Showing posts with label Russian Economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russian Economy. Show all posts

Saturday, June 21, 2025

Russia's Economy Declines Putting Pressure on Its Ability to Conduct Its War on Ukraine

 

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment for June 20, 2025, highlights Russia's economic vulnerability due to its war against Ukraine.  A prolonged war--Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been over three years now (or eleven years if you count from its original invasion in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea--is fought and won on resources.  Due to a slowing economy, Russia is running out of resources and time, and ISW assesses that things are economically worse than Russia admits.  There is a point in which Russia's frailties will catch up with Russian policy makers.

Look for Russia's 2025 second quarter (thru end-June) and its third quarter (thru end-September) economic reporting for further evidence of a decline in economic performance and where the economic fault lines will appear.

If economic decline is pronounced by end year, Russia may not be able to sustain the budgetary cost of its war on Ukraine.  Then Ukraine will have the opportunity to turn the momentum of the war in its favor.

The following on Russia's economy is excerpted below from ISW's full assessment.

"The Kremlin continues to prioritize maintaining the facade of economic stability by pursuing economic policies that will likely exacerbate Russia's economic instability. Putin claimed during SPIEF on June 20 that Russia's debt is not growing and refuted claims that Russia's economy is declining. Putin claimed that the idea that Russia's economy is only tied to raw materials and is dependent on hydrocarbon exports is "outdated," but that Russia aims to increase its non-oil and gas exports. Putin claimed that inflation in Russia decreased to 9.6 percent as of June 16 and that he expects inflation to fall to seven percent by the end of 2025. Putin used his speech to focus on reductions in the poverty level in Russia. Putin also highlighted Russia's low unemployment rate, claiming that the rate has stabilized around 2.3 percent since October 2024. Putin did not speak about Russia's labor shortages that are causing this low employment rate, however, in contrast to his 2024 SPIEF speech in which he acknowledged that Russia was suffering from labor shortages and highlighted the need for skilled migrant labor to increase Russia's economic growth. Putin may be attempting to gloss over his ongoing efforts to leverage migrants to mitigate ongoing labor shortages amid increasing anti-migrant sentiments in Russia.

The Kremlin has repeatedly attempted to posture the Russian economy as strong and stable, claiming in recent months that inflation was between nine and 10 percent when the actual figure was likely closer to 20 percent. Putin's June 20 claim that Russian inflation is 9.6 percent is likely also false. ISW has observed reports that domestic consumers in Russia continue to face rising prices for staple food items, such as potatoes and butter. Putin also failed to acknowledge the growing detrimental effects of high interest rates of 20 percent on the Russian industrial sector. Russian steel company Severstal head, Alexander Shevelev, warned on June 19 that metallurgical production facilities are at risk of shutting down due to low consumer demand and high interest rates. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina notably stated at SPIEF on June 19 that Russia's economy grew at a high rate for two years because Russia was using "free resources," including Russia’s workforce, production capacity, import substitution, the liquid assets of the National Welfare Fund, and the banking system’s capital reserve, but that Russia has exhausted many of these resources and needs to think of a new growth model. ISW previously assessed in early June 2025 that the Russian government was likely pressuring Nabiullina to lower Russia’s key interest rate to reduce the impact of high interest rates on the Russian budget and civilian industries.

Putin's efforts to frame the Russian economy as stable and growing are part of his efforts to balance social support programs with Russia's military needs and maintain his support among the Russian population despite the growing economic costs of his war in Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Kremlin efforts to pressure the Central Bank into prematurely lowering the key interest rate to maintain the facade of economic stability may backfire and contribute to elevated levels of inflation.

Putin is attempting to obfuscate the reality that increased investment in Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) has come at the cost of Russia's civilian economic sectors. Putin stated during his speech at SPIEF that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) has increased by over four percent annually over the last two years, but claimed that Russia's GDP growth is not solely due to Russia's oil and gas or defense industrial sectors. Putin claimed that Russia's agricultural, construction, logistics, financial, and information technology (IT) sectors have also expanded over the last two years. ISW reported in September 2024 that Russia's 2025 federal budget allocated 13.5 trillion rubles ($145 billion) toward "National Defense" expenditures and another 3.5 trillion rubles ($37 billion) toward "National Security," meaning that Russia committed about 41 percent of its 2025 expenditures to defense and security expenses. Russia allocated 6.4 trillion rubles ($69 billion) to its 2025 "Social Policy" budget in comparison, which underscores the disparity between Russia's investment in its defense industrial sectors compared to its civilian sectors.

Putin highlighted Russia's DIB growth during his speech and called for further integration of civilian and defense industrial sectors in order to facilitate greater innovation and increase dual-use goods production. Putin claimed that Russia's DIB has increased its output "many times over" and is "mastering" new equipment and weapons. Putin called for Russia to move away from dividing companies between the defense industrial and civilian sectors of the economy and to quickly implement innovations from the civilian sector into Russia's defense and security. Putin called for Russia to decrease the time between formulating an idea and its implementation and called for Russian military commanders and heads of defense industrial enterprises to be more involved in production decision-making processes. Putin pointed to drones, which Putin called the most effective means to destroy expensive military equipment, as an area where Russia can increase efficiency to ensure Russia's security and solve problems in Russia's DIB. Putin framed Russia's investments in artificial intelligence (AI) as purely focused on economic development and civilian sectors during his speech at SPIEF, although Russia is already working to integrate greater AI and machine learning (ML) capabilities into drones along the frontline. Russia undertook a concerted campaign to centralize Russian drone units and drone production efforts in late 2024, but Putin appears to be acknowledging that Russia's new drone production and testing mechanisms must retain a rapid innovation cycle."

 (ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization in Washington, DC.)


For a similar, though less pessimistic, analysis of Russia's economy, see the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA.org), Russia's Economy: Losing Altitude, Not Control.

Monday, May 22, 2017

Russia's Coming Time of Troubles




As Russia approaches its 2018 presidential election, dissent in Russia has taken an ominous turn.  A wide-spread truckers’ strike against road tolls pits the working class against the oligarchs.  An unexpectedly large “youth protest” against corruption in March pits the young against the last post-WWII generation of the Soviet Union as well as their parents who suffered through the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union.   And, a housing protest in Moscow pits ordinary Russians against their local government.  What happens to Moscow’s plans for a smooth election if dissent metastasizes into opposition?

The threat appears very real because Russia today is threatened by the same economic stagnation, succession turmoil and external pressures as was the Soviet Union in 1991.  The circumstances are similar to other pivotal moments, as well, in Russia’s history, such as its “Time of Troubles” in the late 16th century when economic trouble, a succession crisis following the death of Ivan the Terrible and conflict with Poland resulted in years of political turmoil.  The legacy of such moments in Russian history has been dramatic upheaval and regime change.

Although Russia appears to be emerging from two years of economic recession, prospects for economic growth are dim because of under-investment and falling consumption.  Economic wealth is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few.  Russia has the most unequal distribution of wealth of any major economy in the world.  The wealthiest 10% of the population owns 87% of Russia's wealth.  Moreover, economic activity is increasingly concentrated in a handful of cities, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow, as the Soviet Union’s single industry towns and rural communities die out, leaving entire regions economically and socially devastated.  To balance the Russian budget Putin has reduced spending on welfare, including pensions, health care and education, and on government salaries, further immiserating the Russian people.  At the same time the Russian government is increasing Russia’s international reserves rather than using that income to soften the impact of economic stagnation or to stimulate growth.  High international reserves insulate the Russian financial system from financial crisis, but building those reserves comes at the expense of the real economy where jobs, production and economic growth come from.

Meanwhile, military spending is draining resources from the economy.  Russia’s military strength on show in Syria and in eastern Ukraine does not signify growing power but a hollowing out the rest of society.  In an otherwise fairly positive assessment of Russia’s military capabilities, the Carnegie Endowment makes the point that,

“Excessive spending on the military may indeed be unsustainable in the long term.34 After all, this was a major contributor to state collapse in Russia at least twice during the twentieth century (in 1991, 1917, and, more debatably, 1905) and routinely served as the catalyst for major social upheaval in previous centuries.”

Its military adventures are costly.  Russia has not successfully concluded a single conflict, including Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and eastern Ukraine.  As these frozen or festering conflicts proliferate and perpetuate themselves, the financial and reputational cost to Russia rises, even while the welfare of the subject peoples declines dramatically.  Russian client states are deep wells of expense that weaken Russia in Moscow’s misplaced anticipation that nominal control of slivers of territory will legitimate future claims to historical areas of political control.

Russia’s leaders concede that sanctions due to the seizure of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine are likely to last a long time, hindering economic recovery, because there is no path that they are prepared to contemplate that would change the circumstances on the ground.  Russia’s international isolation suggests that Russia may not receive significant support from outside as it did in 1991 if things go from bad to worse, ensuring an even steeper descent, even if no world leader wants to contemplate a Russia plunged into internal chaos.  Meanwhile Russia’s leaders await the miracle of a failure of Western resolve or Western collapse to alleviate their own suffering.

Domestically, the firmament of the Russian state is being shaken, not just from popular protests by truckers and students and apartment dwellers but also from militant nationalism and elevated levels of societal violence both non-state (mafia) and state (suppression of civil society that punishes dissent and non-conformism under the guise of patriotism}.  Violent crime is rising in Russia because of economic hardship but also because of lawlessness in its vassal territories that is filtering back into Russia.  As one commentator puts it, 

“Russian mercenaries who have fought in the Donbas…have gotten a taste for easy money, easy blood, and easy opportunities for satisfying themselves,” in short, all “the criminal joys.” And they don’t forget these when they return home, yet another way that Putin’s war in Ukraine is harming Russia.”

As Russia anticipates the election of Putin to a fourth term as president in 2018, it faces a new time of troubles.  The problems of economic decline, weak political processes, and international tensions are familiar and the fault lines are increasingly clear.  If the collapse of the Soviet Union was unimaginable in 1991, what of the collapse of the Russian Federation today without a change in trajectory?

Under the threat of continued economic decline, social discontent will rise.  The truckers’ strike, which began simmering in 2015 when a new road toll was announced, has spread to 80 of 85 Russian regions.  The apartment renters’ protest in Moscow coalesced on May 14 in a protest by an estimated 20,000 participants.  Under pressure to preserve its privileges, the Russian elite will likely divide on the question of who will succeed Putin, just as it did in 1991.  Under economic pressure, also, central control of the oblasts will become weaker and perhaps fracture, with Moscow losing political coherence south and east of the Don and Volga Rivers—the internal steppe borderlands between Slavic and multi-ethnic groupings in Russia’s empire.  The Caucasus, where Moscow has tenuous control, will fracture, with Chechnya seeking independence if not its own Muslim zone of dominance, since it has as much to fear from extremism as does Moscow.  Differences will emerge elsewhere possibly splitting off additional regions from Moscow’s control, such as in the southwest where Moscow had difficultly containing the “Cossack” nationalists who swarmed eastern Ukraine in 2014-15.  Crimea, Rostov and Krasnodar are farther from Moscow than, say, Kyiv, if local economic and social issues overwhelm centralized control by Moscow as it runs out of money to dampen civil conflict.  Even in the north, regions such as Karelia may drift away from Russia’s orbit and strengthen old relationships with the Nordic countries.  This is what Moscow’s elite fears.

Rather than address directly the problems of economic decline, political paralysis and international isolation, Moscow is promising economic welfare without economic reform, invoking democratic principles without meaningful political participation, and battling fascism where none exists.  These are driving Russia down the road to collapse.


Russia’s turmoil during the time of troubles in the 16th century was followed by its greatest political and cultural achievements.  To replicate that accomplishment today Russia will have to shed its imperial impulse and complete its transformation begun in 1991 to an open political culture and an engaged civil society in order to emerge as a viable, modern nation-state.  If social unrest continues to grow, the 2018 presidential election may bring that question to a head.

Friday, February 17, 2017

First Signs of Russian Economic Recovery in 2017

photo credit 

The Russian Federal State Statistics Service recently surprised to the upside with new economic data.  As reported by BloombergMarkets, FocusEconomics and others, the Statistics Service reported a smaller -0.2% decline in GDP for 2016 than the -0.6% decline expected by many, including Russia’s Economic Ministry as recently as November.  Even more surprising, 2015 GDP was revised upward to a smaller -2.8% decline instead of -3.7% as previously reported.  And now First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, as reported by Bloomberg, expects GDP growth in 2017 of 1-1.5%, if not 2%.

What accounts for the improvement?  Bloomberg reports that the improvement reflected signs of growth in some sectors; manufacturing rose 1.4% in 2016, commodities including oil and gas production were up 0.2%, and agriculture was up 3.5%, though investment and consumption have not yet turned around.

Bloomberg quotes Nikolay Kondrashov at the Moscow Development Center of the Higher School of Economics, that key drivers in 2016 were an increase in exports and a “rebuilding of stocks”, which was “very strong”.  An increase in exports is perhaps not surprising given the devaluation in the ruble, but a very strong rebuilding of stocks seems odd without evidence for an increase in sales.  Until investment and consumption recover, why build inventories, other than to make output look good?  And output will fall again as inventory levels become unsustainably high.

The explanation may also be that the new numbers do not show an actual improvement in economic activity over what was expected but a change in methodology, as mentioned by Reuters.  The improvement by a third in the 2015 GDP number would feed through to the 2016 numbers and influence the “animal spirits” expectations for 2017, all while little really changed.  In this light, the improvement in the end 2016 numbers means that the recovery in the economy is virtually flat.  The Russian economy seems to be stabilizing, but a return to growth awaits evidence of solid, sustained economic activity.

The seeming improvement in the economy though is certainly helpful to Putin in the run up to the 2018 presidential election, if the Russian people are convinced things are getting better.

However, in Russia it is wise to eat your dark bread with a large pinch of coarse salt.

Monday, August 1, 2016

Putin's Not Enough Economics And Too Much Politics



A good discussion in Bloomberg by Evgenia Pismennaya and Ilya Arkhipov of Russia's economic challenges, especially competing interests and Putin's likely approach dominated by domestic political and geopolitical priorities--which will only prolong Russia's economic agony.

The article does not get into what appears to be Putin's seeming intent to wait out the economic decline until circumstances turn in his favor (through weakening his perceived adversaries), but it does touch on the difference between having a strategy and Putin's approach to "cherry pick" short term fixes that will not achieve Russia's objective of 4% growth considered necessary to maintain Russia's broader national interests.  This is one time when a clever sleight of hand isn't going to be enough.

Wednesday, July 27, 2016

Getting Privatization Wrong - Rosneft's Bid for Bashneft



Russia has this one wrong on so many levels.  As reported, under Russia’s privatization program, government majority-owned energy giant, Rosneft, is bidding to buy another government-owned company, Bashneft.  This would do little to relieve pressure on Russia’s budget and nothing to improve economic performance.

Privatization was originally proposed by the IMF as a way for Russia to increase economic growth by strengthening the private sector.  Little progress was made.  With the emergence of a budget deficit due to the fall in energy prices and sanctions due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, privatization reemerged as one of two means to manage the government budget deficit that spending cuts alone could not solve (the other means is to draw down Russia’s Reserve and Wealth Funds).

While the government may get a few rubles out of this because the change in ownership from one government entity to another is not dollar-for-dollar, the bid by Rosneft is worse news because of what it signals about economic policy.  The sale would serve only to concentrate even more economic control in the hands of one of Putin’s closest associates, Igor Sechin, CEO of Rosneft.  But consolidation is the last thing Russian business needs.  What it needs is a confident, competitive private sector.

Rosneft’s bid signals that Putin is not ready to loosen the government’s grip and that Putin is prepared to compromise on the “understanding that state-owned companies should not participate in the privatization programme.”  Putin spokesperson Peskov’s defense about indirect ownership through holding companies is ludicrous.

It means also that Putin is not ready to support economic reforms proposed by economic council advisor Alexei Kudrin.  Therefore, meaningful reform is unlikely.

As reported separately by The Moscow Times, Kudrin’s proposed economic structural reforms are already under challenge from presidential advisor Andrei Belousov based on an alternative proposal for investment through the government’s budget and central bank support,  which would still leave economic initiative in the government's hands.


Economic policy driven by a small cadre of well-connected and self-interested Putin associates is a losing game, because the first casualty will be the Russian economy.

Wednesday, July 20, 2016

Through A Glass Darkly: The Direction Of The Russian Economy


http://euromaidanpress.com/2016/07/19/through-a-glass-darkly-the-direction-of-the-russian-economy/


At mid-year the Russian economy may be going up—or down.

In what amounts to an ongoing ritual in a June 17 interview President Putin sounded positive about the direction of the Russian economy.  He is quoted as saying, “we expected a slight economic decline by the end of this year, but now we are seeing growth,” although he noted that investment continued to decline because of structural problems, sanctions, and low oil prices.  It was not clear however if he was speaking about the economy overall or areas in which it has done well.  Russian economic policymakers in the latestRussia IMF Article IV 2016 released on July 13 expect the economy to decline by -0.2 percent in 2016 and the IMF forecasts a decline of -1.2%.

The IMF notes that, after oil prices and geopolitical tensions, the banking sector remains a specific risk, although it remains stable.  The IMF is less concerned about public sector finances.  Although the government is running a substantial deficit, the IMF believes that measures taken already have proven effective, public debt, although growing, is low, and, if need be, the National Welfare Fund “with liquid assets worth 5% of GDP” could be used to cover the deficit.  The IMF notes the government’s plans to manage the budget deficit through drawing down the Reserve Fund and from“privatization receipts from a number of large state-owned companies.”

However, evidence of severe financial strains abound. 

IMF reference to the National Welfare Fund arises because the Reserve Fund is projected to decline to about $15b at the end of 2016 and to run dry in 2017.  The government was running through the Reserve Fund at about $6-9b a month early in 2016, so even if the burn rate is lower now, $15b could disappear quickly.

The Welfare Fund, which was meant to cover pensions, not to provide budget support, is said to hold about $73b and the government expects to use $12b in 2017.  However, the Welfare Fund is exposed to considerable financial risk because its assets consist of investments in public and private corporations whose financial health is in question.  It has for instance a large exposure to VEB, Russia’s development bank, which is widely reported to be virtually bankrupt.
The other leg of the government’s plan, privatization, may not provide the income expected, which would put more pressure on the Reserve and Welfare Funds. 

The Russian government recently tested the market for privatizations with the sale of part of its stake in diamond miner Alrosa PJSC, which sold at a 3.8% discount to its market value.  Similar results for sales of other assets may reduce the government’s income from privatization, as well as reduce the value of what it continues to hold.  The IMF itself cautioned that “Staff also recommended preserving more of the RF [Reserve Fund] as liquidity risks could materialize (e.g. drop in oil prices, low privatization receipts, and/or a tightening of sanctions)…”

Meanwhile, the IMF has warned that the Russian financial system will require additional recapitalization.  According to the IMF, non-performing loans “might be higher than reported by some 3.5 percentage points resulting in a capital shortfall of about 0.5-1 percent of GDP.  Under stress scenarios, the shortfall could reach up to about 4½ percent of GDP” (roughly equivalent to the size of the Welfare Fund).  Central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina, is said to be looking into creating a troubled assets fund, putting a further strain on government finances.  In addition, the IMF notes, “Support to the loss-making Russian Development Bank (VEB)…could reach up to 2 percent of GDP over the next few years.”

Moreover, the government expects to run a budget deficit until 2020. 

Ultimately, it plans to balance the budget through reforms that include “pension reform, means-testing social benefits, postponing investment and improving capital budgeting, cutting subsidies, and improving tax collection.”  Many of these measures make sense, such as raising the pension age and focusing social benefits, but these measures mean greater pressure on incomes.  Postponing investment will also weaken growth.

In fact, with all the uncertainty regarding the return to growth and the pace and scope of reforms due to upcoming elections, further pressure on livelihoods is the only certainty.  The IMF refers to livelihoods only obliquely, mentioning in passing the government’s “tight income policies” and a fall in real wages that led to “a rebalancing of national income in favor of corporate profits”.  The impact on livelihoods, however, will greatly influence the return to economic growth, because the renewal of even very modest growth next year is based on the expectation of an increase in demand.

A World Bank report expects the poverty rate (people living at or below the subsistence level of US$139/month) to reach over 13 percent of the population in 2016.  The World Bank believes that “even the improvement in economic conditions projected in the baseline scenario would be unlikely to stop the erosion of household incomes in 2017.”  The poverty rate could peak at 15.2 percent in 2017 before declining in 2018 if economic growth returns.  Pressure on incomes will continue due to the government’s intention to freeze government spending for the next three years, cut social spending, not to fully index pensions and public sector salaries, and raise the pension age.

For the vast majority of Russians, their economic welfare will continue to decline.

Of interest also may be that, a step below the oligarch class, Russia’s economic upper class (with incomes of 15 to 100m rubles), where private investment and discretionary spending might come from, is reported to have lost between 25 to 75 percent of its income in 2015 (Moscow Times).

Sixty percent of these are business owners who as a group lost 50 percent of their income, undercutting small to medium-size business investment. It is interesting to note that 84 percent of the economic upper class live in Moscow and thus might be expected to have a significant influence on government policy, which, economically, might be all for the good if it brings policy closer in line with the economic reality of everyday Russians.