As
Russia approaches its 2018 presidential election, dissent in Russia has taken
an ominous turn. A wide-spread truckers’
strike against road tolls pits the working class against the oligarchs. An unexpectedly large “youth protest” against
corruption in March pits the young against the last post-WWII generation of the
Soviet Union as well as their parents who suffered through the 1991 breakup of
the Soviet Union. And, a housing
protest in Moscow pits ordinary Russians against their local government. What happens to Moscow’s
plans for a smooth election if dissent metastasizes into opposition?
The
threat appears very real because Russia today is threatened by the same
economic stagnation, succession turmoil and external pressures as was the
Soviet Union in 1991. The circumstances
are similar to other pivotal moments, as well, in Russia’s history, such as its
“Time of Troubles” in the late 16th century when economic trouble, a
succession crisis following the death of Ivan the Terrible and conflict with
Poland resulted in years of political turmoil.
The legacy of such moments in Russian history has been dramatic upheaval
and regime change.
Although
Russia appears to be emerging from two years of economic recession, prospects
for economic growth are dim because of under-investment and falling consumption.
Economic wealth is increasingly
concentrated in the hands of the few. Russia
has the most unequal distribution of wealth of any major economy in the world. The wealthiest 10% of the population owns 87%
of Russia's wealth. Moreover, economic activity is increasingly
concentrated in a handful of cities, especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow,
as the Soviet Union’s single industry towns and rural communities die out,
leaving entire regions economically and socially devastated. To balance the Russian budget Putin has
reduced spending on welfare, including pensions, health care and education, and
on government salaries, further immiserating the Russian people. At the same time the Russian government is
increasing Russia’s international reserves rather than using that income to
soften the impact of economic stagnation or to stimulate growth. High international reserves insulate the
Russian financial system from financial crisis, but building those reserves
comes at the expense of the real economy where jobs, production and economic
growth come from.
Meanwhile,
military spending is draining resources from the economy. Russia’s military strength on show in Syria
and in eastern Ukraine does not signify growing power but a hollowing out the
rest of society. In an otherwise fairly
positive assessment of Russia’s military capabilities, the Carnegie Endowment makes the point that,
“Excessive spending on the military may indeed
be unsustainable in the long term.34 After all,
this was a major contributor to state collapse in Russia at least twice during
the twentieth century (in 1991, 1917, and, more debatably, 1905) and routinely
served as the catalyst for major social upheaval in previous centuries.”
Its
military adventures are costly. Russia
has not successfully concluded a single conflict, including Transnistria, South
Ossetia, Abkhazia and eastern Ukraine.
As these frozen or festering conflicts proliferate and perpetuate
themselves, the financial and reputational cost to Russia rises, even while the
welfare of the subject peoples declines dramatically. Russian client states are deep wells of
expense that weaken Russia in Moscow’s misplaced anticipation that nominal
control of slivers of territory will legitimate future claims to historical
areas of political control.
Russia’s
leaders concede that sanctions due to the seizure of Crimea and invasion of
eastern Ukraine are likely to last a long time, hindering economic recovery,
because there is no path that they are prepared to contemplate that would
change the circumstances on the ground. Russia’s
international isolation suggests that Russia may not receive significant support
from outside as it did in 1991 if things go from bad to worse, ensuring an even
steeper descent, even if no world leader wants to contemplate a Russia plunged
into internal chaos. Meanwhile Russia’s
leaders await the miracle of a failure of Western resolve or Western collapse
to alleviate their own suffering.
Domestically,
the firmament of the Russian state is being shaken, not just from popular
protests by truckers and students and apartment dwellers but also from militant
nationalism and elevated levels of societal violence both non-state (mafia) and
state (suppression of civil society that punishes dissent and non-conformism
under the guise of patriotism}. Violent crime is rising in Russia
because of economic hardship but also because of lawlessness in its vassal
territories that is filtering back into Russia.
As one commentator puts it,
“Russian
mercenaries who have fought in the Donbas…have gotten a taste for easy money,
easy blood, and easy opportunities for satisfying themselves,” in short, all
“the criminal joys.” And they don’t forget these when they return home, yet
another way that Putin’s war in Ukraine is harming Russia.”
As
Russia anticipates the election of Putin to a fourth term as president in 2018,
it faces a new time of troubles. The problems
of economic decline, weak political processes, and international tensions are
familiar and the fault lines are increasingly clear. If the collapse of the Soviet Union was
unimaginable in 1991, what of the collapse of the Russian Federation today
without a change in trajectory?
Under
the threat of continued economic decline, social discontent will rise. The truckers’ strike, which began simmering in
2015 when a new road toll was announced, has spread to 80 of 85 Russian regions. The apartment renters’ protest in Moscow
coalesced on May 14 in a protest by an estimated 20,000 participants. Under pressure to preserve its privileges, the
Russian elite will likely divide on the question of who will succeed Putin, just
as it did in 1991. Under economic
pressure, also, central control of the oblasts will become weaker and perhaps fracture,
with Moscow losing political coherence south and east of the Don and Volga
Rivers—the internal steppe borderlands between Slavic and multi-ethnic
groupings in Russia’s empire. The
Caucasus, where Moscow has tenuous control, will fracture, with Chechnya
seeking independence if not its own Muslim zone of dominance, since it has as
much to fear from extremism as does Moscow.
Differences will emerge elsewhere possibly splitting off additional
regions from Moscow’s control, such as in the southwest where Moscow had
difficultly containing the “Cossack” nationalists who swarmed eastern Ukraine
in 2014-15. Crimea, Rostov and Krasnodar
are farther from Moscow than, say, Kyiv, if local economic and social issues overwhelm
centralized control by Moscow as it runs out of money to dampen civil conflict. Even in the north, regions such as Karelia
may drift away from Russia’s orbit and strengthen old relationships with the
Nordic countries. This is what Moscow’s
elite fears.
Rather
than address directly the problems of economic decline, political paralysis and
international isolation, Moscow is promising economic welfare without economic
reform, invoking democratic principles without meaningful political
participation, and battling fascism where none exists. These are driving Russia down the road to
collapse.
Russia’s
turmoil during the time of troubles in the 16th century was followed
by its greatest political and cultural achievements. To replicate that accomplishment today Russia will
have to shed its imperial impulse and complete its transformation begun in 1991
to an open political culture and an engaged civil society in order to emerge as
a viable, modern nation-state. If social
unrest continues to grow, the 2018 presidential election may bring that
question to a head.
