In a nutshell, this is what I am saying in my post, "The Threat of Putin's Mythologized Russian-Ukrainian History".  Putin stands in the way of the future because he cannot let Russia let go of the past.

The Threat of Putin’s Mythologized Russian-Ukrainian History

 

Photo Credit: www.dailystar.co.uk

Putin’s article on Russian-Ukrainian history is written by a man living in a mythologized past of his parents.  What Putin does next will run up against the reality on the ground at the expense of Ukraine, of Russia, and of global stability.

Putin’s recent article on Russian-Ukrainian history raised a storm of comment, not least because in it Putin threatens the existence of Ukraine as a nation based on a mythologized past at odds with the present reality of an increasingly autonomous Ukraine.

At first glance, the article contains nothing new.  Putin has made all the arguments before about a single Slavic people while ignoring Ukraine’s deep eastern European roots and Moscow’s suppression of Ukrainian identity.  He has also used before all the disinformation techniques in the article; a narrowly-focused context that omits critical facts, outright falsehoods, and false inferences, as well as arrogance of power toward a former captive state.  Putin’s rehashing old arguments and false claims highlights his incapacity to look forward while Ukraine increasingly establishes itself as a state independent of Russia.

The article is cause for serious concern though because Putin has often used articles, speeches, and legislation to signal his next move.  Putin likes to set out, from his perspective, incontrovertible facts, or truths, in speeches or articles as a foundation for foreign policy, as he did in his recent article.  He used a speech at the Valdai Club meeting in November 2014, after annexing Crimea, to lash out at the West for destabilizing the international system, a constant theme since then.  And he did it again in April this year when he warned the West about crossing the Kremlin’s red lines.  He wrote in June 2020 in the American publication, The National Interest, an article that was a nostalgic, white-washed tour of the Soviet Union’s role during WWII and made a proposal for a new Allied summit to agree on a new international order and, not incidentally, affirm Russia’s importance to global stability.

Each article or speech has had a purpose that advances Putin’s agenda often at the expense of fact, objective meaning, and common understanding.  So, what purpose does his most recent article serve?

Some commentators suggest the article is a warning to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, who has met with Chancellor Merkel of Germany and will meet with President Biden to strengthen support for Ukraine, including dropping Nordstream2 and advancing membership in the EU and NATO.  In response to Western pressure to reduce corruption, President Zelenskyy has recently acted to curtail Ukraine’s oligarchs, including Viktor Medvedchuk, who is close to Putin and under house arrest in Ukraine for treason.  Clearly, Zelenskyy has wandered a bit too far off the farm for Putin’s comfort.

At the same time, Putin is under pressure at home due to upcoming parliamentary elections at a time when his popularity is declining and his party’s popularity is in the gutter.  Putin is so worried that he has put up his Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and his Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, to lead the United Russia party list of candidates.  Putin’s campaign this spring and summer against independent civil society organizations and media is another sign of nervousness.  By beating the drum of Slavic unity and patriotism, Putin may hope to carry his party over the finish line in September.  Still, the article seems an ineffectual means to boost falling ratings.  And Zelenskyy seems unmoved by Putin’s warning, even trolling Putin with comments about Putin having plenty of time on his hands to write articles.

The article is important though because with it Putin is setting the stage, not for the election, but for what may be necessary should the outcome of the election be at risk--and remember that his purpose is not to win but to give his party overwhelming control of parliament.  In the past, Putin has used foreign adventures to improve his ratings and improve popular support for his party.  If things go badly in the lead-up to the election, the article will serve as a point of reference to anchor whatever action he finds necessary to boost his party’s chances.  He can rally the Russian people around the flag while exclaiming to a shocked Western audience that he gave fair warning, therefore the fault is theirs for failing to respect Russia’s right to protect its interests.  That Russian Defense Minister Shoigu has mandated the article to be read by all military recruits suggests the purpose of the article is to circle the wagons should it be necessary.

At roughly the same time the article came out, there was a surprising leak of Kremlin papers that purportedly exposes Putin’s subversion of the 2016 US election.  The article and the leak are of the same piece.  Given how tight Putin’s inner circle is, the most likely explanation is that the leaker is Putin.  It is characteristic of Putin to believe that he can intimidate by bluster.  Putin’s “red line” speech, his threat to sink British warships in the Black Sea, and his threat to invade Ukraine to protect Russian interests, are bluster to get what he wants without having to do anything. He moves from bluff to action only if he has to.  A leak that attributes to Putin substantial damage to the US domestic political process--especially if his adversary is already predisposed to believe he is capable of such acts--signals that Putin did it once and, if he is pushed, he is capable of doing it again or something equally harmful.  Putin wants the US to believe that going up against him will be very costly to the US. The article tells his audience he has the right and the leak tells his audience he has the power.

However, right now Putin has a problem, but he does not have a solution.  His problem is an election in September and nothing to show the Russian people.  Domestic problems--not least falling welfare and an escalating pandemic--are eroding his popularity and that of his party.  He has no new foreign adventure to offer to rally the people around him, unless one is handed to him or, if all else fails, he can engineer a little incursion into Ukraine of some kind that might just do the trick.  In Putin’s mind, although the Russian people are not in the mood for new adventures, Ukraine is not “really” foreign.  It is too much a part of Russian history.  Polls show that the Russian people are on his side on this one.  In sum, the course of action is not set but, if election prospects fall, the article provides cover if action is needed by setting out a narrative that justifies and excuses that action—such as the brotherhood of the Slavic peoples under Moscow’s domination.

The thing that should worry the Russian people is that early on when Putin had no foreign adventure to offer, he turned on the Russian people, in the 1999 terrorist bombings in which David Satter has shown Putin is implicated or in the war in Chechnya.

In the long run--in this case, the period in which Putin might hope to have uncontested power--Putin by all evidence yearns to right imagined historic wrongs and regain control of Ukraine.  Whether he will go to war to fulfill his dream depends on how desperate he is as his time slips away and his legacy is imperiled.