We Are Entitled to Investigate, Debate and Act on Russian Interference

 TheHill.com

American actor Morgan Freeman tossed a firecracker among Russian scholars by lending his voice to a newly formed Committee to Investigate Russia, whose purpose is to confront Russian interference in American democracy.

The response on behalf of Russian scholars was taken up by well-known Russian expatriate journalist, Leonid Bershidsky, in an article on Sept. 20 in Bloomberg entitled, “Wanted: Russia Experts. No Expertise Required.” Sean Keeley makes a similar point in The Russian Interference Racket in The American Interest.

Bershidsky’s complaint against Freeman is that the Committee to Investigate Russia (CIR) and many who write about Russia have no background in the subject. Therefore, they lack the familiarity to provide the nuance necessary to understand Russia. Consequently, their views are ill-informed and incorrect, and too often manifest as Russophobia. These persons should leave Russia to the experts. However, Bershidsky’s complaint is dead wrong.

The issue is not understanding Russia. The issue is how to deal with Russian aggression against Western institutions and values. CIR “investigates” Russia by drawing attention to Russian interference through posting background information and articles published elsewhere. Although decidedly to the right of the spectrum, CIR addresses plenty of Americans' concern about Russian interference that is well-established, if not yet well-understood. This is hardly Russophobic.

Bershidsky disparages by name the competence of CIR’s advisory board members, who are highly accomplished professionals but do not meet his requisite standard for expertise in Russian affairs. That criticism is misplaced. Whatever their specific competencies, they have a stake in the issue. They are affected by Russian interference.

Following Bershidsky’s reasoning, Jimmy Kimmel, the outspoken American comedian and talk show host, has no business opining on health care reform because he is not a health-care specialist. Kimmel however has a personal stake in the healthcare issue that he has spoken about on his show, as do millions of Americans whose voices cannot be shut out because their familiarity with the issues does not rise to a certain standard. The question here is not a particular kind of competence but a personal stake in the consequences. The same goes for Russia’s behavior, climate change, or tax reform.

Morgan Freeman does say that Russia is at war with the U.S., but Russia’s interference in elections in the U.S. and elsewhere, as well as its attempts to sow conflict through social media, is incontestable. There is nothing exaggerated or overblown in what Freeman says in the video. This isn’t hyperbole or jingoism.

Diminished in standing by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing chaos, Russia under Vladimir Putin has veered toward blaming the West and has chosen to retaliate by invading neighboring countries and by interfering in other countries in areas that are fundamental to those countries’ institutions and values. Russia has legitimate grievances related to its change in circumstances, fed at times by American bungling on the world stage, but it does not follow that Russia’s grievances legitimate its aggression against perceived slights and imagined threats. It doesn’t take special expertise to figure that out.

What Bershidsky decries as lacking expertise and authority is part and parcel of legitimate public debate. Russia experts may feel swamped by the growing public debate on Russia because the importance of the issue to the public has become more manifest with the growing evidence of Russian interference. Russian experts have to speak more loudly to be heard.

Bershidsky quotes Russian scholar, Samuel Greene, to the effect that Russian scholars are not being heard because they are keeping their heads down due to the rise in Russophobia. This is nonsense. The increase in public debate about Russia is a direct consequence of Russian actions against democratic institutions; and, the emergence in some corners of Russophobia does not invalidate or diminish genuine debate about Russia’s behavior. Bershidsky also references Russian affairs expert Mark Galeotti. However, Galeotti does not keep his head down. He continues to publish frequently, as should Greene.

Galeotti’s articles are excellent and should be read by anyone wishing to be well-informed on the nuances of Russian behavior. And, indeed, their voices may be needed to balance out more strident voices, such as Molly McKew, mentioned critically by both Bershidsky and Keeley, who appears on the Committee to Investigate Russia website. An example of an excellent perspective on how to deal with Russian interference is provided by Jan Jankowicz, fellow at the Kennan Institute, in The Only Way to Defend Against Russia’s Information War in the New York Times.

If the drama about Russian influence in the West—or for that matter Trump’s attack on NFL players for speaking their minds--teaches us anything, it is that public debate is the most effective weapon against the real threat of overbearing authority—from governments to extremists of the left and the right, and even the malicious, manipulative voices on social media.

We—the affected parties—are entitled to investigate, debate and act on Russian interference. We are better off if our views are based on objective fact and sound judgement. In the meantime, we need to listen to what legitimate voices across the spectrum have to say.

Dirk Mattheisen is a writer and blogger on political economy and independent consultant on institutional governance and strengthening the role of civil society in government. He is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group. Follow him on Twitter  @DirkMattheisen.

Putin's Trump Moment (continued)

Andrey Pertsev of the Carnegie Moscow Center has a commentary, The Active Minority and Passive Majority: Takeaways from Russia’s Regional Elections, that provides more detail and greater insight into the September 10 elections that I wrote about, including the points that the outcome reflects an "increase in voting by the reform-minded minority and a decrease in voter turnout among Putin’s former majority", which, as I wrote,

"A worrisome feature of this election for Putin is that turnout was as low as 14-15 percent in some districts, which magnified the opposition vote, suggesting that Putin may be stung by voter apathy next year. It seems unlikely that a populist insurgent like Trump could disrupt a vote for Putin, but a disaffected public also means that when the insurgency comes it will be unexpected, widespread and messy."

See Putin's Trump Moment

Putin's Trump Moment

© Getty Images

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump have the same problem, they have squandered their credibility. They both appear clever because by chance they have spent a lifetime getting away with things that have brought down others long ago, and they lied about them. They get away with it because the audacity catches everyone off guard.

However, the lesson of Trump’s first months in office is that, once most people catch on, it is harder to pull off the next audacious stunt. Trump’s agenda from health care to that wall is stalled. Putin has had a longer run in public office but is having trouble with his agenda, too — from lifting oil prices to lifting sanctions.

Now that everyone has caught on to Russia’s election interference and propaganda, Putin’s audacious stunts, despite much hand wringing by his victims, are harder to pull off without a substantial reaction in response. Local elections held in Russia on Sept. 10 fit the pattern and spell possible trouble for next year’s presidential election that Putin is currently expected to win handedly.

On Sept. 10, Putin’s United Russia party swept local elections in the 16 Regions where elections took place, including in Sevastopol in Crimea seized by Russia from Ukraine in 2014. However, opposition candidates in Moscow made surprising gains.

As reported by RFE/RL, United Russia took about 77 percent of the contested seats in Moscow while opposition parties took the remaining 23 percent, putting them on track to “ win a majority of seats in 14 of the more than 100 administrative districts of the capital.” A modest but significant gain for the political opposition in a key region.

Some commentators have made much of this success, arguing that it shows Putin’s declining popularity among the important Moscow electorate. Others conclude it is a ploy by Putin to give the appearance of plurality and vent some of the pressure from alternatives to United Russia before next year’s presidential election.

In one version, Putin will announce in November that he is running for president, but as an independent, effectively throwing United Russia under the bus to deflect public unhappiness from Putin over poor economic conditions and the unpopular and expensive interventions in eastern Ukraine and Syria that are draining lives and the national budget.

Given that Putin is at the pinnacle of his domestic power, it is difficult to believe that election results in Moscow, where everything is controlled from the top, are anything but a ploy in Putin’s presidential reelection strategy. Moreover, poor opposition results elsewhere and numerous election fraud complaints indicate that the modest opposition win in Moscow had at the least Putin’s tacit approval. Since Putin does not intend to give up power, the opposition victories seem to be a tactical concession on the part of Putin.

There is a risk, however, that this very modest ploy will backfire. It is not yet an insurgency, but the appearance of political plurality may escalate into a demand for actual plurality. Such an escalation — like Trump’s surprise election — might effervesce from deep dissatisfaction among ordinary Russians about their poor economic prospects.

Ordinary Russians have already expressed unhappiness with political and economic corruption through the unexpected strength of protests earlier this year. If dissent grows, Putin’s ability to rule through a diminished United Russia party would be undercut. This why there are rumors of him running as an independent.  He would have to build a new coalition, a seemingly improbable event if he can’t hold United Russia together, or he may fall back on suppressing dissent through his control of the justice system and the newly established National Guard that reports directly to him and is trained for such purposes.

In which case, the likely outcome is the social upheaval that Putin wants to avoid (not to mention that Putin might again foment a foreign conflict to rivet the Russian people’s attention and loyalty). A worrisome feature of this election for Putin is that turnout was as low as 14-15 percent in some districts, which magnified the opposition vote, suggesting that Putin may be stung by voter apathy next year. It seems unlikely that a populist insurgent like Trump could disrupt a vote for Putin, but a disaffected public also means that when the insurgency comes it will be unexpected, widespread and messy.

That Putin believes there is a risk of an unpleasant surprise is also suggested by the wave of bomb threats across Russia over the last few days. It may be a prank or a genuine terrorist threat, but it also has the appearance of old tradecraft out of Russia’s security service (FSB) playbook. It’s hard to tell.

It’s an old trick to instill in the Russian people a sense of vulnerability to dark (usually foreign) forces, and their reaction is to look to the central government in Moscow to protect them. Alarmist statements from Russian officials that the bombing threat is unprecedented and could have come from Ukraine fit into this narrative, as does the response of Russian authorities, which has been unremarkable when they are more noted for overreacting. The perception of a Russia under siege from terrorism was, after all, what propelled Putin to power in 2000.

Putin has reason to worry, because, unlike Trump, he is not the disruptor this time. Putin’s game is defensive. He has to fend off challenges to his power. However, his tricks have grown stale and repetition has increased the Russian public’s awareness that the government is failing them. Few believe that elections are fair, the economy is tepid at best, and no one believes that there are no Russian soldiers in eastern Ukraine. Putin and Trump have credibility problems because mistrust of them has only grown and for that reason Putin, like Trump, may win elections but lose the broad appeal necessary to rule.

Dirk Mattheisen is a writer/blogger on political economy and independent consultant on institutional governance as well as strengthening the role of civil society in government.  He is a former assistant secretary of the World Bank Group.  Follow him on @DirkMattheisen or dirkmattheisen.blogspot.com