How to Plan a Pyrrhic Victory; Putin Does Strategy

As evidence mounts of the scope of Putin’s activities, a plausible strategic plan seems to emerge from his actions.  The plan, such as it is, falls short though.  It is in essence a strategy from which Pyrrhic victories are made.

The plausible strategy has all of the following--and possibly other elements as more becomes known--in order to recapture Russia’s importance in global affairs while reasserting its own sphere of influence, Putin is,

• Reestablishing Russian hegemony over neighboring states through conquest, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine but also Armenia and Belarus (through a new military base that Belarus didn’t ask for), and ultimately, the Baltics, as well as other East European states;
• Control of neighboring states promises extended control over nearby strategic spheres, including the Black Sea with improved access to the Mediterranean and the Baltics with improved access to the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic;
• Destabilizing Russia’s near abroad, including through support for rightist and leftist extremist parties across Europe, but also through support for other potential disruptors, such as North Korea (or Berlusconi);
• Unbalancing the US through feints in the Middle East, most notably in Iran and Syria; these feints may involve igniting additional conflict, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia, possibly over control of Iraq, which would push oil and gas prices up;
• Conflict in the Middle East (or elsewhere in the Muslim world) would have the additional benefit of producing a quagmire for the US and Europe that would tie up attention and resources (much as the Syrian refugee crisis is doing) and erode the West’s international standing.  These actions would hopefully drive a wedge between the US and Europe or the US and Saudi Arabia, as well as the US and Iran just as they initiate a rapprochement.

These geopolitical measures elevate the importance of the military and intelligence arms of the Russian government and help reinforce domestic measures to control dissent and social conflict.

Possibly other actions will become apparent that fit this scenario, such as a campaign of murder of opponents in Russia and in foreign capitals.

As a strategy it is doomed to fail because the risks and the costs for Russia are so high that an unanticipated turn will collapse the enterprise, while Russia’s key weakness is not addressed—the very reason Russia finds itself in such a depleted state—its crumpling economy.  Putin has no economic plan other than raising oil prices.

As with monarchs of other empires that imagined their resources were unlimited, Putin is burning through Russia’s wealth.

Russia has insufficient resources to succeed without access to the global economy for markets, finance and technology.

Russian today is characterized by massive erosion of economic power, as evidenced by falling consumption and investment, budget cuts, new unaffordable expenses such as supporting Crimea and eastern Ukraine and military adventure in Syria, capital flight and increased poverty.

Because of the weak economic foundation for elevating Russian influence, Putin’s strategy will fail just as the aborted Eurasian Union strategy failed to halt Russia’s decline.

Possibly Putin has realized the economic problem and is trying to change the international system to give Russia room to launch internal reforms.  This might weaken perceived enemies before risking systemic domestic reforms.

But this entails an extraordinary leap in faith in Putin’s foresight that is not apparent in his approach.  A new international order would require not just destroying the existing order but building a coalition around new, shared principles to manage conflict and preserve peace, which Putin has failed to demonstrate, and, as others have noted, he has no philosophical foundation other than preserving Russia’s importance.