Showing posts with label @Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label @Ukraine. Show all posts

Thursday, August 14, 2025

According to a Lawfare Survey, Most Americans Support Ukraine And The Number Is Growing


 Lawfare Blog:

"Nearly two-thirds of Americans polled, 64 percent, say they sympathize more with Ukraine compared to two percent who say they sympathize more with Russia. This support for Ukraine constitutes an increase of five percent from 59 percent the last time we conducted a similar poll in March 2025. Notably, most of the increase came from Republicans whose sympathy went up from 45 percent in March of 2025 to 55 percent in the latest poll, while Democratic support remains nearly the same at 83 percent compared to 82 percent in March 2025. Sympathy with Russia has remained nearly non-existent at 2 percent—a constant since July 2024—with practically no Democrats sympathizing more with Russia and only 3 percent of Republicans saying the same."

Lawfare Blog is a non-profit multimedia publication dedicated to “Hard National Security Choices.” They provide non-partisan, timely analysis of thorny legal and policy issues.  They strive to achieve academic-level depth with magazine-level readability at the pace of news...with a relentless focus on substantive issues that matter.  Their areas of coverage range from national security law, threats to democracy, cybersecurity, executive powers, content moderation, domestic extremism, and foreign policy, among many others.

The term "Lawfare" is the use of legal systems and institutions to affect foreign or domestic affairs, as a more peaceful and rational alternative, or as a less benign adjunct, to warfare. Wikipedia

Media Bias/Fact Check rates Lawfare Blog as,

  • Overall, we rate Lawfare Blog Least Biased based on evidence-based balanced reporting. We also rate them Very High for factual reporting due to proper sourcing and for being used as a resource for verified fact-checkers.

Tuesday, January 24, 2023

The Noisy Death of Russian Imperialism




Nothing will bring an end to the Russian empire more than an accurate historical accounting of the subjugation of its colonized nationalities.  Truth has the power to undermine governments and armies and the myths that these rely on for power.

Russia will not cease to exist but its empire will.

Botakoz Kassymbekova, Assistant Professor of modern history at the University of Basel, describes the Western mindset that failed to recognize the imperial subjugation of nationalities under Russian domination, especially the brutal oppression under the USSR.  

Russia’s war under Putin is a manifestation of a dying empire.


How Western Scholars Overlooked Russian Imperialism

"When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, discussions emerged about the imperial nature of the war. Scholars who spoke up about it were quickly dismissed in certain Western academic and political circles.

Some, especially the self-professed “anti-imperialists”, claimed Russia was “provoked” and portrayed Ukraine’s resistance as a “Western imperial” plot. Others considered analyses of Russian imperialism as having a pro-war, hawkish agenda or being a reflection of narrow ethno-nationalist sentiments.

But for scholars from the post-Soviet space – from places that have suffered from Russian aggression and imperialism – these reactions were hardly a surprise. They had been ignored and dismissed before.

Discussions of Russian imperialism have long been overlooked while American, British and French imperialisms have been studied closely and thoroughly. This has much to do with how Western academia and to a certain extent political elites have chosen to approach the Soviet Union and its eventual dissolution.

From empire to a ‘union’

Russian imperial ambitions date back to the 16th century when the Grand Principality of Moscow, or Muscovy, proclaimed itself the third Rome, the successor of the Byzantine Empire and protector of all Orthodox Christians.

The Russian imperial army fought numerous wars in the east, west and south, and by the mid-19th century, Russia had become the largest land empire. Along with the British, Austro-Hungarian and French empires, it understood and presented itself as a European colonial power.

Following the October Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks proclaimed the end of the Russian monarchy and Russian imperialism, but they fought brutally to preserve the Russian imperial borders. They reconquered newly formed independent states, such as Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, which emerged after the collapse of the Russian Empire.

In the early 1930s, Joseph Stalin embraced Russian nationalism based on the old imperial myth of the greatness of the Russian people. Bolshevik Moscow made ethnic Russians the most privileged group in the Soviet Union and sent Russian settlers to populate and control non-Russian regions.

Purging native leaders, forcefully resettling entire ethnic groups and creating conditions that led to mass deaths were all part of Soviet colonisation. Non-Russian people’s cultures, languages and histories were disparaged while Russification was presented as enlightenment.

At the same time, the Soviet Union adopted a progressive narrative of enfranchising nations conquered by the Russian Empire and giving them national rights within the Soviet Union. Many in Western academia bought into the anti-colonial narrative Moscow was trying to sell because they took official proclamations at face value and wanted to believe in the story of communist anti-imperialism.

Indeed, the Bolsheviks eliminated the tsarist aristocracy, and the people who took power were of diverse backgrounds. Stalin, for example, was an ethnic Georgian who spoke Russian with an accent.

For many Western scholars, that apparently meant that he was leading a post-colonial state. By focusing on individuals and official proclamations, Western academia too often overlooked the fact that Stalin was obsessed with maintaining Russian imperial borders and had adopted the same toolkit – ethnic cleansing, crushing dissent, destroying national movements, privileging Russian ethnicity and culture – that tsarist Russia used to maintain them.

Soviet coloniality was dismissed also because knowledge about the Soviet Union in the West was Russocentric. The Soviet Union was often referred to simply as Russia. There was little knowledge about non-Russian people. Non-Russian émigrés who fled to the West and wrote about Soviet coloniality with firsthand experience of Soviet imperialism were dismissed as anti-Soviet conservative ideologues.

Importantly, the Soviet Union also became a space of projections for those who looked for ways to criticise capitalism and Western imperialism. Those who blamed capitalism for oppression believed that eliminating capitalism would end all forms of oppression. For them, the Soviet Union was an internationalist project that brought equality and freedom to formerly subjugated peoples.

Violence against various nations and ethnic groups was either ignored or treated as a necessary evil of the transition to communism.

Western scholarship also overwhelmingly focused on the Soviet metropoles – Moscow and Leningrad. They knew very little, if at all, about the Soviet peripheries, which meant that nobody really understood the uprisings in Central Asia, the Caucasus or the Baltics from the late 1980s onwards or the bloodshed in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and later Chechnya.

As Ronald Gregor Suny, historian of Soviet imperial nation-building, noted in a 2017 interview, “Before the late 1980s, no one cared about non-Russians. Sovietology and Soviet studies [were] about the centre and the top – who was standing where on the Kremlin, on the mausoleum, and so forth.”

The generation of scholars who started studying the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s were also shaped by their firsthand experience of the country. When they travelled as foreign students to Moscow, they found impoverished people. Empty shelves and pervasive poverty made Russians look like victims of the Soviet regime, and financially, Soviet Moscow seemed more like a European periphery than an imperial metropole, which they associated with material affluence.

Dissolution without decolonisation

The wave of decolonisation in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, which started after World War II, was accompanied by rigorous academic discussions and scholarship of colonial legacies and tools of violence.

By contrast, the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union did not result in similar scrutiny of the Russian imperial legacy.

For metropolitan Western Europe and the United States, Europe stood for metropolitanism – a place from which the world was colonised, not a place of colonisation. Accepting colonial history within Europe made little sense, so the colonial nature of Russia remained unchallenged.

In Russia itself, the dominant narrative was one of victimhood. Russians learned to see themselves as a special nation that sacrificed its own wellbeing for the sake of non-Russians in the Soviet Union. “Let us stop feeding them” was the slogan Russians used to explain Moscow’s decision to let the colonies go in 1991.

In the West, the collapse of the Soviet Union came as a shock. Many – both in academia and politics – liked Mikhail Gorbachev and saw him as a hero, a man of peace. They approved of his reforms, which spurred a new era of freedom of speech.

Gorbachev was soft, open and democratic in his communication and seemed like a good partner for the next few decades. The United States was even willing to offer him assistance to reform the country; US policy was against Soviet disintegration.

This is how late Professor Mark von Hagen recalled in 2016 the political atmosphere back then: “Again, George Bush … was defending Gorbachev until the very last possible moment because he and the United States government at that level, with a few dissenting voices, wanted to keep the Soviet Union together because they were so afraid of the kind of crazy, fascist nationalism that they thought the Ukrainians represented.”

Indeed, this Western fear of chaos, bloodshed and even nuclear incidents led to the perception of independence movements within the former Soviet space as expressions of destructive ethno-nationalism rather than a natural progression of an empire collapsing.

At the same time, since the official dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was organised centrally by Moscow, it made the question of imperial oppression obsolete in the minds of Western observers. The idea that the Soviet Union was an internationalist experiment continued to stick, and its collapse was seen as this experiment simply expiring.

Many Western historians perceived it not as a regime that erased diverse polities and national movements, but as a political project that created and developed nations. This is highly problematic not only because it ignores the history of national movements that took place prior to the Bolshevik takeover but also goes contrary to the idea of a nation being formed on the basis of popular legitimacy.

Still there were exceptions. Influential works by historians like Ronald Grigor Suny (The Revenge of the Past) and Andreas Kappeler (Russia as a Multinational Empire) have pointed to the violent Bolshevik policies towards colonised nations and their resistance. Others like von Hagen (Does Ukraine Have a History?) and Timothy Snyder (Bloodlands) who have written from the point of view of the colonised were able to properly predict and warn of historical continuities and dangers still posed by Russia today for these nations.

What the myth of the Soviet Union as a nation-builder did was promote in the West the idea that Russia has a sphere of influence, a “backyard”, where it has the right to intervene.

That is why Western academia and political circles had little to say about the genocidal wars Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, led in Chechnya. Rather than seeing people claiming sovereignty and nationhood, the West readily bought into their portrayals of Chechens as bandits, nationalists and terrorists. That is why they also failed to see Russian imperial ambitions in Eastern Europe – the 2008 war on Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, etc – as such.

There has already been some recognition that mistakes were made. As Professor Susan Smith-Peter recently commented: “As scholars of Russia, we need to undertake a searching moral inventory to see the ways in which we have taken the Russian state’s point of view as a default. Have we in any way taken part in the glorification of the Russian state that Putin has taken to a pathological extreme? Has our field participated in casting Ukraine as a state without history in our own way?“

Indeed, it has. And it is time to correct that.

To understand Russia, one needs to listen to those who lived under Russian colonial rule. To understand former and current Russian colonies, one needs to listen to historians from these places and study their cultures, languages and histories, both written and unwritten. To appreciate the ways out of colonial dictatorships, one needs to study the successful transformations of states like Ukraine. This would require dismissing the myth of the “artificial nation” and finally seeing Russia as an empire."

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Monday, March 14, 2022

How Ukraine is Not Russia

Ukraine is not Russia. Despite Western confusion on this point, Ukraine's people, even those of Russian descent, are a distinct society and a very different culture from that of Russia. Volodymyr Yesmolenko, Director of Analytics, Internews Ukraine, and Editor-in-Chief, UkraineWorld, explains the deep--and separate from Russia--history of Ukraine's identity,

"This distinct history has also produced a unique Ukrainian political culture that is anti-tyrannical in its nature. For example, Kyivan Rus' existed as a pluralistic polity for several centuries. Early modern Cossack statehood was deeply influenced by Catholic education, German law and Polish contractual politics. In 19th-century Ukraine, which existed within the borders of the Russian and Habsburg empires, Ukrainian intellectuals were defending decentralized and democratic politics, including poet Taras Shevchenko, historian Mykola Kostomarov, and philosopher Mykhailo Drahomanov. This pluralist political identity explains why today Ukraine is not governed by one person and why Ukrainians have been rebelling whenever there have been attempts to establish authoritarian rule. Domestic authoritarianism in Ukraine is difficult to achieve and it has always been imported."
 
Yermolenko also explains where the false Russian narrative of a pan-Slavic identity comes from,

"The "Russian World" is the construction of the new era, which to a large extent repeats the ideas of the elites of the Russian Empire before the 1917 revolution. At that time, Russian elites defined Ukrainians as "Little Russians", a part of the Russian nation, which also included "Great Russians" and "Belarussians"...When the Bolsheviks took power, they aimed strategically at "amalgamation of the nations", which actually meant Russification of the lands that they controlled."

And, here is Yermolenko on Ukrainian national identity today (March 11) in the face of Russia's war on Ukraine.

Another excellent discussion of Russian colonialism and Ukrainian identity is this Twitter thread by Volodymyr Sheiko, Director of the Ukrainian Institute (courtesy of Olga Tokariuk).

In celebration of Ukraine's cultural achievements (Ukrainians Who Have Changed Ukraine and the World), here is an excellent article by Euromaidan Press (Euromaidan Press a high-quality source for information on contemporary Ukraine).

Wednesday, December 20, 2017

There Is Too Much At Stake In Ukraine To Give Up Now


I made the point in an article a few days ago that Ukraine could be at the start of a promising economic recovery (Why I Am Optimistic About Ukraine, Euromaidan Press) that would support a stronger civil society.

The Financial Times this week has two opinion pieces that focus on the one threat to that recovery, the entrenched business and political interests bent on undermining Ukraine's economic and social reforms, as I had discussed in my article.

That both opinion pieces and my article highlight the threat at this time reflects the deep concern in the West that recent political turmoil in Kyiv could derail the reform program.

To conflate the two opinion pieces, both write that there is too much at stake in Ukraine to give up now.

In the first piece, Too Much Is At Stake To Give Up On Ukraine, Tony Barber, FT Europe Editor, warns that if Ukraine "veers off the path of domestic reform it is less likely to flourish as an independent state,"  And, indeed, the current political turmoil in Kyiv around the reform agenda is a serious threat to Ukraine's economic and social development.

However, Barber's observation that the mood has soured and embittered Ukrainians find that "post-Maidan authorities turned out to be no better than their predecessors" does not mean that Ukrainians are ready to give up on reform.  Few Ukrainians would return to the earlier time when Yanukovych and his Donetski thugs lorded over Kyiv and Ukraine.  Therefore, something new has to take its place.  Too many lives have been sacrificed in opposing corruption and Russian aggression.  Attacking the reform agenda is unlikely to dampen Ukrainian civil society's intent to see the reforms through, even if it is likely to result in dramatic moments along the way.

Even so, more can be achieved by civil society with technical and financial help from the West. Francis Malige, EBRD Managing Director for Eastern Europe and Caucasus, in Now Is Not The Time To Give Up On Ukraine, makes the case for Western support; "Giving up on Ukraine means giving up on courageous and determined people, alongside an entire country, at a time when they need us [the West] and when we can protect past successes and achieve much more, if we do it right."  Malige's piece is a convenient checklist of ways that international institutions and bilateral support can help by strengthening the private sector in Ukraine to improve people's well-being, while civil society reforms.

Short of a full-on Russian invasion, it is unlikely that reforms will fail because they have become part of civic culture in Ukraine.  But the reform process does need to keep up momentum so that the benefits--especially economic--become visible and tangible for all Ukrainians.  It is too early to see the full shape of Ukraine's transformation but the elements are there; popular support, civic activism, the realization that change is possible, a maturing multi-party political system and growing familiarity with civic culture in the West to which Ukrainians aspire.


Wednesday, November 23, 2016

Backing Ukraine's Reforms



An excellent short Policy Brief on the reform process in Ukraine and what the West ought to do in support has been written by Anders Aslund (@anders_aslund), adjunct professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Ukraine stabilized its finances in 2015-2016 and returned to modest economic growth this year.  It introduced major reforms, including restructuring the energy sector and anti-corruption measures such as public disclosure by public officials of their financial interests and making government procurement substantially more transparent.  It has, as well, contained the threat from Russian-led insurgents in eastern Ukraine bordering Russia (without defensive arms support from the West).

Ukraine has achieved a lot and must do more to limit corruption, reform government, and free its internal market, but continued progress requires Western support.  As set out by Aslund, the West needs to do three main things,


  • "...mobilize its [the West's] resources for investment funding for the next half decade.  Former Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko has proposed US$5 billion a year for the next five years for investments, which sounds right."

  • "...allowing visa-free travel for Ukrainians in the European Union...This step alone could salvage the European Union's positive standing among Ukrainians."

  • ...that the European Union expands or abolishes its 36 import quotas for Ukraine.  These cover all of Ukraine's most important goods, notably all significant agricultural products.
With a population about half that of Germany and a land area 70% larger, with abundant and varied resources including a well-educated, industrious workforce, Ukraine has the potential to greatly augment Europe's economic strength.

The key is not to let this promising moment be wasted.



Tuesday, October 27, 2015

Ukraine Local Elections - People Give Government a Free Pass For Now

Local elections carried out on Sunday in Ukraine were described as a test of Poroshenko’s government.  In the event, the electorate has given the government a free pass for now.

Turnout was low (seeming to average around 40%), there were no major disruptions (though balloting in Mariupol was canceled and will have to be done later), and parties of the extreme right or left did not sweep into power.  The worst that can be said is that a seeming reversion in the east to parities supported by parochial, oligarchic interests is not a good sign for civil society.

Despite widespread public distrust of government and dissatisfaction with the economy, the electorate, by not showing up and by not voting for extremists is giving the government the option to reform before getting punished in subsequent elections.

Local electoral contests financed by oligarchic interests and/or restructured political machines, and involving fraud and overt electoral manipulation--such as between Borys Filatov, backed by oligarchic Ihor Kolomoisky, and Oleksandr Vilkul, the Russia leaning descendent of the Yanukovych era Party of the Regions backed by Oligarchic Rinat Akhmetov--do not instill confidence in the integrity of the electoral process or the legitimacy of government.

For Ukraine to move forward, whoever wins needs the credibility of a reasonably fair election process that reflects the wider interests of civil society.  Neither Filatov nor Vilkul have that.

To endure, and for the sake of a strong civil society, the Poroshenko government has to make progress on three reform fronts,
  • ·      The corruption agenda, especially judicial reform where the principles of sound corporate and public governance are established and defended,
  • ·      The economic agenda, especially the need to separate politics and business based in law, supportive economic policies and transperancy.
  • ·      The political agenda, where reform is essential to build a credible civil society.  Indeed, the incumbents need it most if government is to gain credibility and legitimacy.

Poroshenko needs to deliver a cleaner election process next time around through an uninterrupted reform process.


An excellent break down of Sunday’s election results and implications by freelance journalist Oliver Carroll can be found at http://www.politico.eu/article/petro-poroshenko-hobbles-on-ukraine-local-election-vote-rigging/