Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?

To hear Marine Le Pen talk, sanctions against Russia don’t work, and she stands a decent chance of being elected president of France.  She has company here and there in odd places.  The deputy speaker of the Serbian parliament, Gordana Chomich, recently said she could not support sanctions because they hurt the Russian people, and did sanctions actually target oligarchics anyway?ma

So, do sanctions work and whom do they harm?

The best evidence for the success of sanctions is that Russia has not achieved its goals.

Moscow does not dictate to Kyiv what its domestic and international policies should be. Socially, the chances of a pro-Russian government in Kyiv are slim to none. Russia is mired in a costly military campaign in eastern Ukraine from which it cannot withdraw nor can it scale up without fear of new sanctions. Russia has failed to take Mariupol or create a land bridge to Crimea that is vital to making Crimea economically viable.

Moreover, Russia’s hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, while Crimea endures an economic collapse that Russia can’t remedy, compounded by crude Russian social oppression that is routinely condemned by others.  And dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead. Russia will be constrained by sanctions for as long as it does not withdraw from Ukraine.

Economic losses: from 1.5% to 6% of GDP

In terms of Russia as a whole, if Alexii Kudrin is to be believed, sanctions cost Russia 1.5% of GDP, which aligns with the IMF, which estimates that

”…sanctions and counter sanctions might have initially reduced real GDP by 1 to 1½ percent. Prolonged sanctions may compound already declining productivity growth. The cumulative output loss could amount to 9 percent of GDP over the medium term.”

Since the Russian economy is expected to grow at about 1.5% in the future, that is equivalent to 6 years of no growth.

Estimates that Russia lost over $100 bn in 2014/2015 due to sanctions suggest the cost is higher.  A loss of $100 bn for a Russian economy that went from a GDP of about $2,100 bn in 2014 to about $1,300 bn in 2015–in large part due to the fall in energy prices–suggests a cost from sanctions in those two years of anywhere from 2 to 6% of GDP in rapidly evolving economic circumstances.

Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that after three years of low oil prices and sanctions, Russian finances are now in a desperate state and, therefore, sanctions have contributed to a substantial decline in Russia’s economic welfare. 

For example, the murky Rosneft privatization suggests Russia is moving funds between the government, central bank, and public enterprises to make it look like government finances are better than they really are.  Rosneft is a sanctioned firm and has had trouble securing financing to sustain its operations, at one time seeking a bailout from the Russian government.  It also suggests that massive corruption continues.

Rejection of Russia’s behaviour

Beyond the failure to achieve its goals and the economic cost, there are other equally important impacts from sanctions. Sanctions demonstrate a rejection by the international community of Russia’s behavior.

The US and the EU have acted on behalf of the principle of self-determination and the inviolability of national borders, and they continue to do so. 

This provides Ukraine an international stage from which to counter Russia’s aggression.  Over time, the UN and various EU bodies have fallen in line, as well, in explicitly condemning Russian aggression toward Ukraine, adding to the effect of sanctions.

Targeted effect

In addition, the nature of sanctions has been important in targeting their effect. The most important sanctions are the more comprehensive ones that prohibit providing new debt or equity of greater than 30 day’s maturity and restrictions on the energy and defense sectors. 

These prohibitions, along with a reluctance to risk capital in Russia while tensions persist, have all but eliminated Russia’s access to international finance.

Foreign investment in Russia has plummeted from $71 bn in 2013 to just $7 bn in 2016.  It is not expected to return to anywhere near the 2013 level in the foreseeable future (IMF: Russian Federation – Staff Report For The 2016 Article IV Consultation). In the absence of sanctions, what is the likelihood that companies such as ExxonMobil would have halted their investment plans in Russia? They might have assessed the risk as higher, but the prohibitions and arm-twisting provided by sanctions are what stopped them.

The other sanctions that were designed to target key businesses and individuals in Russia are important, as well, in recognition of the role they play in supporting Putin. By targeting wealthy or influential businesses and individuals closely associated with Putin, the West hoped to hurt those who were key in enabling Putin’s actions against Ukraine. As beneficiaries of vast riches extracted from the Russian economy, their interests are in self-enrichment at the expense of the state and the people.

Putin is clearly worried about public discontent as the 2018 election approaches and, if Putin’s support begins to look shaky, he has to worry about the loyalty of the oligarchs and others who are already hurting from sanctions.

Sanctions take time

In one key respect sanctions have been exceptional. Against expectations, they have held. The West has new found resolve to confront Russian interference in the affairs of not only Ukraine but of all Western countries through its manipulation of information and various forms and levels of aggression.

No one, including Marine Le Pen, should be surprised that sanctions take time.  Russia is still a large, powerful country capable of defending itself economically and politically.  Sanctions are not war.  They don’t produce dramatic, immediate results.  Even wars don’t yield immediate results; otherwise, Russia would have gotten what it wanted long ago.  Sanctions take time, but they are ultimately effective; as sanctions against Iran, Myanmar and South Africa have shown.

When sanctions are not effective, such as in the case of North Korea, it is the sanctioned state that suffers.  North Korea has been reduced to an isolated, impoverished pariah state.  Like North Korea, Russia now faces years of economic stagnation–and probably slow national decline–unless it can find a way to reform its economy and a path to rapprochement with the international community.

Marine Le Pen can rest assured that sanctions are effective. A new report by the US Department of State concludes that sanctions against Russia have caused substantial harm to targeted individuals and firms. As reported by BuzzFeedNews the State Department report concludes that

“the average sanctioned company or associated company loses about one-third of its operating revenue, over one-half of its asset value, and about one-third of its employees relative to their non-sanctioned peers.” BuzzFeedNews goes on to report, 

“…the researchers also discovered that the “smart” or “targeted” sanctions placed against Russian companies and individuals starting in 2014 live up to their name. The four rounds of sanctions that have been put into place — aimed at Putin’s inner circle, several Russian banks, the defense industry, and the energy sector — have, according to the paper, managed to affect those individuals without being a primary damager of the Russian economy broadly.”

BuzzFeedNews quotes Bill Browder, co-founder of Hermitage Capital Management Group and zealous critic of Putin, that Putin is “apoplectic” about the sanctions and as told by Browder,

“In my mind, the reason for that reaction is that wealth is so concentrated in Russia that you can go after the assets of just a few bad players and you have a disproportionate effect on the evil and rot in Russia.”

Harm to ordinary Russians?

Since 2013 nearly all Russians have experienced a decline in their economic welfare, and poverty has increased dramatically—it rose from 11.2%, or 16.1 mn people in 2014, to an estimated 14.2%, or 20.1 mn people in 2016. Deputy speaker Gorsana Chomich should know though that the principal reason is not sanctions but poor economic management and the collapse in energy prices, as well as self-inflicted economic harm from political adventurism.

In the realm of sanctions, the greatest harm to ordinary Russians has come from Russia’s own counter-sanctions, especially on the import of food, which has driven up prices beyond what many Russian can afford.

Lest deputy speaker Gorsana Chomich still harbor concerns that sanctions have not been specific enough, as of mid-2016 the US has sanctioned by name 111 businesses and political figures and 82 firms and an additional 136 firms under the sectoral sanctions (an additional 7 individuals, 8 firms, and 2 vessels were added in December 2016).  The EU has sanctioned as of mid-2016 149 individuals and 37 firms and an additional 20 firms under sectorial sanctions.  Information on US and EU sanctions, including targeted individuals and businesses can be found here (US) and here (EU).

Sanctions are the consequence of Russia’s own policies and the limited means available to the West to influence Russia’s aggression against other states. 

The economic welfare of ordinary Russians will not change materially if Western sanctions end because economic growth will still not be sufficient without internal reform.  Economic reform is supposedly conditioned by Russian’s fear of economic chaos, but that is not the choice.  Russia can prosper in the same way that all countries prosper through sound economic policies and a strong civil society.  Ordinary Russian’s suffering is not an integral part of Russian exceptionalism, as much as Putin would like to convey that impression.

It is a toss up whether the Russian upper, middle or lower class will buckle first, but, when the Soviet Union collapsed, it was the Russian elite that led the rush for the exits.  When that happens again, will Putin have the wisdom of Gorbachev to concede the obvious and step aside?

An excellent and balanced overview of sanctions against Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty in the context of broader US-Russia relations by Andrew Weiss and Richard Nephew from the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs can be found here.

Privatbank

http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/12/29/nationalization-of-privatbank-a-promising-chapter-in-ukrainian-reforms/#arvlbdata

Article by: Dirk Mattheisen

The nationalization on December 18 of Privatbank, Ukraine’s largest bank by assets, opens a new and promising chapter in the reform of Ukraine.

Privatbank’s nationalization due to a slow boiling insolvency crisis that threatened to undermine Ukraine’s financial system was a necessary and overdue measure to stabilize Ukraine’s financial system given the size of Privatbank, which holds about 20% (or US$10.3 b) of Ukraine’s banking assets, even if it’s recapitalization puts additional pressure on the national budget. The cost to the state of nationalization will be partially offset through a “bail-in” of bondholders, but the principal burden will still fall on taxpayers.

Read more: Nationalization of PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest bank, explained

The public guarantee of Privatbank’s deposits, amounting to about a third of total Ukrainian deposits, was also necessary to prevent a run on the bank. The other two systemically important banks identified by the Ukrainian Treasury–Oschadbank and Ukreximbank–are already government owned.

Privatbank, though, highlights as almost nothing else can, the depth of financial and economic mismanagement and corruption by Ukraine’s old guard political and business elite that reformers in the current government are struggling to uproot.

As detailed in several blistering articles in BNE Intellinews (including here and here), Privatbank’s owners, oligarchs Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Hennadiy Boholyubov, used the bank, as BNE describes it, to “vacuum up” ordinary Ukrainian’s savings and use those savings as collateral to obtain loans for themselves and other closely related parties. BNE reports,

“The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) found that a massive 97% of the bank’s loans had been made to shell companies, many of them offshore, that are believed to be owned by the bank’s oligarch owners.” BNE estimates that “around 90% of the Privatbank loan book comprises loans to related parties, mostly shell firms linked to the [Kolomoisky’s] fuel trading business.”

Much of the money that left Privatbank was transferred overseas, enabled by correspondent banks in Austria and Luxemburg, as well as intermediaries in Cyprus and shell companies in the UK. Without the help of institutions and individuals in developed countries, the drain on the Ukrainian financial system could not have taken place, once again highlighting the role of the developed world in enabling corruption in the developing world. The offshore correspondent banks were often not shady fly-by-night financial institutions, but venerable banks, such as the Vienna’s Bank Winter that has operated as a private wealth management bank since 1892. How the scheme to transfer Ukrainian wealth offshore worked is worth quoting from BNE;

“The back-to-back funding scheme worked thus: Ukrainian banks placed depositors’ funds with the Alpine banks, and the Ukrainian bank shareholders received loans from the Alpine banks using their depositors’ funds as collateral. The shareholders then used at least part of these loans to recapitalize their banks, another part they simply moved offshore.

There is no reason to believe that PrivatBank’s arrangement with the niche Alpine banks was any different to that of around a dozen smaller brethren. Since 2011 up to 10 Ukrainian banks were reportedly involved in a scheme of siphoning of assets, where money was said to be unlawfully withdrawn by the owners and/or insiders of the insolvent Ukrainian banks through correspondent accounts of different banks incorporated in EU.”

What is extraordinary is that Ukraine may never recover the domestic or foreign-held money because it does not have adequate fiduciary laws and enforcement resources to protect savers from the likes of Kolomoyskyi and Bolholyubov.

With the nationalization of Privatbank, and the closure of over 80 smaller banks over the last couple of years by the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), as well as tightening of regulations and oversight, led by reformist head Valeriya Hontareva, Ukraine has taken a major step in reforming its financial sector and ensuring its stability. Governance problems remain, including that the four largest banks are now government owned, limiting the opportunity to diversify the financial system and invigorate private sector investment. The four largest banks have assets of about US$25.5 bn and account for about half the banking sector. Ukraine is reported to intend to re-privatize Privatbank but privatization of any government-owned bank may be a long way off. The largest private bank, Raiffeisen Bank Aval, has a capitalization of only US$1.9 bn —a fifth that of Privatbank — so how to generate sufficient private capital to invest in banking is unclear.

Through schemes such as Privatbank, economic mismanagement and, most importantly, rampant corruption, had catastrophic consequences for the Ukrainian economy and for the Ukrainian people. The control of Ukraine’s financial resources by a small number of individuals, who offshored the gains and invested only to their own business interests limited productive investment in Ukraine and distorted the efficient allocation of capital to the advantage of those few individuals who reaped a disproportionate share of any economic gains. In other words, they stole it.

Ukrainian 2016 nominal GDP per capita is less than a quarter of Russia’s, and a sixth of Poland’s, which is roughly comparable to Ukraine in terms of economic potential. There is no economic basis for Ukraine’s poverty other than pervasive corruption such as that practiced by Privatbank.

To be sure, Russian aggression and economic interference have had a devastating impact as well but, in Ukraine’s first 25 years of independence, mismanagement and the capture and transfer of wealth out of Ukraine on the scale seen with Privatbank has been the primary impediment to sustainable economic growth and the distribution of economic benefits to the people of Ukraine. The local criminal with his hand in Ukrainians’ pockets has been more destructive than the neighboring criminal with a gun to Ukraine’s head.

Over the last two years, President Porochenko has delivered stability and the necessary reforms to keep the essential IMF support program from slipping off the rails, but the outlook is shaky for the 2018 elections because he and many others have one foot still lodged in the old school, pre-Maidan oligarch economy.

Rosneft--Strategic Genius Or Shell Game?

Photo Credit

Two versions of the surprising and murky Rosneft deal, one 😋 pro (Rosneft's Triumph) and one 😖 con (The Story That Russia Does Not Want You To See)--strategic genius or shell game?

Either way, the complexity and lack of transparency of the convoluted Rosneft deal, which is key to meeting Russia's budget target this year and to Russia's privatization program, strongly suggest economic reform is captive to Russia's political sclerosis and, therefore, economic growth is an ever more distant prospect.  😔

Backing Ukraine's Reforms

An excellent short Policy Brief on the reform process in Ukraine and what the West ought to do in support has been written by Anders Aslund (@anders_aslund), adjunct professor at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC.

Ukraine stabilized its finances in 2015-2016 and returned to modest economic growth this year.  It introduced major reforms, including restructuring the energy sector and anti-corruption measures such as public disclosure by public officials of their financial interests and making government procurement substantially more transparent.  It has, as well, contained the threat from Russian-led insurgents in eastern Ukraine bordering Russia (without defensive arms support from the West).

Ukraine has achieved a lot and must do more to limit corruption, reform government, and free its internal market, but continued progress requires Western support.  As set out by Aslund, the West needs to do three main things,

• "...mobilize its [the West's] resources for investment funding for the next half decade.  Former Finance Minister Natalie Jaresko has proposed US$5 billion a year for the next five years for investments, which sounds right."

• "...allowing visa-free travel for Ukrainians in the European Union...This step alone could salvage the European Union's positive standing among Ukrainians."

• ...that the European Union expands or abolishes its 36 import quotas for Ukraine.  These cover all of Ukraine's most important goods, notably all significant agricultural products.
  

With a population about half that of Germany and a land area 70% larger, with abundant and varied resources including a well-educated, industrious workforce, Ukraine has the potential to greatly augment Europe's economic strength.

The key is not to let this promising moment be wasted.

Putin's Long Descent (Post 2)

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Having written my last post on "Putin's Long Descent", Foreign Policy has an excellent article this week by Mark Galeotti, visiting fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations, that makes the same point that Putin's tactical successes are not translating into strategic gains, including that,

"The Russian president’s tactical instincts for how to seize an opportunity are so brilliant, and yet the strategic outcomes are almost invariably disastrous."

 and

"The Kremlin’s problem, among others, is that Putin the Opportunist is consumed by the moment. He is focused on what he can accomplish tomorrow, without necessarily thinking through to what the consequences may be the day after. He also too easily assumes that he will remain in control of what he started..."

The Foreign Policy article rightly points out that, in my words, Putin's successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here.  Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  (Putin's Long Descent)

Putin’s Long Descent

Photo Credit:  Euromaidan Press

As airstrikes resume in Aleppo after a brief pause, Putin seems to be on the verge of another tactical success and to hold the fate of Aleppo in his hands.  Yet Putin would have preferred that Syrian forces had already taken Aleppo.  Syrian forces, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters have failed to sew up a clear win over tenacious rebel forces.  In addition, even if Aleppo now falls, Russia will pay a high price for success because it will require carpet-bombing reminiscent of Putin’s conquest of Grozny during the second Chechen war.  The West is already united in condemning Russia’s barbarism in Syria and further brutality will have unpredictable consequences for Russia (even if the EU failed at its meeting on October 20 to threaten sanctions).

In fact, Putin finds himself where he has been before.

His successes are not victories and they cost more than they are worth.  There is a pattern here. Putin’s tactical successes to date do not translate into strategic gains due to his penchant for miscalculation.  Consider each of Putin’s supposed successes.

Putin hoped to gather a new pan-Russian world under an Eurasian Economic Union, for which Ukraine was key.  He attempted to maneuver former Ukrainian President Yanukovych into keeping Ukraine under Russian suzerainty, including through bribes, threats and subversion of state institutions, especially the military and security services.  Not only did Putin misjudge the resistance and strength of civil society in Ukraine, his actions strengthened resistance to Russian dominance across all the former Soviet Republics. 

Putin attempted to base Russian economic power on rents from resource extraction and a corrupt keptocracy, but he misunderstood what drives a dynamic economy.  GDP growth slowed due to lack of investment and poor governance.  Russia then plunged into economic crisis when commodity prices collapsed in 2014 and sanctions were imposed on Russia for the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.  GDP feel 3.7% in 2015 and is expected to fall 1% in 2016.  Russia is currently running a budget deficit that may reach or exceed 4% this year, putting an enormous strain on social spending, including all-important public sector salaries and pensions upon which a large share of the population depends and upon which his support is based.  Even the modernization program for the military, with which Putin hopes to project Russian power, is subject to budget cuts.  GDP growth is projected to be nearly stagnant into the foreseeable future, without deep economic and governance reforms, and the Russian Economic Ministry projects no change in Russians’ living standard before 2035.

Reputedly, when deciding to seize Crimea, Putin asked his advisors if Russia could weather a year of adverse international reaction.  Putin mistakenly believed that the West was so dependent on Russian energy and so weakened by economic and political disarray--encouraged in part by Russia--that it could not sustain diplomatic opposition to Russia’s land grab for longer.  Putin appears not to have anticipated the scale of sanctions that were imposed by the US and the EU.  Nearly three years later, international isolation and the prospect of continuing sanctions looks only stronger due to lack of progress on a settlement in eastern Ukraine and events in Syria.  Meanwhile, Russia continues to bleed resources to sustain Crimea and Russian-backed eastern Ukraine, as well as conduct military operations in Syria.

Buoyed by the first flush of success when seizing Crimea, Putin attempted to take control of the east and south of Ukraine through Odesa to the Moldovan border, calling it “Novorossiya.”  The people did not rally to Russia as expected, and Russian provocateurs and local agents who attempted to seize control of the region were overwhelmed.  Russia had to send in “unmarked” regular troops and armor to stop the Ukrainian military advance in eastern Ukraine.  The price in dead Russians and diplomatic fallout became too high and Putin was beaten to a standstill.  During the course of the conflict, Russia and/or its proxies committed an act of international terrorism by shooting down a civilian aircraft, MH17, killing nearly 300 persons.  A Dutch-led investigation released in September 2016 confirmed Russian involvement and the identification, and possible prosecution, of guilty Russian military and political leaders is expected in the future. 

Putin pivoted to Syria, looking for new leverage over the West.  In Syria, Putin believed he had seized the initiative from a feeble EU and American response to the crisis, while avoiding an Afghanistan-like quagmire by relying solely on airpower to support the Syrian army, Iranian Guards and Hezbollah fighters.  And, indeed, the West looked flatfooted and outmaneuvered.  But the Syrian army proved unable to make the gains that Russia expected.  Russian Special Forces and “irregulars”, as well as barbaric methods, had to be added to sustain gains.  Putin was compelled to add support for a campaign to take Aleppo.  As of this writing, the combined pro-government forces have yet to take the city.  In the meantime, the brutality of the campaign has alienated the EU, which condemned Russian supported bombing and threatened prosecutions for war crimes.  Rather than gaining leverage over the West, Russia finds itself even more isolated. 

Meanwhile, Russian hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and others is disruptive but has given the US new resolve to confront unconventional Russian interference and aggression.  The US has promised a firm and unmistakable response.  Ecuador cut Julian Assange, the Wikileaks founder who is believed to be working hand-in-hand with Russia, off from the Internet on suspicion of interfering in the US election, and the Russian news service, RT, accused of propaganda, had its bank accounts frozen in the UK.  If Russia had hoped to undermine Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, it failed miserably.  Russia’s capacity to be disruptive will now be confronted by firm US and European counter-measures.

Even if one steps back and looks at Putin’s probable strategic objective of a West too weak and in disarray to counter Russia’s interests, it is not clear Putin is making any headway.  Discord in Europe is the result of homegrown political mismanagement and of events elsewhere, such as Syria, that Putin can only hope to exploit but not control.  Even where Russia has had an outsized influence, such as using illicit money and offshore financial centers to corrupt Western elites, the window is closing after numerous revelations, including the Panama Papers and Spanish indictments of Russian mobsters and serving political figures.  Everyone is now alert to Russia’s corrosive influence.  That elites can be corrupted or that institutions can be undermined is not an insight that Putin alone has.  Europe and the US understand it also and can be effective in confronting it.  In short, what the Soviet Union could not do, Russia cannot do either.  Although Putin has managed to elevate Russia’s profile on the international stage, its standing is fragile because Russia’s role is seen as more disruptive than constructive.

Putin may deflect, feint, cut his loses, and pivot to a new provocation to distract from his failure to translate tactical successes into strategic gains, but the costs are mounting and his opportunities are narrowing.  Fundamentally, Putin cannot overturn global leadership on the foundation of political deceit and corruption, nor on militant nationalism.  Lack of political credibility and corruption through which Putin hopes to undermine the West are more deeply rooted in Russia.  And militant nationalism—especially if based on ethnicity--is a formula for catastrophe, whether in Nazi Germany, post-Yugoslavia Serbia or contemporary Russia.

Although it has been touched on by policy analysts at times, Putin’s personality is an underestimated weakness that contributes to his penchant for miscalculation.  Putin is not fully aware of how the most human of qualities, “empathy”, informs judgment and, therefore, he does not understand how it affects political decisions.  Much like Benedict Cumberbatch’s Sherlock Holmes character in the hit series “Sherlock,” Putin is oblivious to societal norms because he is a “high-functioning sociopath.”   He recognizes societal norms based on empathy, such as aversion to doing harm and sympathy for those who suffer or are less fortunate, but he does not feel it, and because he doesn’t feel it he is suspicious and contemptuous of it.  He personally expresses little sympathy and evidences no effort to comfort those who suffer in Donbas or for the horror in Syria or the increasingly difficult circumstances of the Russian people, except at the abstract level of strategic policy when he condemns the actions of others that he perceives are directed against Russian power.  Putin perceives Western leaders' concern for the impact of their actions on people as weakness.

Putin is not only indifferent to causing harm, he is personally culpable.  Putin is strongly implicated in “terrorist” attacks that killed hundreds of Russian citizens in 1999 that propelled him into the Presidency on a law and order platform.   Military and security services under his command are also implicated in provocations in 1999 that launched the second Chechen war that killed tens of thousands.  Putin is believed to be responsible for the deaths of countless opponents, including investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya and whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko whom a British Public Inquiry concluded had been murdered on orders by Putin personally.  The imprisonment--and torture--in Russia of numerous Ukrainian citizens, including Ukrainian pilot, Nadiya Savchenko, could not occur without Putin’s concurrence.  There are no checks on Putin’s behavior and deaths of ordinary Russians, opponents, and citizens of other countries, do not bother him and so are not part of his calculus of risk.

With less room to maneuver and an increasingly fragile base on which to support his actions, Putin will attempt further aggression.  His current bluster in Syria, moving missiles closer to the EU, and invading Finnish airspace may be carefully calibrated to convey threat without risking direct confrontation, but Putin’s hubris and inability to empathize mean that he will overreach yet again, and at some point his luck will collide with his penchant for miscalculation, and he will experience a categorical tactical failure.  At that point, rather than be unmasked as fallible, Putin will attempt to reverse his failure, possibly up to and including through a tactical nuclear “event” (not necessarily, but possibly, involving an actual limited strike). With the smoke and mirrors removed, Putin will be revealed to be, like Stalin, a plague on Russia and the world.

Putin's Attempt to Delegitimize a Revolution (Paul Niland, KyivPost)

photo credit

Paul Niland is a blogger (Twitter @PaulNiland) and regular contributor to the KyivPost, a Ukrainian English-language newspaper.

He writes with exceptional clarity in an objective, fact-based manner on the Ukrainian reform process and Ukraine's continuing democratization.

His latest article responds to remarks by Russian President Putin that badly mischaracterize Ukraine's recent history and the status of the Minsk agreement.  The article is essential reading for those that are too easily misled by Russian misinformation and propaganda; particularly those in the Western press who frequently fail to challenge Putin's false narrative about events in Ukraine.

The article can be read here:

Putin's Attempt to Delegitimize a Revolution

Paul has also provided a definitive narrative on Ukraine's Maidan Revolution and subsequent events that should be required reading for informed reporting on Ukraine.

The Way Forward For Ukraine (Part 3)

Euromaidan Revolution Myth and Reality (Part 2)

What Has Changed In Ukraine Post-Yanukovych (Part 1)

and

The Will Of The People?