Russian Provocations Test Georgia

In a recent article, “Russia Increasingly Treats Georgia As Its Prospective Satellite,” Vasili Rukhadze, political analyst at the Jamestown Foundation, writes that Georgia has recently experienced a “heightened level of Russian intimidation.” He details recent incidents, including an attempt by the Night Wolves, a nationalist Russian motorcycle club, to enter Georgia to celebrate May 9 Victory Day over Nazi Germany and a visit to Georgia by Yuri Luzhkov, former mayor of Moscow and open supporter of Georgia’s Russian-dominated, secessionist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Mr. Rukhadze though does not go as far as to draw the logical conclusion from these incidents.

Vladimir Putin riding with e Night Wolves during his election campaign

The Night Wolves are closely associated with Putin. They were early participants in the occupation of Crimea and fighting in eastern Ukraine, where they carried the standard for Russian nationalism. The purpose of Mr. Luzhkov’s visit is not clear but was described as a personal visit. However, similar informal visits of this kind by Russian officials and prominent individuals also accompanied the occupation of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. If Mr. Rukhadze is feeling nervous, he has every reason to be. Provocations in Georgia have a familiar ring. Lack of a resolute response by the government of Georgia will likely open the door to further provocations.

As a former constituent state of the Soviet Union, Georgia is strategically important.

Russia’s 2018 presidential election is rapidly approaching, and Putin needs something to excite flagging support among the Russian people whose enthusiasm for the seizure of Crimea and Russian-led satellite statelets in eastern Ukraine is waning due to the economic and social costs. Ukraine is now clearly a major headache and opportunities to generate heightened patriotic fervour through tensions in the Baltics could be costly due to a re-invigorated NATO. Even tiny

Even tiny Montenegro in Central Europe was not so easily destabilised last year when Russian and Serbian citizens believed to be directed by Moscow failed to carry off an attempted coup.

Putin may believe, as he searches for a casus belli that Georgia is the perfect opportunity. International condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was a slap on the wrist, and Putin may believe that he can pull it off again since he has very little to lose.

And the prize is worth the taking. As a former constituent state of the Soviet Union, Georgia is strategically important. Control of Georgia would extend Russian authority south over more of the Black Sea coast. It borders on Turkey and, together with a pro-Moscow leaning Armenia, is the most direct transport corridor with Iran—countries Russia has prioritised for improved relations. Georgia also sits astride major east-west oil and gas transport routes. It even offers greater control of the Caucasus region by allowing Moscow to effectively encircle the Muslim oblasts in the North Caucasus.

Russia already controls two puppet states on occupied Georgian territory

Recent provocations in the Russian-controlled Abakhazia and South Ossetia enclaves themselves suggest a tightening of Moscow’s screws on Georgia, including the recent announcement of the creation of joint Abakhazia-Russian military units and the planned merger of law enforcement bodies, as well as rumors that Russia may seek to absorb the enclaves as it did with Crimea.

Recent Russian provocations in Georgia are tangible reminders that Moscow has not given up its interest in the region. Provocations there and elsewhere suggest that Russia remains active and capable of surprising acts of covert and overt aggression.

Переглянути зображення у Твіттері

 Читати

Sputnik 

✔@SputnikInt

Top US think tank says @NATO must swallow up #Georgia, #Macedonia, #Bosnia & #Ukraine https://sptnkne.ws/ez3E 

08:00 – 20 May 2017

Twitter Ads info and privacy

Twitter post by Russia’s Sputnik. Russian misinformation often accuses others of conduct Russia itself engages in.

If Russian provocations in Georgia continue or escalate over the next few months, if Russian media escalates its criticisms and attacks on Georgia’s government or its interests—such as this from Sputnik—and, if Russia’s designs on the two enclaves advances toward absorbing them into the Russian Federation, then it is prudent to ask how far Putin might go, which will depend on his assessment of how vulnerable Georgia is, how the West might respond, and on how desperate Putin is to achieve an overwhelming electoral victory next year.

So far, Putin has not found his opportunity. It may be too early yet. The 2018 election is still months off. In the meantime, Georgia needs to be alert and counter Russian misinformation when it occurs. The recent agreement between Georgia and the US on intelligence sharing is a useful step to counter Russian misinformation, which is the first step in any escalation by Russia. Also, useful is the draft US 2017 federal budget that proposes “not less than $100m” to counter Russian influence and aggression in Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia, including Georgia, through support for rule of law, media, cyber, and other programs as well as support for internet freedom in the Russian Federation.

In order not to allow Russia to benefit from aggression, Georgia needs sustained diplomatic, financial and civil society support.  Mr. Rukhadze has it right.  Without Georgia’s steadfastness, and without international support, Georgia risks becoming a Russian satellite.

Euromaidan Press

Russia's Coming Time of Troubles

Euromaidan Press

As Russia approaches its 2018 presidential election, dissent in Russia has taken an ominous turn.  A wide-spread truckers’ strike against road tolls pits the working class against the oligarchs.  An unexpectedly large “youth protest” against corruption in March pits the young against the last post-WWII generation of the Soviet Union as well as their parents who suffered through the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.   And, a housing protest in Moscow pits ordinary Russians against their local government.  What happens to Moscow’s plans for a smooth election if dissent metastasizes into opposition?

The threat appears very real because Russia today is threatened by the same economic stagnation, succession turmoil and external pressures as was the Soviet Union in 1991.  The circumstances are similar to other pivotal moments, as well, in Russia’s history, such as its “Time of Troubles” in the late 16^th century when economic trouble, a succession crisis following the death of Ivan the Terrible and conflict with Poland resulted in years of political turmoil.  The legacy of such moments in Russian history has been dramatic upheaval and regime change.

Although Russia appears to be emerging from two years of economic recession, prospects for economic growth are dim because of under-investment and falling consumption.  Economic wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few.  Russia has the most unequal distribution of wealth of any major economy in the world.  The wealthiest 10% of the population owns 87% of Russia's wealth.  Moreover, economic activity is increasingly concentrated in a handful of cities, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, as the Soviet Union’s single industry towns and rural communities die out, leaving entire regions economically and socially devastated.  To balance the Russian budget Putin has reduced spending on welfare, including pensions, health care and education, and on government salaries, further immiserating the Russian people.  At the same time the Russian government is increasing Russia’s international reserves rather than using that income to soften the impact of economic stagnation or to stimulate growth.  High international reserves insulate the Russian financial system from financial crisis, but building those reserves comes at the expense of the real economy where jobs, production and economic growth come from.

Meanwhile, military spending is draining resources from the economy.  Russia’s military strength on show in Syria and in eastern Ukraine does not signify growing power but a hollowing out the rest of society.  In an otherwise fairly positive assessment of Russia’s military capabilities, the Carnegie Endowment makes the point that,

“Excessive spending on the military may indeed be unsustainable in the long term.³⁴ After all, this was a major contributor to state collapse in Russia at least twice during the twentieth century (in 1991, 1917, and, more debatably, 1905) and routinely served as the catalyst for major social upheaval in previous centuries.”

Its military adventures are costly.  Russia has not successfully concluded a single conflict, including Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and eastern Ukraine.  As these frozen or festering conflicts proliferate and perpetuate themselves, the financial and reputational cost to Russia rises, even while the welfare of the subject peoples declines dramatically.  Russian client states are deep wells of expense that weaken Russia in Moscow’s misplaced anticipation that nominal control of slivers of territory will legitimate future claims to historical areas of political control.

Russia’s leaders concede that sanctions due to the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine are likely to last a long time, hindering economic recovery, because there is no path that they are prepared to contemplate that would change the circumstances on the ground.  Russia’s international isolation suggests that Russia may not receive significant support from outside as it did in 1991 if things go from bad to worse, ensuring an even steeper descent, even if no world leader wants to contemplate a Russia plunged into internal chaos.  Meanwhile Russia’s leaders await the miracle of a failure of Western resolve or Western collapse to alleviate their own suffering.

Domestically, the firmament of the Russian state is being shaken, not just from popular protests by truckers and students and apartment dwellers but also from militant nationalism and elevated levels of societal violence both non-state (mafia) and state (suppression of civil society that punishes dissent and non-conformism under the guise of patriotism}.  Violent crime is rising in Russia because of economic hardship but also because of lawlessness in its vassal territories that is filtering back into Russia.  As one commentator puts it, 

“Russian mercenaries who have fought in the Donbas…have gotten a taste for easy money, easy blood, and easy opportunities for satisfying themselves,” in short, all “the criminal joys.” And they don’t forget these when they return home, yet another way that Putin’s war in Ukraine is harming Russia.”

As Russia anticipates the election of Putin to a fourth term as president in 2018, it faces a new time of troubles.  The problems of economic decline, weak political processes, and international tensions are familiar and the fault lines are increasingly clear.  If the collapse of the Soviet Union was unimaginable in 1991, what of the collapse of the Russian Federation today without a change in trajectory?

Under the threat of continued economic decline, social discontent will rise.  The truckers’ strike, which began simmering in 2015 when a new road toll was announced, has spread to 80 of 85 Russian regions.  The apartment renters’ protest in Moscow coalesced on May 14 in a protest by an estimated 20,000 participants.  Under pressure to preserve its privileges, the Russian elite will likely divide on the question of who will succeed Putin, just as it did in 1991.  Under economic pressure, also, central control of the oblasts will become weaker and perhaps fracture, with Moscow losing political coherence south and east of the Don and Volga Rivers—the internal steppe borderlands between Slavic and multi-ethnic groupings in Russia’s empire.  The Caucasus, where Moscow has tenuous control, will fracture, with Chechnya seeking independence if not its own Muslim zone of dominance, since it has as much to fear from extremism as does Moscow.  Differences will emerge elsewhere possibly splitting off additional regions from Moscow’s control, such as in the southwest where Moscow had difficultly containing the “Cossack” nationalists who swarmed eastern Ukraine in 2014-15.  Crimea, Rostov and Krasnodar are farther from Moscow than, say, Kyiv, if local economic and social issues overwhelm centralized control by Moscow as it runs out of money to dampen civil conflict.  Even in the north, regions such as Karelia may drift away from Russia’s orbit and strengthen old relationships with the Nordic countries.  This is what Moscow’s elite fears.

Rather than address directly the problems of economic decline, political paralysis and international isolation, Moscow is promising economic welfare without economic reform, invoking democratic principles without meaningful political participation, and battling fascism where none exists.  These are driving Russia down the road to collapse.

Russia’s turmoil during the time of troubles in the 16^th century was followed by its greatest political and cultural achievements.  To replicate that accomplishment today Russia will have to shed its imperial impulse and complete its transformation begun in 1991 to an open political culture and an engaged civil society in order to emerge as a viable, modern nation-state.  If social unrest continues to grow, the 2018 presidential election may bring that question to a head.

Do Sanctions Against Russia Work (Continued)?

Photo Credit: Euromaidan Press

Following my article in Euromaidan Press, Do Sanctions Against Russia Work?, the New York Post has a good article in the same vein entitled When Sanctions Work--And Why They Fail.  To be clear, the author, Ralph Peters, writes that sanctions against Russia are working and should be continued (while he argues sanctions against North Korea and Iran are another story).  He writes regarding sanctions against Russia (underlining added),

"Contrary to counter-factual claims, economic sanctions imposed on Russia after successive invasions of its neighbors have had a profound effect ...Sanctions have bitten Russia for two reasons.  First, they coincided felicitously with a global collapse in energy prices.  Putin’s economic monoculture relies on income from gas and oil exports.  The double-whammy of cheap gas and Western sanctions hit Russia hard, causing Putin to pause his war in Ukraine and now to cut his defense budget.  But the second reason is that even Putin has to answer to his people at some level. And while Russia’s been under sanctions, the poverty rate doubled, inflation soared, pensions declined dramatically in real value and trade collapsed.  For months, Russian newspapers insisted that there was no shortage of medicines — which told Russia-watchers there were medicine shortages.  Sanctions alone won’t bring Putin down, but they’ve imposed a painful cost for his bad behavior.  As evidence mounts of Russian attempts to subvert our democracy, it would be wanton capitulation to remove the sanctions now"

He writes as well,

"...in Russia sanctions are frustrating Putin’s hostile ambitions, crippling his ability to modernize his military machine. Discontent is deepening, if slowly: The old maxim that Russians unite in their suffering breaks down when Russians see their leaders and favored oligarchs leading lives of unprecedented opulence."

As I wrote in my original post, sanctions have had a substantial impact in containing Russia aggression--Moscow does not dictate what Kyiv's domestic and international polices should be, its hold on Crimea is recognized by no one, its dreams of Novorossiya across southern Ukraine are dead, sanctions are responsible for 1.5% to 6% of Russia's economic decline, and Russia's prospects for significant economic growth are dim.

There was one point though that I failed to make in my original article that is echoed by Ralph Peters when he writes that sanctions are a tool not a stand-alone solution.  Sanctions are essential to tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine, but the real reason Ukraine has been able to stand up to Russia's aggression is because its civil society would not submit to intimidation and violence by either the corrupt Yanukovych government or by Putin's Russia, and because of the stubborn, valorous defense of Ukraine by its armed volunteer brigades and military.  As long as Ukrainian society stands firm, Russia has little prospect of achieving its aims, and sanctions are an essential aid in helping Ukraine remain a free and independent nation.   However, even now, Ukraine's civil society and its military continue to suffer daily from Russian aggression.  So far in 2017, 21 civilians have been killed and 95 wounded in daily fighting with Russian-led forces along the line of contact with the occupied Donetsk and Luhansk regions.  In March alone the Ukrainian military suffered 27 killed and 189 wounded.  Russia's aggression toward Ukraine and other countries is reason to sustain and expand sanctions until Russia reverses its behavior.  As both Ralph Peters and I write, sanctions take time but they are taking a heavy toll on Russia and in time Ukrainian resolve and sanctions will end Russia aggression.

Three Years After Crimea, US Struggles With Response To Russia

TheHill.com

In March 2014, Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in a nearly bloodless occupation of the peninsula and, within weeks, conducted a referendum under the massive presence of Russian soldiers to annex Crimea to Russia.

Three years later, Ukraine has little means to compel the return of Crimea without the sustained support of the United States and Europe. At a panel discussion convened by the Atlantic Council to commemorate the third anniversary of Russia's annexation, Reps. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio) and Gerry Connolly (D-Va.) drew attention to U.S. support for Ukraine and pending legislation affirming support for sanctions against Russia.

Chabot stated that Russia must be rebuked for its actions, Putin's tactics must be confronted and Russia must be denied effective sovereignty of Crimea, as well as eastern Ukraine, until these are returned to Ukrainian control.

Panel speakers Anders Aslund of the Atlantic Council; Michael Carpenter of the Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement; Steven Pifer of the Brookings Institution, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine; and Robert Herman of Freedom House emphasized it was incumbent upon the West to respond to Russia's aggression, without which Russia would be emboldened to pursue more "small victorious wars" to sustain the Russian elite's popularity and hold onto power.

Recent moves by Russia to incorporate the army of the Georgian breakaway territory of South Ossetia into the Russian military and to recognize as valid documents of the Russian-controlled territories in eastern Ukraine, including passports, demonstrate that Russia has not deviated from its intent to exploit opportunities to dominate neighboring countries and seize new territory.

Carpenter noted that control of Kyiv is an existential issue for Moscow, and therefore the threat to Ukraine would not go away until there was a change of outlook in Moscow. Therefore, a sustained, concerted response from the United State and the European Union is necessary into the foreseeable future.

Against the need to confront Russia's violation of the international system, there is a seeming ill-defined embarrassment about Crimea. That Russia was able to take the territory without a fight, that many Crimeans (but by no means all) welcomed the annexation, and that, for some, Russia's historic claim to Crimea gives a veneer of legitimacy to Russia's action, tempt many to accept the annexation as a fait accompli. The difficulty of reversing Russia's action only reinforces the temptation to accept Russia’s narrative.

However, Ukraine simply did not have the means to confront Russia after years of mis-governance by former President Viktor Yanukovich, who was ousted during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014. And while Russia claims improbably that 95.5 percent of Crimeans voted to join Russia, in a nationwide referendum in 1991, 54 percent of Crimeans voted for independence from Russia, including 57 percent in the predominantly Russian city of Sevastopol (83 percent of Ukrainians voted for independence in Donetsk, the region in eastern Ukraine now occupied by Russia).

The Russian Federation held Crimea from 1783 until 1954 when — after 171 years — it was transferred under somewhat clouded circumstances to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, an "autonomous" republic within the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin dismisses the transfer as some kind of personal decision by then-Premier Nikita Khrushchev for "God only knows" what reason.

However, despite Putin's disdain for Khrushchev and the 1954 decision, Crimea may simply have been transferred to Ukraine to make administration of Crimea easier since it was, and is, dependent on Ukraine for nearly all its economic needs, including energy, water and transportation.

Despite President Trump's curious affection for Russia, U.S. support for Ukraine has been consistent and most recently forcefully expressed by Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, who on Feb. 2 at the U.N. Security Council condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine and said that U.S. sanctions against Russia would remain in place until Russia returned control of Crimea to Ukraine.

Meanwhile, congressional legislation (H.R. 830) aimed at deterring Russian aggression in Ukraine was introduced in February with impressive bipartisan sponsorship of at least 32 representatives. The act includes complementary measures that are required if the United States is to successfully confront Russian aggression, including the use of sanctions, diplomacy and the provision of "lethal defensive weapons" — the latter being absent from the Republican Party platform last election in circumstances that remain unclear — and addressing Russian disinformation and propaganda.

The new bill is one step in ensuring sustained support for Ukraine. Other assistance, particularly economic support, is needed to sustain Ukraine's struggling pro-Western democracy, fight corruption and improve the Ukrainian people's welfare while preserving stability on Europe's southeastern flank and upholding principles of fairness and equity among free and independent nations in the interest of global peace.

Dirk Mattheisen is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group. He writes on political economy with a focus on Russian and Ukrainian relations and global institutional governance. Follow him on Twitter@DirkMattheisen.

---

The views of contributors are their own and not the views of The Hill.

Kyiv Noir - The Assassination of Russian Parliamentarian Denys Voronenkov

Euromaidan Press - Kyiv Noir: When Will The Headlines End?

The photo above says it all. Soviet era façades. The blonde in an expensive ski jacket. The bloodied body on the sidewalk next to a luxury car. It’s the stuff of post-Soviet pulp novels. On Thursday, Denys Voronenkov, a Russian parliamentarian who fled to Ukraine, was assassinated in downtown Kyiv. To many in the West, this is their image of Ukraine.

Read more: Former Russian MP Voronenkov, key witness in Yanukovych treason case, assassinated in central Kyiv

Ukraine doesn’t get into the mainstream Western news much except, it seems, when someone is assassinated, moves money offshore, or Russia escalates the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

All too often the impression is that Ukraine is still submerged in corruption and violence. Not much different from Russia.

But much of the newsworthy violence in Ukraine starts with Russia’s subversion of Ukraine’s determination to carry out democratic reforms, including anti-corruption reforms. These reforms are a threat to Putin because they demonstrate that there is next door in a fellow post-Soviet country an alternative to his oppressive rule. Nearly everyone in Ukraine, including President Poroshenko, believes Voronenkov’s death was a Russian hit. Voronenkov had been a vocal critic of Putin since fleeing prosecution for corruption himself in Russia.

Read more: Who was Denis Voronenkov, exiled Putin critic murdered in Kyiv

What bothers Putin is that Ukraine’s reform process is succeeding. It has already had some notable successes, which provide a striking contrast to the absence of reform in Russia. Reform in the Ukrainian energy sector has greatly reduced the opportunity for corruption where it was once rampant. The establishment of an anti-corruption bureau is producing its first potentially big success with the arrest of Roman Nasirov, the head of Ukraine’s tax agency, in a US$75m graft case–even while Ukraine’s judicial system remains mired in corruption. A new e-procurement system has made public procurement more transparent and therefore less susceptible to fraud. And a new financial disclosure requirement makes it harder for politicians and high government officials to hide their wealth.

Support for reform from Western capitals is critical, though, both in terms of funding and expertise. That support is contingent on success.

Faith in the process of reform is undermined by highly visible shortcomings; in particular, the failure to make even one significant conviction for corruption by the previous or, for that matter, the current regime.

Greater accountability needs to be backed up by consequences for those who have engaged in corruption.

Denys Voronenkov was not only a critic of Putin but also a key witness in the case against Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine’s previous president, for corruption and treason. The legacy of Voronenkov’s death should not be that yet another case is deflected, stalls and peters out.

Until then, lurid headlines about Ukraine will continue to reverberate across television screens in the West and overshadow the effort to end corruption leaving the impression that life in Ukraine is like a potboiler crime novel.