Is Russian Civil Society Dead? - FT: Russia’s Unlikely Media Revolutionary

Photo Credit: Financial Times

I had written (Is Russian Civil Society Dead?) that the tendency to authoritarian government prevents Russian civil society from confronting its own history as evident from the absence of introspection and atonement for past societal crimes; that Russia has not faced the truth about its brutal past, and this enables Putin’s crimes and his war on Ukraine.

In a Financial Times interview, Natalia Sindeyeva, head of Russia’s former independent news service, TVRain, makes the same argument on a more personal level.  She argues in a similar vein that Russia's problems go beyond Putin.  She "thinks the problem has deeper roots in Russia's failure to hold a truth and reconciliation process in the way Germany did after the second world war...'We didn't get together as a country, as a society, to recognise the mistakes that were made.  It all went unsaid.'"

Sindeyeva continues on social values--what I described as the basis for liberty--during the transition from communism to capitalism, “…if you move from communism to capitalism, it doesn’t mean you can start making money.  There are values—private property, human life, freedom of speech, free elections…we didn’t have a big discussion as a society about how it happened in our country…we didn’t set those values.”  

Sindeyeva describes the personal complicity that I quoted Axio's Dave Lawler on, "It's not just collective guilt but collective complicity.  What Putin's done is smear everyone, so you become part of it even without doing anything."  She describes the "cognitive dissonance" of complicity; "You can't imagine that your government, which you believed in, could have done something like that.  You start convincing yourself and everyone around you that it's all lies and you know the truth..."At some point you have to convince yourself, because otherwise you just lose your mind."

Read Sindeyeva FT's interview.  It makes tangible on a personal level what I described in historic terms that Russian society is going through in the manufactured reality of a criminal Russian authoritarian government.

Is Russian Civil Society Dead?

Putin’s lies to the Russian people about the war in Ukraine, his suppression of civil liberties, and his criminalizing of dissent are strangling Russia.  It does not seem extreme to ask, is Russian civil society dead?

Is Russian Civil Society Dead?

And, for a more emotional and personal perspective on Russian society, read Russian journalist Yelena Kostyuchenko

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/14/you-didnt-know-that-russia-is-fascist-a77356

How Ukraine is Not Russia

Photo Credit

Ukraine is not Russia. Despite Western confusion on this point, Ukraine's people, even those of Russian descent, are a distinct society and a very different culture from that of Russia. Volodymyr Yesmolenko, Director of Analytics, Internews Ukraine, and Editor-in-Chief, UkraineWorld, explains the deep--and separate from Russia--history of Ukraine's identity,

"This distinct history has also produced a unique Ukrainian political culture that is anti-tyrannical in its nature. For example, Kyivan Rus' existed as a pluralistic polity for several centuries. Early modern Cossack statehood was deeply influenced by Catholic education, German law and Polish contractual politics. In 19th-century Ukraine, which existed within the borders of the Russian and Habsburg empires, Ukrainian intellectuals were defending decentralized and democratic politics, including poet Taras Shevchenko, historian Mykola Kostomarov, and philosopher Mykhailo Drahomanov. This pluralist political identity explains why today Ukraine is not governed by one person and why Ukrainians have been rebelling whenever there have been attempts to establish authoritarian rule. Domestic authoritarianism in Ukraine is difficult to achieve and it has always been imported."

 

Yermolenko also explains where the false Russian narrative of a pan-Slavic identity comes from,

"The "Russian World" is the construction of the new era, which to a large extent repeats the ideas of the elites of the Russian Empire before the 1917 revolution. At that time, Russian elites defined Ukrainians as "Little Russians", a part of the Russian nation, which also included "Great Russians" and "Belarussians"...When the Bolsheviks took power, they aimed strategically at "amalgamation of the nations", which actually meant Russification of the lands that they controlled."

And, here is Yermolenko on Ukrainian national identity today (March 11) in the face of Russia's war on Ukraine.

Another excellent discussion of Russian colonialism and Ukrainian identity is this Twitter thread by Volodymyr Sheiko, Director of the Ukrainian Institute (courtesy of Olga Tokariuk).

In celebration of Ukraine's cultural achievements (Ukrainians Who Have Changed Ukraine and the World), here is an excellent article by Euromaidan Press (Euromaidan Press a high-quality source for information on contemporary Ukraine).

How Russia's Invasion of Ukraine Ends

 

Photo Credit

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ends in one of two ways; either economic weakness undermines Russia’s capacity to sustain its war or Putin loses domestic support enough that he is deposed.  A third way is that Putin dies in office, with or without help.

Although economic weakness and/or loss of domestic support will inevitably bring Putin down, it is not a foregone conclusion that Ukraine will not defeat Russia on the battlefield.  Ukrainian resistance has proven much stronger than Russia anticipated and apparently has thrown Russia’s conquest of its neighbor behind schedule.  The longer resistance can slow or stop the Russian advance, the less likely Russia will prevail.

Whatever the outcome in battle, Russia does not have the capacity to occupy Ukraine for long because of the difficulty and cost of occupying the largest country in Europe after Russia with forty million plus citizens.  And an occupation on that scale will spur opposition at home as the economic cost and cost in soldiers' lives grow.

For good real-time reporting of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine follow https://twitter.com/nexta_tv on Twitter.

For good analysis of the economic cost to Russia, read the excellent article by Vladislav Inozemtsev at Riddle (although posted on February 26, Inozemtsev’s analysis is behind rapidly evolving sanctions against Russia’s economy, which would result in an even worse economic outcome than Inozemtsev describes in his article) or this thread by Rob Person at the US Military Academy at Westpoint.

The evidence for loss of domestic support is uneven.  Russian civil society has been aggressively suppressed by Putin by arrests, crushing public dissent, and closing of public media.  Nevertheless, there is incidental evidence of the Russian public’s discomfort with Putin’s invasion of a Slavic neighbor, including as reported by Johnson’s Russia List and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty or from Moscow Correspondent for the Wall Street Journal’s Evan Gershkovich.

For why Putin will ultimately be defeated, read Dr. Brain LaPierre, Zoya Sheftalovich at Politico.EU or Lawrence Freedman at King’s College, London.

Children of Kyiv waiting for Russian assault on the Ukrainian city

 

Russia’s Ukrainian Agents

Photo Credit: China Daily - Ukraine Parliment 2012

The US Treasury notice sanctioning four Ukrainians for “activities to destabilize Ukraine” is a compelling window on Moscow’s campaign of subversion that complements its campaign of military aggression.  Each of the Ukrainians is accused of aiding Russia against Ukraine through activities that undermine Ukraine’s government and civil society.   You read that right.  Ukrainians against Ukraine.

Take Taras KOZAK(age 49) from Lviv in western Ukraine. He is a current member of the Ukrainian Parliament with the Opposition Platform – For Life party led by Victor Medvedchuk, who is himself sanctioned by the U.S. for undermining Ukrainian sovereignty in 2014 ( Medvedchuk, a close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin, is currently under house arrest in Ukraine for treason). US Treasury writes,

“Kozak, who controls several news channels in Ukraine, supported the [Russian] FSB’s plan to denigrate senior members of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s inner circle, falsely accusing them of mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, Kozak used his news platforms to amplify false narratives around the 2020 U.S. elections first espoused by U.S.-designated Andrii Leonidovych Derkach (Derkach). Kozak has attempted to legitimatize Derkach’s claims by rebroadcasting Derkach’s false assertions about U.S. political candidates. Throughout 2020, Kozak worked alongside FSB intelligence agents.”

Or, take Oleh VOLOSHYN (age 40) from Kyiv. Like Kozak, Voloshyn is a member of the Ukrainian Parliament and a member of the political party led by Medvedchuk. US Treasury writes,

“Voloshyn has worked with Russian actors to undermine Ukrainian government officials and advocate on behalf of Russia. Voloshyn also worked with U.S.-designated Konstantin Kilimnik, a Russian national with ties to Russian intelligence who was sanctioned for attempts to influence the U.S. 2020 presidential election, to coordinate passing on information to influence U.S. elections at the behest of Russia.”

US Treasury writes that “Russia has directed its intelligence services to recruit current and former Ukrainian government officials to prepare to take over the government [underline added] of Ukraine and to control Ukraine’s critical infrastructure with an occupying Russian force. At the heart of this effort are Taras Kozak (Kozak) and Oleh Voloshyn (Voloshyn)”

Then there is Volodymyr OLIYNYK (a.k.a., Oleinik or Oliinyk) (age 64) from Yalta, Crimea, which has been annexed by Russia, who fled to Moscow for vote-rigging in 2014. US Treasury writes that,

“Oliynyk has a history of supporting Russia, currently resides in Moscow, Russia, and shares Russia’s anti-Western sentiments. In 2021, Oliynyk worked at the direction of the [Russian] FSB to gather information about Ukrainian critical infrastructure.

…

“As in previous Russian incursions into Ukraine, repeated cyber operations against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure are part of Russia’s hybrid tactics to threaten Ukraine. The overall strategy is designed to pull Ukraine into Russia’s orbit by thwarting Ukraine’s efforts at Western integration, especially with the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Russia has pursued broad cyber operations against critical infrastructure, it has focused on disrupting one critical infrastructure sector in particular: Ukraine’s energy sector [underline added]. Russia has also degraded Ukraine’s access to energy products in the middle of winter. Acting through Russia’s state-owned gas company Gazprom, Russia has repeatedly disrupted supplies to Ukraine—a vital transshipment country with pipelines to other European countries—due to purported disputes over gas pricing.”

Or, lastly, Vladimir SIVKOVICH (a.k.a. Sivkovych) (age 61) from the Kyiv region. The US Treasury writes,

”Vladimir Sivkovich (Sivkovich) is the former Deputy Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council. In 2021, Sivkovich worked with a network of Russian intelligence actors to carry out influence operations that attempted to build support for Ukraine to officially cede Crimea to Russia [underline added] in exchange for a drawdown of Russian-backed forces in the Donbas, where separatists continue to receive support from Russia. In early 2020, Sivkovich coordinated with Russian intelligence services to promote Derkach’s disinformation campaign against the U.S. 2020 presidential election. Sivkovich, who has ties to the FSB, also supported an influence operation targeting the United States from 2019 to 2020.”

As the US Treasury explains,

“…The four individuals have played various roles in Russia’s global influence campaign to destabilize sovereign countries in support of the Kremlin’s political objectives [underline added].”

…

“Russian intelligence services, including the FSB, recruit Ukrainian citizens in key positions to gain access to sensitive information, threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, and then leverage these Ukrainian officials to create instability in advance of a potential Russian invasion [underline added].”

"In 2020, Kremlin officials launched a comprehensive information operation plan designed in part to degrade the ability of the Ukrainian state to function independently [underline added]…This included identifying and co-opting pro-Russian individuals in Ukraine and undermining prominent Ukrainians viewed as pro-Western, who would stand in the way of Russian efforts to bring Ukraine within its control [underline added]. Goals of the plan included destabilizing the political situation in Ukraine and laying the groundwork for creating a new, Russian-controlled government in Ukraine."

Russia systematically suborns Ukrainians, especially those in government or the military, who are susceptible through bribery or coercion to act against Ukraine.  Outside observers of events in Ukraine can be confused by–if not outright hostile to–Ukraine because these Ukrainian persons appear to be evidence that Ukrainian society does not support its government or an independent, democratic Ukraine.  Indeed, they are led to believe that part of Ukrainian society dreams of rejoining Russia.  For an outside observer, the Ukrainians who are loyal to Moscow–although few–create confusion about how deep, or shallow, Ukrainian society’s sense of identity is. And that confusion helps fuel Russian disinformation that casts doubt how cohesive the Ukrainian state and society are.

The corrupt Ukrainians who fled Kyiv for Moscow when former President Viktor Yanukovych was ousted are well-known.  But it is inexplicable how pro-Moscow individuals can be members of Ukraine’s parliament today and act against Ukraine’s national interest--they are not just sympathetic, they act on behalf of Moscow against Ukraine. In another country, they would be prosecuted as traitors. A particular threat is Victor Medvedchuk, who not only leads a pro-Moscow political party but has direct access to Putin and to other individuals at the highest level in the Kremlin and whose personal interests are more aligned with Moscow than with Kyiv.

Although fueled by a Russian campaign of subversion and corruption, it is alarming that Russia finds Ukrainians willing to trade their country for Moscow’s favors.


For more on the four sanctioned individuals, read Irene Kenyon, former Treasury intelligence officer and Director of Risk Intelligence for FiveBy Solutions.

For an excellent analysis how Russia might use suborned Ukrainian politicians or government functionaries to undermine Ukraine's legitimate government, see Euromaidan Press article,

Of Kremlin plans and thinking: The “Murayev coup” plot seen through the prism of the Surkov Leaks

Pandora Papers Leak - More Evidence that Economic and Financial Sanctions Work

Among the insights from the Pandora Papers leak is that sanctions against hostile state actors and enablers work--a hotly contested point in international relations.  The Pandora Papers provide abundant evidence that sanctions inflict a high cost on the targets of those sanctions.  In an article in The Washington Post, Greg Miller writes,

"Over the past seven years, the United States and Europe have imposed sanctions on more than 800 Russian individuals and entities for alleged “malign” behavior including Russia’s annexation of Crimea, armed incursions into Ukraine, attempted assassinations of political dissidents, cyberattacks on Western institutions and disruptions of U.S. elections.

"The Pandora files show sanctions not only hitting their Russian targets but then triggering losses that spread across their interconnected financial networks.

...“The impact of such measures can be severe. Treasury designations all but lock targets out of global markets, where the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency, and bar U.S. banks and companies from doing business with them.”

In other words, sanctions do what they are meant to do, unquestionably inflict a significant cost on their targets, even though they do not prevent hostile acts.  Miller writes,

"But the files also underscore the limits of sanctions, making clear that vast quantities of Russian money continue to slosh through secret global accounts while Moscow’s actions beyond its borders seem undeterred. Russia remains in control of Crimea, a prominent critic of Putin was poisoned last year, and U.S. intelligence agencies accused Moscow of mounting a new attack on a U.S. presidential election."

However, short of removing hostile actors from their positions of power by force, the U.S. and the West can use sanctions to influence--if not ultimately stop--hostile acts from reoccurring.  Miller, again, 

"Current and former U.S. officials said the losses and reactions depicted in the documents demonstrate the reach of the West’s financial arsenal. The officials said these punitive measures influence the Kremlin’s calculations if not always change its course."

Or, as Miller quotes Julia Friedlander,

“What it shows is that these networks don’t feel untouchable,” said Julia Friedlander, who served in senior positions at the Treasury Department and the White House during the Obama and Trump administrations. “Although sanctions have often failed to deliver on larger political goals,” she said, they disrupt adversaries who “rely on our financial markets as an element of their own power.”

Miller's article is a worthwhile read on how sanctions impose a substantial cost on Russian oligarchs who align themselves with President Putin's policies and acts of aggression:

How U.S. Sanctions Take a Hidden Toll on Russian Oligarchs

For a description of the Pandora Papers leak and what the leak is revealing, go to ICIJ.org.