Don V. Vladimirovich Putin Quixote

Putin’s rule in Russia is defined by three delusions, or conceits, that only Don V. Vladimirovich Putin Quixote could believe.

First, that only a handful of people matter.  A leader no matter how inept or cruel is  entitled to lead and the people should obey.  His favorites, Yanukovich, Gaddafi, Mubarak, Assad and Berlusconi (with whom he recently vacationed in Crimea), were men of iron who were unfairly dethroned.  The people erred.

Second, that the world is run by security services.  The color revolutions were CIA conspiracies, as was the Arab Spring.  The people would never have thought up self-expression on their own and, like the hundreds of thousands of Russians who turned out in 2012 to protest election fraud by Putin’s United Russia Party, the people were certainly not entitled to act on their own.  Accordingly, Putin himself relies on his security services to maintain his legitimate authority against the illegitimate aspirations of the Russian people.

Third, that larger states through spheres of influence rule over lesser states, and that this is immutable.  Therefore, though independent, sovereign nations, such as Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic nations and eastern Europe, should serve the interests of greater Russia, their natural imperial overlord.  Failure to submit is punishable by Russian subversion and invasion.

Deluded by these conceits, Putin has set out to right the wrongs of a world and visit justice upon non-believers in order to restore Russia’s sphere of influence and preeminence as a global power.   Once renewed through valorous deeds, Russia will be transformed into the Soviet Union or imperial Russia or Novorussiya.

Like Don Quixote, Putin tilts repeatedly at windmills lost in his own grand illusion that he must destroy the wicked.  He humbled the unworthy knights of Chechnya, Georgia and Ukraine, and he threatens to humble Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, and Slovenia.  Knocked out of Ukraine, Putin now tilts at Syria.  There are windmills at every turn. 

With each tilt at a windmill, the humbled oligarchics--Sanchos to Putin’s Don Quixote--tremble at his rush to folly.  They remain loyal on the promise of protecting their riches.  Meanwhile, Putin’s aging nag, Rocinante, the Russian military, struggles to carry its knight forward, though a shadow of the strong and steady steed Putin imagines.

Like Don Quixote of old, Putin gives up Russia’s worldly comforts in the name of Dulcinea, his goddess of authority and power.  In so doing, our deluded, czar-errant is transformed into a thief that preys upon the increasingly confused and oppressed Russian people.  Putin’s poor Sanchos realize it is better to live a quieter life than as servants to Putin’s grand illusion.  Eventually, an old friend—an oligarchic, a general, or a member of the opposition--disguised as the Knight of the White Moon, vanquishes our sad czar and he passes from our story consumed by his own fevered grandiose dreams.  And the kingdom that never was dies with him.

CitiesandThronesandPowers: Waist Deep in the Big Muddy - Putin in Syria

I had mentioned twice now in "the Big Muddy" and "The Tide Turns Against Russia" about the risk that Putin runs from Russian soldiers returning from fighting in Ukraine.  They know and will tell others that Putin is lying about there being no Russian soldiers fighting and dying in Ukraine.  This is a growing risk to Putin's political survival because the presence of Russian soldiers and their deaths in Ukraine are deeply unpopular among Russians.  An article by Catherine Fitzpatrick illustrates how that awareness is growing and affecting civil society.



http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/16/finding-putin-s-dead-soldiers-in-ukraine.html



CitiesandThronesandPowers: Waist Deep in the Big Muddy - Putin in Syria: It’s tempting to think Putin has a strategy in Syria.   But he doesn’t. Having decided to step down in Ukraine (for the moment) and a ...

Waist Deep in the Big Muddy - Putin in Syria

It’s tempting to think Putin has a strategy in Syria.  But he doesn’t.

Having decided to step down in Ukraine (for the moment) and a fitful cessation of hostiles taking hold, Putin knows he needs a new distraction for the Russian people, and not the least for his military, which is running on nerves at this point but doesn’t have a plan.  The last thing Putin wants is a void that will give the Russian people a chance to reflect on what the last year has done to them or that will be filled by others, such as decommissioned troops.  The game is next year’s parliamentary elections when Putin’s United Russia party, which does not enjoy the protection of Putin’s cult of personality, will almost certainly face a deeply disenchanted electorate.  An eroding United Russia base will spell trouble for Putin in 2018.

Supporting Assad fits Putin’s narrative of defending Russian interests against Western aggression, but still has the kind of ambiguity that Putin likes where just possibly he is doing something in the spirit of international cooperation but you just don’t know.  However, ratcheting up support for Assad just now serves no strategic purpose.  Putin needs economic relief.  As the temperature goes down in Ukraine, raising the temperature in Syria doesn’t move Putin’s chess pieces forward.  Backing a regime that is unlikely to ever recover lost territory or legitimacy is pointless and costly. 

If the purpose is to court Iran, the timing is odd, since Iran doesn't need a new irritant with the West at the moment it is seeking to improve economic relations and move forward a nuclear proliferation deal—Putin needs take heed from Iran that improving economic relations will take something more than belligerence. 

Unless, of course, Putin’s purpose is to court the Iranian intelligence and military services as a counter-weight to the West-leaning Iranian moderates, which would make things really interesting.

It would be quintessential Putin, to lend support to the Iranian nuclear deal while courting the Iranian conservatives in order to keep his tactical options open.  In this scenario, refugees in Europe are just the icing on the cake.

With no strategy in mind, Putin is keeping his pawns busy while waiting for the opportunity to advance his knights and bishops.  Like the old Pete Seeger song from the 1960s, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy, “…the big fool just says to push on."

A Tale of Two Cities: Moscow and Kyiv. Kyiv's Debt Deal Changes the Game

Kyiv reached a debt agreement with its creditors on August 27, which was impressive in one respect, the relative ease with which it was concluded.  There was little of the drama of a Greek bailout.  The term “good will” might be a bit strong, but all the parties at the table seemed to recognize that a country in Ukraine’s unique circumstances needed a way out and an opportunity to rebuild its economy if it was to meet its financial obligations.  The deal includes a new security linked to Ukraine’s economic growth rate from 2021, an indication of hope at least that creditors expect Ukraine to return to a growth rate sufficient to reward patient debt holders.

On its merits the deal is equally good, including a 20% reduction in debt, a four-year extension on payments, and immediate debt relief of about $3.6b.  The deal avoids a default and will allow Ukraine to return to bond markets by 2017.  With a debt deal in place, Kyiv can reasonably focus on growing its economy. 

The moment of Ukraine’s return to the financial markets in 2017 may also be the moment that Russia departs the markets.  With little prospect that the conflict in eastern Ukraine will end, that sanctions will be lifted or that oil prices will rise soon, Russia is widely expected to run out of cash in 18 to 24 months.  Although its debt levels are low, its prospects are worsening.

Indeed, already in June the World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects projected Ukraine’s GDP to grow 2% in 2016 and 3% in 2017, while Russia was projected to grow only 0.7 and 2.5%, respectively.  The IMF has since reduced its 2016 projection for Russia to a negligible 0.2%.  In August the IMF projected Ukrainian growth higher in 2016 at 3.5% and 4% in the years thereafter, and this was before the debt deal was concluded.  Since then oil prices, upon which Russia is dependent but Ukraine is not, have continued to fall, putting additional pressure on Russian growth.

Already the economies of Ukraine and Russia are separating as war, sanctions and geopolitical tension reduce commercial interactions and cross border trade and drive them apart.

The two economies will continue to diverge, with Russia trapped in a downward spiral of economic mismanagement, under investment, falling productivity and corruption.

Ukraine is at the beginning of a perilous reform process that moves in fits and starts, but its finances are stabilizing and, with the debt deal, its prospects are improving.  Not “blessed” with huge oil and gas reserves, the Ukrainian economy has a more diverse base of agriculture, transportation, forestry and manufacturing upon which it can build.

No longer distorted by Soviet planning and post-Soviet political manipulation, Kyiv is freeing itself of policy deference to Russia and subservience to oligarchic interests. Kyiv has a wide-open, free-for-all political climate and open public debate about its future (in Moscow people are afraid to speak out or give their last names when they are interviewed).

All signs suggest that Kyiv is on the right path.

A Taunt Too Far: Putin's Next Big Mistake

President Putin of Russia is famously regarded as a masterful tactician who keeps his adversaries on their toes through careful calculation and unpredictable behavior.  Putin himself cultivates an air of infallibility.

Taking the evidence of his actions over last twelve months, one can be forgiven for wondering what his tactical mastery is supposed to accomplish.  But facts aside, maybe he just gives himself a lot of latitude in measuring success.  To be fair, in his bruising match with the West, it is sometimes hard to tell who is ahead on points.

That said, Putin now needs to play his game to perfection because the weight of his miscalculations is so precariously balanced it could cascade into catastrophe for Russia and a giant headache for everyone else.

Given Putin’s record, here are five miscalculations experience tells us he is likely to make that will get him into trouble before the Russian general election in fall 2016.

Fabrications that don’t gel.  Well and good to fabricate lies you can get away with, but getting caught at it repeatedly erodes credibility and undermine one’s authority.  Clumsy Russian fabrications about what really happened to Malaysia Fight MH17 shocked Europe and arguably did more to alienate Europeans than the fighting in Ukraine.  Russian media fabrications about what is happening in eastern Ukraine—including such horror stories as Ukrainian troops harvesting POW organs or a child being publicly crucified in a town square by Ukrainian soldiers--have eroded Russian credibility about anything at all.  From Putin’s perspective, the big lie is that Russian soldiers are not fighting and dying in eastern Ukraine.  When the realization finally hits home among Russians, as it already has with everyone else, Putin’s pedestal may wobble dangerously.  The longer the lies go on, the more dangerous it will become to Putin’s political survival.

Cheating too often.  In 2011 and 2012 Russians poured into the streets by the thousands to protest election fraud by the United Russia party headed by Putin and Putin’s announcement that he planned to run for President again in 2012.  Even with pervasive election fraud, United Russia’s popularity dropped 15 percentage points.  While Putin’s popularity seems secure at the moment, economic issues and local corruption continue to erode support for the United Russia party.  A repeat of heavy-handed election fraud in 2016 may undue United Russia and Putin’s grip on power.

Start a fight.  Putin is under pressure as the fighting in eastern Ukraine drags on because it is enormously costly to Russia to underwrite the ongoing conflict and support economically the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts held by Russian-led separatists.  Putin may be tempted to launch a new offensive before winter to restart the Minsk II “peace” process or to carve out a larger space for the two separatist entities to make them more sustainable.  The sooner the better it would seem.  However, attacking Ukraine this fall offers little strategic gain, since the additional territory is of little value relative to the high cost of securing it, and the time when Putin could dictate the terms of any “peace” agreement are long over.

One reason Putin may be tempted though is to rally patriotic support for himself and his United Russia party before the elections.  It would require, however, first, winning the fight, and, second, sustaining the momentum into late next year when the elections will take place.  A tough challenge.  The last time Putin tried it was last year when Russian-led separatists appeared to overrun eastern Ukraine and Putin first raised the idea of creating a new Novorossiya extending across southern Ukraine to the border of Moldova.  Then the separatists were pushed back into a sliver of land on Ukraine’s eastern border, and Putin hasn’t mentioned Novorossiya since.  Another match of that caliber would finish Putin off as a geopolitical pugilist.  Promoting Novorossiya also didn’t win any fans other than the few far right Russians who already liked the idea.  Most Russians thought it was just plain dumb, and Ukrainians in those regions are still digging trenches to fight the Russians if they attempt it again. 

Premature declaration that the worst is over—oops, already did that one.  In May Putin declared the worst of the economic crisis for Russia was over.  Since then the economic collapse in Russia has accelerated.  The Russian economy declined 2.2% in QI of 2015 and 4.6% in QII.  Russian is now officially in recession.  Putin’s economic strategy of late seems to consist mostly of bulldozing contraband EU cheese in order to demonstrate he is serious about nurturing domestic industry.  It’s not a pretty picture.  A lot will break bad in the economy between now and next year’s elections, raising the question how much economic mismanagement the Russian people can endure.

Gloating and empty showmanship.  When he annexed Crimea Putin put on a huge show glorifying the return of Crimea to Mother Russia, culminating in a showy celebration of patriotism in Moscow with a host of Russian politicos and celebrities.  Overly impressed with his own rhetoric, Putin engaged in a series of verbal faux pas that alarmed his global audience, including that Russia had historic claims to just about everyone else’s territories, that Russian soldiers had taken Crimea after having denied it, and that everyone should remember that Russia had nuclear arms.  Not a man to quietly savor success, Putin rubbed salt in new wounds by trumpeting his violations of Ukrainian sovereignty and international law, increasing everyone else’s resolve to resist Russian aggression.  The Russian emperor may prove to have no cloths if he raises the rhetorical temperature again to gain support leading into elections, further exposing his imperialist ambitions.  The Russian people are already wondering about the price they are paying for such grand gestures.

Don’t do what you promise.  They applauded Crimea, but Putin disappointed his  followers who expected the Russian army to roll into Kyiv last summer.  He disappointed them again when he failed to consolidate the little success he had in eastern Ukraine and absorb the separatist areas or at least establish a Novorossiya framework.  Putin’s declarations to act as the protector of all Russians ring hollow now because he didn’t follow through in Ukraine, the Baltics, or elsewhere, and he hardly concerns himself with the misery of the half million Ukrainian “Russians” trapped in Donetsk and Luhansk.   Lack of progress in eastern Ukraine is eroding moral among separatists, which is breeding discontent in eastern Ukraine and in Russia.  A disaffected patriotic far right may emerge to disrupt Putin’s carefully stage-managed election process.

Plain old miscalculation.  Still, the most obvious problem is simple miscalculation.  Putin thought no one would notice if he seized Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine, that the Ukrainians wouldn’t fight, that all Ukrainian politicians could be bought, that the people of Ukraine could be played like Russian puppets.  He continues to believe that the Europeans will forget about Malaysian Flight MH17, or that little tactical nibbles here and there will not be noticed.  There may no longer be any large strategic goals within his grasp now that everyone is alert to his machinations, but that doesn’t mean he has the good judgment not to tempt fate with little gestures that ignite a greater conflict.

Like a playground bully who thinks he can win a fight by taking blows longer than anyone else, Putin’s survival strategy has serious flaws.  It is just a matter of time and a taunt too far.

DirkMattheisen.blogspot.com