them of mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, Kozak used his news platforms to amplify false narratives around the 2020 U.S. elections first espoused by U.S.-designated Andrii Leonidovych Derkach (Derkach). Kozak has attempted to legitimatize Derkach’s claims by rebroadcasting Derkach’s false assertions about U.S. political candidates. Throughout 2020, Kozak worked alongside FSB intelligence agents.”

Or, take Oleh VOLOSHYN (age 40) from Kyiv. Like Kozak, Voloshyn is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament and a member of the political party led by Medvedchuk. US Treasury writes,

“Voloshyn has worked with Russian actors to undermine Ukrainian government officials and advocate on behalf of Russia. Voloshyn also worked with U.S.-designated Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian national with ties to Russian intelligence who was sanctioned for attempts to influence the U.S. 2020 presidential election, to coordinate passing on information to influence U.S. elections at the behest of Russia.”

US Treasury writes that “Russia has directed its intelligence services to recruit current and former Ukrainian government officials to prepare to take over the government [underline added] of Ukraine and to control Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with an occupying Russian force. At the heart of this effort are Taras Kozak (Kozak) and Oleh Voloshyn (Voloshyn)”

Then there is Volodymyr OLIYNYK (a.k.a., Oleinik or Oliinyk) (age 64) from Yalta, Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, who fled to Moscow for vote-rigging in 2014. US Treasury writes that,

“Oliynyk has a history of supporting Russia, currently resides in Moscow, Russia, and shares Russia’s anti-Western sentiments. In 2021, Oliynyk worked at the direction of the [Russian] FSB to gather information about Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

…

“As in previous Russian incursions into Ukraine, repeated cyber operations against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure are part of Russia’s hybrid tactics to threaten Ukraine. The overall strategy is designed to pull Ukraine into Russia’s orbit by thwarting Ukraine’s efforts at Western integration, especially with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Russia has pursued broad cyber operations against critical infrastructure, it has focused on disrupting one critical infrastructure sector in particular: Ukraine’s energy sector [underline added]. Russia has also degraded Ukraine’s access to energy products in the middle of winter. Acting through Russia’s state-owned gas company Gazprom, Russia has repeatedly disrupted supplies to Ukraine—a vital transshipment country with pipelines to other European countries—due to purported disputes over gas pricing.”

Or, lastly, Vladimir SIVKOVICH (a.k.a. Sivkovych) (age 61) from the Kyiv region. The US Treasury writes,

”Vladimir Sivkovich (Sivkovich) is the former Deputy Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council. In 2021, Sivkovich worked with a network of Russian intelligence actors to carry out influence operations that attempted to build support for Ukraine to officially cede Crimea to Russia [underline added] in exchange for a drawdown of Russian-backed forces in the Donbas, where separatists continue to receive support from Russia. In early 2020, Sivkovich coordinated with Russian intelligence services to promote Derkach’s disinformation campaign against the U.S. 2020 presidential election. Sivkovich, who has ties to the FSB, also supported an influence operation targeting the United States from 2019 to 2020.”

As the US Treasury explains,

“…The four individuals have played various roles in Russia’s global influence campaign to destabilize sovereign countries in support of the Kremlin’s political objectives [underline added].”

…

“Russian intelligence services, including the FSB, recruit Ukrainian citizens in key positions to gain access to sensitive information, threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, and then leverage these Ukrainian officials to create instability in advance of a potential Russian invasion [underline added].”

"In 2020, Kremlin officials launched a comprehensive information operation plan designed in part to degrade the ability of the Ukrainian state to function independently [underline added]…This included identifying and co-opting pro-Russian individuals in Ukraine and undermining prominent Ukrainians viewed as pro-Western, who would stand in the way of Russian efforts to bring Ukraine within its control [underline added]. Goals of the plan included destabilizing the political situation in Ukraine and laying the groundwork for creating a new, Russian-controlled government in Ukraine."

Russia systematically suborns Ukrainians, especially those in government or the military, who are susceptible through bribery or coercion to act against Ukraine.  Outside observers of events in Ukraine can be confused by–if not outright hostile to–Ukraine because these Ukrainian persons appear to be evidence that Ukrainian society does not support its government or an independent, democratic Ukraine.  Indeed, they are led to believe that part of Ukrainian society dreams of rejoining Russia.  For an outside observer, the Ukrainians who are loyal to Moscow–although few–create confusion about how deep, or shallow, Ukrainian society’s sense of identity is. And that confusion helps fuel Russian disinformation that casts doubt how cohesive the Ukrainian state and society are.

The corrupt Ukrainians who fled Kyiv for Moscow when former President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted are well-known.  But it is inexplicable how pro-Moscow individuals can be members of Ukraine’s parliament today and act against Ukraine’s national interest--they are not just sympathetic, they act on behalf of Moscow against Ukraine. In another country, they would be prosecuted as traitors. A particular threat is Victor Medvedchuk, who not only leads a pro-Moscow political party but has direct access to Putin and to other individuals at the highest level in the Kremlin and whose personal interests are more aligned with Moscow than with Kyiv.

Although fueled by a Russian campaign of subversion and corruption, it is alarming that Russia finds Ukrainians willing to trade their country for Moscow’s favors.


For more on the four sanctioned individuals, read Irene Kenyon, former Treasury intelligence officer and Director of Risk Intelligence for FiveBy Solutions.

For an excellent analysis how Russia might use suborned Ukrainian politicians or government functionaries to undermine Ukraine's legitimate government, see Euromaidan Press article,

Of Kremlin plans and thinking: The “Murayev coup” plot seen through the prism of the Surkov Leaks

Monday, October 4, 2021

Pandora Papers Leak - More Evidence that Economic and Financial Sanctions Work

Among the insights from the Pandora Papers leak is that sanctions against hostile state actors and enablers work--a hotly contested point in international relations.  The Pandora Papers provide abundant evidence that sanctions inflict a high cost on the targets of those sanctions.  In an article in The Washington Post, Greg Miller writes,

"Over the past seven years, the United States and Europe have imposed sanctions on more than 800 Russian individuals and entities for alleged “malign” behavior including Russia’s annexation of Crimea, armed incursions into Ukraine, attempted assassinations of political dissidents, cyberattacks on Western institutions and disruptions of U.S. elections.

"The Pandora files show sanctions not only hitting their Russian targets but then triggering losses that spread across their interconnected financial networks.

...“The impact of such measures can be severe. Treasury designations all but lock targets out of global markets, where the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency, and bar U.S. banks and companies from doing business with them.”

In other words, sanctions do what they are meant to do, unquestionably inflict a significant cost on their targets, even though they do not prevent hostile acts.  Miller writes,

"But the files also underscore the limits of sanctions, making clear that vast quantities of Russian money continue to slosh through secret global accounts while Moscow’s actions beyond its borders seem undeterred. Russia remains in control of Crimea, a prominent critic of Putin was poisoned last year, and U.S. intelligence agencies accused Moscow of mounting a new attack on a U.S. presidential election."

However, short of removing hostile actors from their positions of power by force, the U.S. and the West can use sanctions to influence--if not ultimately stop--hostile acts from reoccurring.  Miller, again, 

"Current and former U.S. officials said the losses and reactions depicted in the documents demonstrate the reach of the West’s financial arsenal. The officials said these punitive measures influence the Kremlin’s calculations if not always change its course."

Or, as Miller quotes Julia Friedlander,

“What it shows is that these networks don’t feel untouchable,” said Julia Friedlander, who served in senior positions at the Treasury Department and the White House during the Obama and Trump administrations. “Although sanctions have often failed to deliver on larger political goals,” she said, they disrupt adversaries who “rely on our financial markets as an element of their own power.”

Miller's article is a worthwhile read on how sanctions impose a substantial cost on Russian oligarchs who align themselves with President Putin's policies and acts of aggression:

For a description of the Pandora Papers leak and what the leak is revealing, go to ICIJ.org.


Wednesday, April 29, 2020

The Tightening MH17 Noose Around the Throat of Putin

                                                                                                                        photo credit

No need to add anything to this.  Bellingcat has again done a superb job of bringing to light the facts about the shooting down of Malaysia Flight MH17 over Ukraine by Russia, as summarized below by The Times.  The conclusion is inescapable that the BUK’s presence—and therefore the shooting down of MH17--in Ukraine was authorized by Russia officials and could not have happened without the consent if not the instruction of Putin.

Sanctions against Russia should not be lifted until the final determination of culpability for shooting down MH17 has been determined, and additional sanctions should be imposed if Russia continues to attempt to interfere in the investigations and judicial proceedings.

 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-spy-chief-is-potential-suspect-in-downing-of-mh17-jwqcxxrct

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Do Sanctions Against Russia Work (Continued)?

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Following my article in Euromaidan Press, Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?, the New York Post has a good article in the same vein entitled When Sanctions Work--And Why They Fail.  To be clear, the author, Ralph Peters, writes that sanctions against Russia are working and should be continued (while he argues sanctions against North Korea and Iran are another story).  He writes regarding sanctions against Russia (underlining added),

"Contrary to counter-factual claims, economic sanctions imposed on Russia after successive invasions of its neighbors have had a profound effect ...Sanctions have bitten Russia for two reasons.  First, they coincided felicitously with a global collapse in energy prices.  Putin’s economic monoculture relies on income from gas and oil exports.  The double-whammy of cheap gas and Western sanctions hit Russia hard, causing Putin to pause his war in Ukraine and now to cut his defense budget.  But the second reason is that even Putin has to answer to his people at some level. And while Russia’s been under sanctions, the poverty rate doubled, inflation soared, pensions declined dramatically in real value and trade collapsed.  For months, Russian newspapers insisted that there was no shortage of medicines — which told Russia-watchers there were medicine shortages.  Sanctions alone won’t bring Putin down, but they’ve imposed a painful cost for his bad behavior.  As evidence mounts of Russian attempts to subvert our democracy, it would be wanton capitulation to remove the sanctions now"
He writes as well,
"...in Russia sanctions are frustrating Putin’s hostile ambitions, crippling his ability to modernize his military machine. Discontent is deepening, if slowly: The old maxim that Russians unite in their suffering breaks down when Russians see their leaders and favored oligarchs leading lives of unprecedented opulence."
As I wrote in my original post, sanctions have had a substantial impact in containing Russia aggression--Moscow does not dictate what Kyiv's domestic and international polices should be, its hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, its dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead, sanctions are responsible for 1.5% to 6% of Russia's economic decline, and Russia's prospects for significant economic growth are dim.

There was one point though that I failed to make in my original article that is echoed by Ralph Peters when he writes that sanctions are a tool not a stand-alone solution.  Sanctions are essential to tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine, but the real reason Ukraine has been able to stand up to Russia's aggression is because its civil society would not submit to intimidation and violence by either the corrupt Yanukovych government or by Putin's Russia, and because of the stubborn, valorous defense of Ukraine by its armed volunteer brigades and military.  As long as Ukrainian society stands firm, Russia has little prospect of achieving its aims, and sanctions are an essential aid in helping Ukraine remain a free and independent nation.   However, even now, Ukraine's civil society and its military continue to suffer daily from Russian aggression.  So far in 2017, 21 civilians have been killed and 95 wounded in daily fighting with Russian-led forces along the line of contact with the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  In March alone the Ukrainian military suffered 27 killed and 189 wounded.  Russia's aggression toward Ukraine and other countries is reason to sustain and expand sanctions until Russia reverses its behavior.  As both Ralph Peters and I write, sanctions take time but they are taking a heavy toll on Russia and in time Ukrainian resolve and sanctions will end Russia aggression.


Friday, February 10, 2017

Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?

To hear Marine Le Pen talk, sanctions against Russia don’t work, and she stands a decent chance of being elected president of France.  She has company here and there in odd places.  The deputy speaker of the Serbian parliament, Gordana Chomich, recently said she could not support sanctions because they hurt the Russian people, and did sanctions actually target oligarchics anyway?ma
So, do sanctions work and whom do they harm?
The best evidence for the success of sanctions is that Russia has not achieved its goals.
Moscow does not dictate to Kyiv what its domestic and international policies should be. Socially, the chances of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv are slim to none. Russia is mired in a costly military campaign in eastern Ukraine from which it cannot withdraw nor can it scale up without fear of new sanctions. Russia has failed to take Mariupol or create a land bridge to Crimea that is vital to making Crimea economically viable.
Moreover, Russia’s hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, while Crimea endures an economic collapse that Russia can’t remedy, compounded by crude Russian social oppression that is routinely condemned by others.  And dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead. Russia will be constrained by sanctions for as long as it does not withdraw from Ukraine.

Economic losses: from 1.5% to 6% of GDP

In terms of Russia as a whole, if Alexii Kudrin is to be believed, sanctions cost Russia 1.5% of GDP, which aligns with the IMF, which estimates that
”…sanctions and counter sanctions might have initially reduced real GDP by 1 to 1½ percent. Prolonged sanctions may compound already declining productivity growth. The cumulative output loss could amount to 9 percent of GDP over the medium term.”
Since the Russian economy is expected to grow at about 1.5% in the future, that is equivalent to 6 years of no growth.
Estimates that Russia lost over $100 bn in 2014/2015 due to sanctions suggest the cost is higher.  A loss of $100 bn for a Russian economy that went from a GDP of about $2,100 bn in 2014 to about $1,300 bn in 2015–in large part due to the fall in energy prices–suggests a cost from sanctions in those two years of anywhere from 2 to 6% of GDP in rapidly evolving economic circumstances.

Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that after three years of low oil prices and sanctions, Russian finances are now in a desperate state and, therefore, sanctions have contributed to a substantial decline in Russia’s economic welfare. 
For example, the murky Rosneft privatization suggests Russia is moving funds between the government, central bank, and public enterprises to make it look like government finances are better than they really are.  Rosneft is a sanctioned firm and has had trouble securing financing to sustain its operations, at one time seeking a bailout from the Russian government.  It also suggests that massive corruption continues.

Rejection of Russia’s behaviour

Beyond the failure to achieve its goals and the economic cost, there are other equally important impacts from sanctions. Sanctions demonstrate a rejection by the international community of Russia’s behavior.
The US and the EU have acted on behalf of the principle of self-determination and the inviolability of national borders, and they continue to do so. 
This provides Ukraine an international stage from which to counter Russia’s aggression.  Over time, the UN and various EU bodies have fallen in line, as well, in explicitly condemning Russian aggression toward Ukraine, adding to the effect of sanctions.

Targeted effect

In addition, the nature of sanctions has been important in targeting their effect. The most important sanctions are the more comprehensive ones that prohibit providing new debt or equity of greater than 30 day’s maturity and restrictions on the energy and defense sectors. 
These prohibitions, along with a reluctance to risk capital in Russia while tensions persist, have all but eliminated Russia’s access to international finance.
Foreign investment in Russia has plummeted from $71 bn in 2013 to just $7 bn in 2016.  It is not expected to return to anywhere near the 2013 level in the foreseeable future (IMF: Russian Federation – Staff Report For The 2016 Article IV Consultation). In the absence of sanctions, what is the likelihood that companies such as ExxonMobil would have halted their investment plans in Russia? They might have assessed the risk as higher, but the prohibitions and arm-twisting provided by sanctions are what stopped them.
The other sanctions that were designed to target key businesses and individuals in Russia are important, as well, in recognition of the role they play in supporting Putin. By targeting wealthy or influential businesses and individuals closely associated with Putin, the West hoped to hurt those who were key in enabling Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As beneficiaries of vast riches extracted from the Russian economy, their interests are in self-enrichment at the expense of the state and the people.
Putin is clearly worried about public discontent as the 2018 election approaches and, if Putin’s support begins to look shaky, he has to worry about the loyalty of the oligarchs and others who are already hurting from sanctions.

Sanctions take time

In one key respect sanctions have been exceptional. Against expectations, they have held. The West has new found resolve to confront Russian interference in the affairs of not only Ukraine but of all Western countries through its manipulation of information and various forms and levels of aggression.
No one, including Marine Le Pen, should be surprised that sanctions take time.  Russia is still a large, powerful country capable of defending itself economically and politically.  Sanctions are not war.  They don’t produce dramatic, immediate results.  Even wars don’t yield immediate results; otherwise, Russia would have gotten what it wanted long ago.  Sanctions take time, but they are ultimately effective; as sanctions against Iran, Myanmar and South Africa have shown.
When sanctions are not effective, such as in the case of North Korea, it is the sanctioned state that suffers.  North Korea has been reduced to an isolated, impoverished pariah state.  Like North Korea, Russia now faces years of economic stagnation–and probably slow national decline–unless it can find a way to reform its economy and a path to rapprochement with the international community.
Marine Le Pen can rest assured that sanctions are effective. A new report by the US Department of State concludes that sanctions against Russia have caused substantial harm to targeted individuals and firms. As reported by BuzzFeedNews the State Department report concludes that
“the average sanctioned company or associated company loses about one-third of its operating revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third of its employees relative to their non-sanctioned peers.” BuzzFeedNews goes on to report, 
“…the researchers also discovered that the “smart” or “targeted” sanctions placed against Russian companies and individuals starting in 2014 live up to their name. The four rounds of sanctions that have been put into place — aimed at Putin’s inner circle, several Russian banks, the defense industry, and the energy sector — have, according to the paper, managed to affect those individuals without being a primary damager of the Russian economy broadly.”
BuzzFeedNews quotes Bill Browder, co-founder of Hermitage Capital Management Group and zealous critic of Putin, that Putin is “apoplectic” about the sanctions and as told by Browder,
“In my mind, the reason for that reaction is that wealth is so concentrated in Russia that you can go after the assets of just a few bad players and you have a disproportionate effect on the evil and rot in Russia.”

Harm to ordinary Russians?

Since 2013 nearly all Russians have experienced a decline in their economic welfare, and poverty has increased dramatically—it rose from 11.2%, or 16.1 mn people in 2014, to an estimated 14.2%, or 20.1 mn people in 2016. Deputy speaker Gorsana Chomich should know though that the principal reason is not sanctions but poor economic management and the collapse in energy prices, as well as self-inflicted economic harm from political adventurism.
In the realm of sanctions, the greatest harm to ordinary Russians has come from Russia’s own counter-sanctions, especially on the import of food, which has driven up prices beyond what many Russian can afford.
Lest deputy speaker Gorsana Chomich still harbor concerns that sanctions have not been specific enough, as of mid-2016 the US has sanctioned by name 111 businesses and political figures and 82 firms and an additional 136 firms under the sectoral sanctions (an additional 7 individuals, 8 firms, and 2 vessels were added in December 2016).  The EU has sanctioned as of mid-2016 149 individuals and 37 firms and an additional 20 firms under sectorial sanctions.  Information on US and EU sanctions, including targeted individuals and businesses can be found here (US) and here (EU).
Sanctions are the consequence of Russia’s own policies and the limited means available to the West to influence Russia’s aggression against other states. 
The economic welfare of ordinary Russians will not change materially if Western sanctions end because economic growth will still not be sufficient without internal reform.  Economic reform is supposedly conditioned by Russian’s fear of economic chaos, but that is not the choice.  Russia can prosper in the same way that all countries prosper through sound economic policies and a strong civil society.  Ordinary Russian’s suffering is not an integral part of Russian exceptionalism, as much as Putin would like to convey that impression.
It is a toss up whether the Russian upper, middle or lower class will buckle first, but, when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was the Russian elite that led the rush for the exits.  When that happens again, will Putin have the wisdom of Gorbachev to concede the obvious and step aside?

An excellent and balanced overview of sanctions against Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the context of broader US-Russia relations by Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew from the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs can be found here.